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Chapter 1
Introduction
Welcome to the Land 
of the Checkpoints
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1.1: Introduction 
 
I’m on a go-along interview with 21-year-old Hajar, a Palestinian with an 
Israeli identity (ID) card. We drive through Beit Sfafa, a Palestinian 
neighbourhood in East Jerusalem. The section of Freeway 60 that is 
located next to Beit Sfafa, the freeway that leads from Beer Sheva to 
Nazareth, has been rebuilt. I heard there is no ramp available for 
Palestinians living in Beit Sfafa to enter the freeway. I ask Hajar about this. 
She assures me that this is not possible. We drive to where this entrance 
should be and are confronted with a big wall. Hajar is shocked. You can see 
the road that used to lead onto the freeway, the markings are still on the 
ground, but this wall blocks it now. So, the Palestinian residents of Beit 
Sfafa are effectively excluded from using the new freeway.  
(fieldnotes, 16 June 2016) 
 
The system [of closure and traffic restrictions] relied upon an extensive 
network of barriers that included permanent and partially manned 
checkpoints, roadblocks, metal gates, earth dykes, trenches, ‘flying’ or 
mobile checkpoints, all of which were operated according to a frequently 
changing assortment of bans and limitations. (…) The various barriers 
splintered the West Bank into a series of approximately 200 separate, 
sealed-off ‘territorial cells’ around Palestinian ‘populations centres’ 
(roughly corresponding to the boundaries of the Oslo era, Areas A and B) 
with traffic in between these cells channelled through military-controlled 
bottlenecks.  
(Eyal Weizman, 2007, p. 146) 
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The Occupied Palestinian Territories have been coined the “land of the 
checkpoints” by Palestinian Israeli Knesset member Azmi Bishara. Bishara described 
Israel as the “state of the checkpoints”, the Israelis as “the owners of the 
checkpoints” and the Palestinians as the “people of the land of the checkpoints” 
(Bishara, 2004, in Braverman, 2011, p. 264). Today there are about 100 Israeli 
checkpoints inside the West Bank and on the ‘border’ with Israel (B’Tselem, 2017a). 
In this thesis, I analyse how three of these checkpoints in the Bethlehem area 
produce, via the interplay between its managers, commuters and material devices, 
specific geographies based on the limitation and control of the movement of 
Palestinians. But, before zooming in on these checkpoints, I will introduce the 
broader context of the ‘land of the checkpoints’ and its architecture of occupation. 
1.2: The architecture of occupation 
1.2.1: ‘A land without a people for a people without a land’ 
Since the end of the 19th century, when large-scale Jewish immigration from 
Europe into Palestine began, there has been a continuous struggle between the 
Jewish and Arab inhabitants of Palestine over the land located between what is 
today Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea. In 1917, 
Jewish people in Palestine represented less than 7 per cent of the total population. 
When the State of Israel was founded 30 years later, this percentage had grown to 
one-third of the population (Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 50). The area, which previously 
had been under Ottoman rule for several centuries, fell under British rule in 1920 
after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the installation of the British ‘Mandate 
for Palestine’ (Sharoni & Abu-Nimer, 2008). Already in 1917, before the British 
Empire had any jurisdiction over the area, the British government had signed the 
Balfour Declaration – in which Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour promised 
Lord Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, to support the 
establishment of a ‘Jewish homeland’ in Palestine (Pappé, 2004).  
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In this same period, the influx of Jewish immigration into Palestine soared as a 
result of the rise of antisemitism in Europe. However, as explained by Simona 
Sharoni and Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2008), the famous Zionist slogan – ‘A land 
without a people for a people without a land’ – did not take into account that there 
was a Palestinian population that already had been fighting for independence for 
many years, first from the Ottoman rulers and later from the British. Bursts of 
violence between Palestinian, Jewish and British forces ensued, as well as large 
strikes by Palestinian labourers. As a response to the unrest, in 1936 the Peel 
Commission – officially titled the Palestinian Royal Commission – was formed to 
investigate the situation. This Commission recommended the partition of Palestine 
into two states, which led to the 1936-39 Arab Revolt and further unrest and 
violence (Qumsiyeh, 2011). In the aftermath of the Holocaust and the resistance by 
European countries and the US to take in large numbers of Jewish refugees, 
another surge of Jewish immigration to Palestine took place. In 1947, the United 
Nations (UN) proposed a new partition plan. This plan would grant the proposed 
Jewish state 57 per cent of the Palestinian territory, although the Jewish 
inhabitants of Palestine only made up 33 per cent of the population at the time and 
owned 6 per cent of the land. The partition was rejected by Palestinian leadership, 
but the UN General Assembly voted in favour of the plan on 29 November 1947 
(Pappé, 2006). This sparked an unprecedented wave of violence, which escalated 
into the Arab-Israeli War following the withdrawal of British troops and the 
establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948. During this war – which is 
commemorated on 15 May in Palestine as the Nakba, the Catastrophe – 750,000 
Palestinians were expelled from their homes and 600 Palestinian villages 
destroyed. After this, 77 per cent of the area formerly recognised by the UN as 
Palestine fell under Israeli rule. The remaining areas – later known as the 
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Palestinian Territories – fell either under Egyptian rule (the Gaza Strip) or were 
annexed by Jordan (the West Bank) (Sharoni & Abu-Nimer, 2008).1 
During the Six-Day War in 1967 between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan, Israel 
occupied the Palestinian Territories - the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.2 Since 
then, an intricate ‘architecture of occupation’ has been developing in which 
Palestinians living in the Palestinian territories have seen the area they identified as 
‘Palestine’ or ‘Palestinian’ shrink continuously, and with it, their freedom of 
movement (Handel, 2009).3 The two opening quotes illustrate some of 
contemporary materialisation and effects of this. This architecture of occupation, a 
term famously coined by Israeli architect Eyal Weizman (2007), has splintered the 
‘border’ between Israel and the Palestinian territories into a multitude of ever-
changing borders – both with regard to their location and their degree of porosity. 
The term ‘border’ should not be interpreted here as a separation between two 
sovereign states. In this thesis, I use the term ‘border’ to refer to the Green Line, or 
the 1949 Armistice border: the border recommended by the UN in 1947 between 
Israel and Palestine. This Line is often referred to as the ‘Pre-‘67 border’ between 
Israel and the West Bank and still seen by many international bodies such as the 
UN, but also by heads of state such as former US president Barack Obama and 
                                                 
1 For insightful in-depth analyses of the history of Israel/Palestine, see, amongst others, 
Edward Said (1979), Ilan Pappé (1999, 2004, 2006), Neve Gordon (2008), Adi Ophir, Michal 
Givoni, and Sari Hanafi (2009), and Mazin Qumsiyeh (2011). 
2 When Israel occupied the Palestinian Territories in 1967, it annexed East Jerusalem - even 
though it has been claimed by the Palestinian Authority as the capital city of a future 
Palestinian state. Due to its status as a municipality of Israel, East Jerusalem and its residents 
are facing a particular set of problems that are different from the rest of the West Bank. 
These include a lack of investment in public services by the Israeli state, an almost complete 
absence of building permits for Palestinian homes or areas designated for the development 
of Palestinian neighbourhoods, home demolitions, the specifically precarious status of its 
residents – who are not citizens of the state of Israel, but were given temporary residency – 
and the presence of large settlement blocs that are actively supported by the Israeli state in 
their development (see, amongst others, Baumann, 2016; Braverman, 2007; Yiftachel, 2016). 
3 In this thesis I focus on the West Bank, not on the Gaza Strip. Due to the differences in 
strategies employed by Israel in the Gaza Strip, the context for Palestinians living there is not 
comparable to the context of the Palestinians living in the West Bank. Hence, unless clearly 
signposted, the thesis only discusses the West Bank.  
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Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, as the most viable border when discussing 
a future Palestinian state next to Israel.4 However, this line has not been accepted 
by the Israeli state as a definite border (Bier, 2017). Furthermore, as will become 
clear throughout this thesis, the Israeli architecture of occupation, as well as many 
of the practices of the Israeli army and Jewish settlers, make it increasingly difficult 
to identify the Green Line or any other ‘border’ between Israel and the West Bank 
(B’Tselem, 2017b). 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 (below) illustrate the complex spatial division of the West Bank. 
Figure 1.1 offers a map of the West Bank and Figure 1.2 zooms in on the Bethlehem 
area, the area in which the checkpoints that are the focus of this study are located. 
These maps have been produced by the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OCHA OPT).5 The 
Green Line is depicted in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 with the use of a green dotted line. I 
will refer more often to these maps in the upcoming pages, as they help to visualise 
the architecture of occupation discussed here.  
 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, the report on the visit of the Delegation of the Committee on the Exercise 
of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to Brussels in March 2019, in which the 
delegation called for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 
borders (United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, 2019), or (now 
former) US President Barack Obama’s call in May 2011 for Israel to return to the pre-1967 
borders (Cohen, 2011), and Palestinian President Abbas’ expressed wish for a Palestinian 
state to be established within the pre-1967 borders on Israeli television in November 2012 
(BBC News, 2012).  
5 Maps should never be seen as a neutral representation of ‘facts on the ground’ (Crampton, 
2010). As such, the use of a map produced by UN OCHA OPT and not, for instance, one 
produced by the Israeli state, should be seen in line with the critical position that I take 
throughout this thesis towards the occupation. For a detailed discussion of the politics of 
maps in Israel/Palestine, see Jess Bier (2017). 
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Figure 1.1: A map of the West Bank  
(source: OCHA Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2019a). 
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Figure 1.2: A map of the Bethlehem area  
(source: OCHA Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2019b). 
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1.2.2: Areas A, B and C 
The first reason it has become difficult to identify a clear border between Israel and 
the West Bank, or one continuous territory that can be called ‘Palestine’ inside the 
West Bank, is the separation of the West Bank into three administrative areas 
following the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo 
II): Area A, Area B and Area C.6 In Area A, corresponding to 18 per cent of the West 
Bank, the Palestinian Authority has full control over civil affairs and the 
responsibility for maintaining law and order (Gordon, 2009). In Area B, 22 per cent 
of the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority has control over civil affairs – such as 
planning and construction – while Israel has the responsibility for police 
enforcement. This means that Palestinians living in these areas fall under Israeli law 
enforcement. In Area C, 60 per cent of the West Bank, Israel has full control over 
police enforcement and public order, as well as civil issues related to planning and 
construction legislation (B’tselem, 2017b). As such, 82 per cent of the West Bank is 
under partial or full Israeli control. Areas A, B and C can be seen in Figures 1.1 and 
1.2. The light-brown areas on the maps have been designated as Area A, the 
darker-brown areas as Area B and the rest of the West Bank is Area C. As can be 
seen on the maps, all light- and darker-brown areas are surrounded by Area C. As 
such, it has become impossible to travel from the north of the West Bank to the 
south without exiting Area A and entering Area C several times.  
1.2.3: Jewish settlements and their bypass roads 
One of the most explicit impacts of the full Israeli control over Area C is the 
presence of the approximately 600,000 Jewish settlers living in these areas (Allegra, 
Handel, & Maggor, 2017).7 As Marco Allegra, Ariel Handel and Erez Maggor 
explained (2017), the 200 Israeli settlements in the West Bank are the most 
significant ‘fact on the ground’ established by the Israeli state in the Palestinian 
                                                 
6 The Gaza Strip was not divided into separate administrative zones. 
7 Whose presence inside the West Bank is considered illegal according to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (refworld.org) 
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Territories (p. 2). B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories, states: 
The settlements are the single most important factor shaping life in the 
West Bank. Their destructive impact on the human rights of Palestinians 
extends far beyond the hundreds of thousands of dunams [1 dunam = 
1,000 sq. meters], including farm land and grazing areas, that Israel 
appropriated from Palestinians in order to build them. 
(B’Tselem, 2017c) 
The built-up areas of the settlements cover almost 10 per cent of the West Bank. 
The regional councils of the settlements – the local Israeli administrative entities – 
have control over another 30 per cent of largely unused land that surrounds these 
built-up areas. This means that 40 per cent of the West Bank is under the control of 
the regional Israeli councils (B’Tselem, 2017c). The locations of these settlements 
can be seen in Figure 1.1 and, for a more detailed view of the Bethlehem area, in 
Figure 1.2. Most of the settlements are relatively small: almost 50 per cent is 
inhabited by less than 500 people, almost 40 per cent has 500 to 5000 inhabitants, 
and only 12 per cent has more than 5000 inhabitants (PeaceNow, 2019). The large 
majority of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank is surrounded by barriers, such 
as smaller walls, fences or dirt mounds. Similar barriers are regularly erected by the 
Israeli military around the Palestinian towns close to the settlements. The 
settlements often have an armed guard controlling the entrance. Palestinians living 
in the West Bank are not allowed to enter settlements without explicit permission 
from the Israeli state. 
Due to the small size of the settlements, most of the inhabitants have to leave their 
settlement to go to work or school, do their shopping, and visit their families and 
friends in Israel or in other settlements. Hence, besides the barriers surrounding 
the settlements and neighbouring Palestinian towns, hundreds of kilometres of 
‘bypass roads’ between the settlements and to Israel have been established over 
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the years to allow passage for the Jewish settlers. These bypass roads have been 
constructed specifically to be used by Jewish settlers and their construction has 
established a single and continuous – separate – Israeli space8. Although 
Palestinians are only explicitly excluded from using a few of these roads, the way in 
which they are constructed and securitised often makes it particularly difficult for 
Palestinians to use them. The new section of Freeway 60 discussed in the fieldnotes 
excerpt opening this chapter illustrates this. As such, a parallel road system has 
been created.  
Achille Mbembe (2003) identified this creation of a parallel infrastructure as one of 
the most important strategies in the Israeli colonial occupation of the Palestinian 
territories, which is characterised by “a network of fast bypass roads, bridges, and 
tunnels that weave over and under one another (…)” (p. 28). Roads are seemingly 
benign structures, ‘natural’ connections between one place and another. However, 
as Omar Jabary Salamanca (2015) explained, this infrastructure is only meant to be 
convenient for one part of the population, namely the Jewish settlers. For the 
Palestinian population of the West Bank, this parallel infrastructure brings about 
destruction of their routes, where “state-led infrastructure destruction is an 
attempt at forced de-modernization of the Palestinian society” (Salamanca, 2015, 
p. 118).  
1.2.4: The Wall, dirt mounds, fences and road blocks 
Besides the settlements and their barriers, numerous other material barriers have 
been built by the Israeli government in the West Bank. Perhaps the most infamous 
of these is the Wall, the (planned to be 750km long) separation barrier the Israeli 
government started to build in the West Bank in 2002. When the Wall is finished it 
is expected that 85 per cent will be built on the Palestinian side of the Green Line. 
As stated by Reece Jones, Christine Leuenberger and Emily Wills (2016), more than 
                                                 
8 While a single and continuous Palestinian space inside the West Bank does not exist 
(Handel, 2014).  
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ten years after the start of the construction of the Wall, there is little consent 
“between Israelis, Palestinians, and international observers about the Wall’s basic 
justifications, functions, and permanence” (p. 3). Already its name is contested: “is 
it an apartheid wall, an anti-terror fence, a security barrier, or something else 
entirely?” (Jones, Leuenberger, & Wills, 2016, p. 3). But, as Jones, Leuenberger and 
Wills (2016) continue, “the Wall’s existence and route has become another ‘fact on 
the ground’ that reshapes Palestinian experience of occupation, their limited 
national sovereignty, their political struggles over Jewish settlements, and their 
position in peace negotiations with Israel” (p. 3). Large sections of the Wall do not 
consist of a concrete wall but, rather, of a 4.5 metre high electric fence with a 
security zone. The sections of the Wall that are actual concrete wall are 8-9 metres 
high, as is the case in Bethlehem (OCHA Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2011). In 
this thesis, I follow authors such as Jones, Leuenberger and Wills (2016) and 
Weizman (2007), in using the term ‘Wall’, with a capitalised ‘w’, as this term clearly 
represents the distinct spatial and political nature of this barrier.  
Israel has built numerous other barriers in the West Bank, such as dirt mounds, 
fences, no-go military zones and road blocks. A 2016 report published by the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs showed that besides the Wall, 
settlements and their by-pass roads, there was an average of 543 temporary 
physical obstructions in the West Bank in 2015 alone. This situation has remained 
relatively stable since (OCHA Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2017). These barriers – 
together with Areas A, B and C; the Wall; and the settlements and their bypass 
roads – have parcelled out sub-cells inside the West Bank, separating Palestinian 
from Israeli spaces, but also Palestinian spaces from each other. As argued by Ariel 
Handel (2014), this has turned the West Bank into a continuous Israeli space with 
isolated Palestinian islands (p. 505). In this context, Jewish settlers can move 
around smoothly and quickly in one uninterrupted space while Palestinians are 
slowed down, marginalised to slow back roads and forced to avoid numerous 
material barriers. Or put differently, it has brought the privileged points in space, 
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the Israeli points, closer together, while making the numerous Palestinian islands 
less and less accessible for its Palestinian inhabitants (Handel, 2014).  
The route of the Wall, as well as the locations of the other material barriers, can be 
seen in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. As can be seen from these maps, the Wall does not 
follow the Green Line but snakes into the West Bank to include large settlements to 
the ‘Israeli side’ of the Wall. This is especially the case east of Jerusalem and west 
of Nablus (see Figure 1.1). Furthermore, the Wall is not finished. Large sections of 
the ‘border’ between Israel and the West Bank are still ‘unwalled’, specifically in 
the south of the West Bank and east of Bethlehem. Besides the Wall, settlements, 
dirt mounds, fences and road blocks, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 also show the locations of 
another important technology that helps to create ‘Israeli-only’ spaces and control 
the mobility of Palestinians: the checkpoints, which are the focus of this thesis 
project.  
 
1.3: Checkpoints as unpredictable openings 
When Israel occupied the Palestinian Territories in 1967, all Palestinians living in 
the Territories were granted a general permit to enter Israel and Jerusalem by the 
Israeli state (Keshet, 2006). People who were convicted of a crime or considered a 
security threat were not granted this permit. This permit could be revoked at any 
time, but due to the lack of a comprehensive system of material barriers and 
checkpoints from 1967 until the 1990s, the mobility of Palestinians was still 
relatively unaffected. This situation changed at the end of the First Intifada (1987-
93) when the first permanent checkpoints were built and individual permits were 
required for Palestinians to enter Israel and Jerusalem (Keshet, 2006, p. 13). Since 
the beginning of the Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada in 2000, the number and the 
locations of checkpoints has continuously grown. Anyone – foreigner, Israeli or 
Palestinian – travelling within the West Bank or to Jerusalem and Israel usually has 
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to pass through at least one checkpoint (although, as will also become clear in this 
study, these groups do not experience their checkpoint passages in a similar way).  
Nowadays, checkpoints play a particularly important role in the architecture of 
occupation in the West Bank (Hammami, 2015). They represent key technologies 
that are used to monitor, discipline and/or selectively limit the mobility of 
Palestinians. Checkpoints can take on many different forms, ranging from 24-hour 
manned airport-like constructions called ‘terminal checkpoints’, to car checkpoints 
resembling tollbooths, to sheds between two fences (B’Tselem, 2018a). Of the 100 
checkpoints located inside the West Bank and on its ‘border’ with Israel, 61 have 
been categorised as ‘internal checkpoints’ by the Israeli army and they are located 
deep within the West Bank (see Figure 1.1). The other 40 checkpoints have been 
named ‘border checkpoints’ (B’Tselem, 2018a). These checkpoints are located close 
to the Green Line, although the large majority of these are not on the Green Line 
but inside the West Bank (Weizman, 2007). Internal and border checkpoints work 
differently.  
Internal checkpoints are often ‘not activated’ and can be passed through by 
anyone, either on foot or inside a vehicle. If these checkpoints are not active, there 
are usually no Israeli soldiers present. Hence, passing through them does not entail 
any interaction with Israeli forces: one can just continue driving (see, for example, 
photo dossier on page 141). This type of checkpoint can be ‘activated’ for specific 
reasons, such as orders of the Israeli army to slow down Palestinian movement 
towards a specific area to enforce a closure – which entails a specific area in the 
West Bank or town is on complete lockdown – or a search by the Israeli army for a 
specific person or illegal goods such as weapons (B’Tselem, 2017a).  
The 40 border checkpoints are securitised by the Israeli army as ‘entry points into 
Israel’, although, as noted above, the large majority of these checkpoints is not 
actually located on the Green Line but inside the West Bank. Border checkpoints 
are always ‘active’ and permanently staffed by Israeli soldiers. These checkpoints 
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can be passed through freely by people with an Israeli ID card, Jerusalem ID card or 
a foreign passport. Palestinians with a West Bank ID card need special permission 
of the Israeli state to pass through these checkpoints (these ID cards and the 
permit system are explained in Section 1.2.2 below). Passing through these 
checkpoints usually entails engaging with Israeli soldiers and several machines. 
Internal checkpoints that lead into an ‘Israeli space’, such as a settlement, work in a 
similar fashion. 
In this thesis I analyse two types of border checkpoints in the Bethlehem area: one 
terminal checkpoint, (Checkpoint 300) and two car checkpoints (The Tunnels and Al 
Walaja).  
1.3.1: Terminal checkpoints: Checkpoint 300 
Terminal checkpoints are a type of checkpoint first introduced in 2005. These 
checkpoints are described by the Israeli army as ‘international border crossings’. 
They are all located close to the Green Line, although the majority is not positioned 
on this ‘border’ but, rather, on the Palestinian side of it (Weizman, 2007). All 
terminal checkpoints have been categorised as ‘border checkpoints’. These 
checkpoints have been designed in a very specific way to resemble ‘neutral airport 
terminals’ and ostensibly ‘address certain humanitarian concerns’, such as long 
waiting times under the burning sun or in the freezing cold, a lack of toilets and 
water, and violent interactions between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers 
(Braverman, 2011; Weizman, 2007). The deployment of numerous machines, such 
as turnstiles, metal detectors, x-ray machines and fingerprint- and iris-scanning 
devices, was presented by the Israeli army as reducing contact between 
Palestinians and Israeli soldiers, and therefore decreasing the possibility of tension 
between them (Braverman, 2011). The majority of checkpoints is managed only by 
Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) soldiers, but terminal checkpoints are also managed by 
private security guards. These private security guards were placed in terminal 
checkpoints to ‘take the army out of the checkpoints’ – although IDF soldiers are 
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still present in terminal checkpoints. By taking the ‘army out of the checkpoints’ 
and designing these checkpoints in such a way that they ostensibly resemble 
‘neutral airport terminals’, the IDF wanted to disconnect these checkpoints from 
the occupation and further legitimise their status as ‘neutral border crossings’ 
(Braverman, 2011; Who Profits Research Centre, 2011). While these private 
security guards have a different legal and hierarchical status, in this thesis I often 
conflate IDF soldiers and private security guards into one term: ‘checkpoint 
managers’ or ‘soldier/private security guard’. This is due to the fact that they 
normally hold the same roles and functions in managing the checkpoints.  
Checkpoint 300 is located north of Bethlehem on the road that historically led from 
Hebron to Jerusalem but that, nowadays, is interrupted by the Wall. In Figure 1.2 
on page 9 it is marked by a red dot and white cross, which indicates that it is a 
checkpoint, and it is named Gilo.9 Although the checkpoint is a ‘border checkpoint’, 
it is not located on the ‘border’ between Israel and the West Bank but, rather, 
inside the West Bank. The checkpoint is one of the largest and most often crossed 
Israeli checkpoints inside the West Bank. According to ActiveStills, an NGO 
involving Palestinian, Israeli and international reporters, as many as 15,000 
Palestinians pass through Checkpoint 300 on busy mornings (ActiveStills, 2018). 
Checkpoint 300 was first established in the 1990s as a combination of cement 
blocks, sand bags and Israeli soldiers, with the aim of checking the documents of 
Palestinians travelling to Jerusalem and further on. It was relaunched as a ‘terminal 
checkpoint’ in 2005. As can be seen in Figure 1.3, nowadays, Checkpoint 300 
consists of a main building and an entrance for commuters passing through the 
checkpoint from the Bethlehem side.  
 
                                                 
9 Checkpoint 300 is sometimes called Gilo checkpoint, as is the case in Figure 1.2. However, 
as my interviewees referred to it as ‘Checkpoint 300’, I will also refer to the checkpoint here 
with that name. 
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Figure 1.3: A map of Checkpoint 300 based on the author’s fieldnotes and drawings 
during her multiple passages through the checkpoint (source: Iulian Barba Lata).10 
                                                 
10 This map is also used in Chapter 4 of this thesis. I decided to also add it to this chapter 
because I believe it may help the reader to visualise Checkpoint 300. In Chapter 5 of this 
thesis, a similar, but slightly modified map of Checkpoint 300 is included, which depicts more 
accurately the processes discussed in that chapter.  
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Figure 1.4: The entrance of Checkpoint 300 on the Bethlehem side  
(source: Rijke, May 2017). 
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The main building and the entrance are separated from each other by an empty 
parking lot. The entrance is made up of three tunnels (Figure 1.4) and it has a 
‘humanitarian gate’ (Figure 1.5), an entrance that can be used by specific 
‘privileged’ groups – such as women and elderly – to avoid the pressure of large 
crowds. The checkpoint has been built on the route of the Wall and, to enter or exit 
the checkpoint on the Bethlehem side, one has to walk through a gate in the Wall 
(see Figure 1.3). There are numerous machines at the checkpoint: turnstiles (Figure 
1.5), metal detectors, x-ray machines (Figure 1.6) and fingerprint- and iris-scanning 
devices. Furthermore, the checkpoint has several ‘welcome signs’ (Figure 1.7).  
 
 
Figure 1.5: The exit/humanitarian lane (source: Rijke, May 2017). 
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The checkpoint also has a car lane. This car lane can only be passed through by 
commuters with a foreign passport, Israeli or Jerusalem ID card while inside a 
vehicle with an Israeli – yellow – number plate. Palestinians with a West Bank ID 
card have to pass the checkpoint on foot. Checkpoint 300 is a checkpoint 
predominately used by Palestinians commuting between the south of the West 
Bank and Jerusalem and Israel. The large majority of the commuters using the 
checkpoint comprises Palestinians with a West Bank ID who can only pass through 
checkpoints as pedestrians. Checkpoint 300 is located in Area C. It leads to 
Bethlehem, which is located in Area A, the 18 per cent of the West Bank that is 
under full Palestinian control (see Figure 1.2). This means that Jewish Israeli citizens 
do not use this checkpoint. The design and workings of this checkpoint is analysed 
in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
Figure 1.6: A queue in front of the turnstile that leads to the metal detectors inside 
the main building (source: Rijke, June 2017). 
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Figure 1.7: The sign at the entrance of Checkpoint 300 on the Jerusalem side  
(source: Rijke, July 2016). 
 
1.3.2: Car checkpoints: The Tunnels and Al Walaja 
Car checkpoints are checkpoints that can only be passed through with a vehicle. 
They have been in place since the first checkpoints were introduced in the West 
Bank in the 1990s. Their design usually resembles tollbooths and they are managed 
by IDF soldiers. Internal car checkpoints (except the ones positioned on roads 
leading towards settlements) can be passed in a vehicle with a Palestinian – green-
white – or Israeli – yellow – number plate. Border car checkpoints can only be 
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passed inside a vehicle with an Israeli – yellow – number plate. The large majority 
of these border car checkpoints can only be passed by people with foreign 
passports, Israeli ID cards or Jerusalem ID cards. A very small number of permits 
allow Palestinians with a West Bank ID to pass through certain border car 
checkpoints. Passing through a border car checkpoint entails one has to be given 
permission by the IDF soldier managing the checkpoint to pass. 
Al Walaja and The Tunnels checkpoints are both located west of Bethlehem and are 
considered ‘border checkpoints’. Al Walaja checkpoint11 is indeed on the Green 
Line and positioned next to the Palestinian town after which it was named, Al 
Walaja. It is marked by a green dot and a white cross in Figure 1.2, which indicates 
that it is a checkpoint located on the Green Line. The Tunnels checkpoint, however, 
is located several kilometres east of the Green Line and, hence, inside the West 
Bank. It is marked by a red dot and white cross in Figure 1.2. It is located on the 
road that is also called The Tunnels and that is partly made up of tunnels that pass 
underneath the Palestinian town Beit Jala. Both checkpoints are located in Area C, 
the 60 per cent of the West Bank that is under full Israeli control. The Tunnels 
checkpoint has four lanes with four soldier booths leading in the direction of 
Jerusalem and two lanes leading in the direction of Bethlehem/Hebron. It has 
watchtowers and a separate area to which cars can be directed for further 
inspection (see Figures 1.8 and 1.9). Al Walaja checkpoint is considerably smaller; it 
has one lane in either direction and a small area on the side for further inspection 
of cars (see Figure 1.10). Both checkpoints are characterised by an absence of 
machines: besides cameras there are no visible machines present at the 
checkpoints.  
 
                                                 
11 Al Walaja checkpoint is sometimes called Malha checkpoint (B’tselem, 2018a). However, 
as my interviewees referred to it as ‘Al Walaja checkpoint’, I will also refer to the checkpoint 
here with that name.  
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Figure 1.8: A map of The Tunnels checkpoint based on the author’s fieldnotes and 
drawings during her multiple passages of the checkpoint (source: Iulian Barba Lata). 
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Figure 1.9: The Tunnels Checkpoint (source: Rijke, May 2017). 
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Figure 1.10: A map of Al Walaja checkpoint based on the author’s fieldnotes and 
drawings during her multiple passages of the checkpoint (source: Iulian Barba Lata). 
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Only commuters with foreign passports, Israeli ID cards or Jerusalem ID cards can 
use these two checkpoints.12 The large majority of commuters uses private cars to 
cross through these checkpoints. Because both checkpoints are border car 
checkpoints, the cars need to have a yellow – Israeli – number plate. The Tunnels 
checkpoint can also be passed inside a public Palestinian bus, which drives from 
Bethlehem to Jerusalem and back again. Only Palestinians who have the necessary 
paperwork to pass this checkpoint can use this bus. The paperwork of the 
commuters using the bus is checked at the checkpoint by Israeli soldiers. There is 
no data available regarding the number of people passing through these 
checkpoints. However, The Tunnels checkpoint is a very busy checkpoint, often 
characterised by long queues of cars and resulting traffic jams during rush hour 
periods. Jewish settlers living in the ‘Guts Etzion’ settlements and in Hebron, 
located south of Bethlehem, make up a large proportion of the people crossing 
these checkpoints. The design and workings of these checkpoints are analysed in 
Chapter 6.  
1.3.2: ID cards  
The functioning of checkpoints is made possible because of the thorough and 
detailed system of ID cards that the Israeli state uses to categorise its residents, 
including the occupied population. As analysed by Palestinian-American media 
scholar Helga Tawil-Souri (2011a), the ID card regime is an important part of Israel’s 
approach to its control of Palestinian territory. There are three different ID cards: 
Israeli ID cards, Jerusalem ID cards (only held by Palestinians living in East 
Jerusalem) and Palestinian Authority (PA) ID cards (which I also call ‘West Bank ID 
cards’ in this thesis). All these documents, including the PA ID cards, are issued by 
the State of Israel. While all ID cards state the expected information – name, date 
                                                 
12 There are some exceptions. Palestinians with a West Bank ID card can use The Tunnels 
checkpoint with special permits, such as permits provided through their employment at 
international NGOs and certain hospital permits. However, as this regards a very small 
group, and none of my interviewees were eligible for this, I will not include this group in my 
analysis.  
28 
 
of birth, place of residence, religion and marital status – there are some important 
differences. The Israeli ID cards and Jerusalem ID cards are imprinted with the seal 
of the state of Israel and placed in a blue cover (‘blue cards’), while the Palestinian 
IDs have a Palestinian Authority (PA) emblem and are placed in a green cover 
(‘green cards’). The blue cards are further distinguished; under ‘nationality’, it is 
stated whether someone is Jewish, Arab, Druze or Bedouin (Tawil-Souri, 2011a).  
The condition of the Palestinians with a Jerusalem ID card is especially precarious 
(Tawil-Souri, 2011a). When Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 the Palestinians 
living there did not become citizens of the Israeli state. Instead, they were given 
temporary residency cards. These cards are called Jerusalem ID cards and their 
owners are excluded from voting and traveling abroad with the use of these ID 
cards. East Jerusalemites can only travel abroad with either Israeli-issued travel 
permits or with temporary Jordanian passports. Jerusalem ID cards can be revoked 
at any time – a punitive measure regularly used by the Israeli state (Community 
Action Centre, 2016). East Jerusalemites are distinguished from Palestinians who 
are Israeli citizens in their ID cards as the nationality in Jerusalem ID cards does not 
say ‘Arab’ but, rather, is left blank. Hence, a hierarchy is created of “true-blue for 
Jewish-Israelis, Arab-blue for Palestinian citizens of Israel, others-blue for Israeli 
citizens who are neither Arab nor Jewish, and blue-green for Palestinian 
Jerusalemites” (Tawil-Souri, 2011a, p. 159). As Tawil-Souri (2011a) notes, “if it’s 
sounding confusing, it’s supposed to be” (p. 159).  
These ID cards are connected to different levels of freedom of movement (see 
Table 1.1 below). This is most explicitly represented by whether or not the holder 
of the ID card needs a permit to enter Jerusalem and Israel. Firstly, the most mobile 
group are the Jewish Israelis who hold ‘true-blue’ Israeli ID cards. The Jewish 
settlers belong to this group. They can travel through border checkpoints13 without 
                                                 
13 Again, one needs to keep in mind that the large majority of these ‘border checkpoints’ are 
not actually located on the Green Line but inside the West Bank. 
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a permit and are free to enter settlements. Officially, they are not allowed to enter 
Area A, the 18 per cent of the West Bank that is under full PA control. This rule is 
regularly broken, especially by Israeli forces such as soldiers, intelligence operatives 
and border police. Secondly, the Palestinian Israelis, who hold an ‘Arab-blue’ Israeli 
ID card, also do not need a permit to travel through border checkpoints and are 
allowed to enter settlements, although their entry may be challenged by the 
security forces guarding the settlement. Technically, this group is not allowed to 
enter Area A, but this rule is normally not enforced. As Salah14, a 47-year-old 
Palestinian man with an Israeli ID card, explained: “Of course I enter Area A. These 
signs [that state it is illegal for Israeli citizens to enter Area A] are only for Jewish 
people. Not for Arabs. I am still a Palestinian. Even if I am carrying the Israeli ID, I 
am a Palestinian” (interview, 12 May 2017). Thirdly, Palestinians with a Jerusalem 
ID card, the ‘blue-green’ ID card, also do not need a permit to travel through 
border checkpoints and they are allowed to enter settlements, again, while running 
the risk of being scrutinised by security guards. This group is also allowed to enter 
Area A. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, the checkpoint passages of 
Palestinians holding Israeli and Jerusalem ID cards are often associated with tense 
and humiliating contact with Israeli forces. All people holding an Israeli ID card 
(‘true-blue’ to ‘blue-green’) are permitted to own a car with an Israeli number plate 
and, hence, can pass border car checkpoints. Fourthly, the least mobile group in 
the West Bank are the Palestinians with a Palestinian ID.15 This group is not allowed 
to own a car with an Israeli number plate and, hence, has to pass border 
checkpoints on foot. To pass border checkpoints and to enter settlements, this 
group needs a permit and a special (biometric) magnetic card, both provided by the 
Israeli military authorities.  
                                                 
14 Since all interviewees asked to remain anonymous, fictitious names will be used in this 
thesis.  
15 Because I focus on the experiences of Palestinians in the West Bank I have not included 
Palestinians with a Gazan ID card, a group even more immobilised than Palestinians with a 
West Bank ID card.  
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 Foreign 
passport 
Jewish 
Israeli 
‘True 
Blue’ 
Palestinian 
Israeli 
‘Arab Blue’ 
 
East 
Jerusalemites 
‘Blue Green 
West 
Bank 
‘Green’ 
Does the ID 
holder need 
a permit to 
pass a 
border 
checkpoint? 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No, but 
s/he may 
be 
questioned 
 
No, but s/he 
may be 
questioned 
 
Yes 
Is the ID 
holder 
allowed free 
entry into a 
Jewish 
Israeli 
settlement? 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes, but 
s/he may 
be 
questioned 
 
Yes, but s/he 
may be 
questioned 
 
No 
Table 1.1: ID cards and the associated levels of freedom of movement  
(source: the content of the table is based on Tawil-Souri, 2011a). 
 
1.3.3: Permit regime  
There are numerous types of permits for which a Palestinians with a Palestinian ID 
has to apply when wanting to pass through a border checkpoint or to enter a 
Jewish settlement. Examples are work permits, student permits, hospital permits, 
permits for prayer, permits for farmers travelling to their land and separate permits 
for these same farmers allowing them to carry farming materials with them (Alqasis 
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& al-Azza, 2015). Applying for a permit is often a difficult, costly16 and long process 
(Berda, 2018; Keshet, 2006). The permit system has not been the subject of many 
academic studies. As argued by Cédric Parizot (2018), most studies focused on the 
permit system have been executed by researchers and NGOs involved in the 
juridical support of Palestinians who apply for a permit (see Berda, 2018; Bocco, 
2015; Etkes, 2011; Gisha, 2011; Kadman, 2012; Piterman, 2007). He explains this as 
an effect of “the absence of written rules and the opacity of the system” (Parizot, 
2018, p. 22). These studies of the system indicate that the diverse ways in which, as 
put by Yael Berda (2018), “the permit regime in the West Bank is an extreme case 
of a sophisticated apparatus to manage population movement” (p. 9). It is 
embedded in a “bureaucratic labyrinth” (Berda, 2018, p. 11), based on the 
“massive classification of the Palestinian population” (Berda, 2018, p. 31). 
Furthermore, as Berda (2018) continues, “the bureaucracy is characterized by (…) 
‘effective inefficiency’, which is a product of the ambiguity of a system that is both 
civil and military with a severe shortage of personnel” (p. 35). Whether or not a 
permit will actually be awarded and for how long is never predictable. A permit for 
a hospital visit in Jerusalem can, for instance, provide someone permission to be in 
Jerusalem for a day or only for several hours. A common reason for denial is that 
the applicant has been blacklisted. As Berda (2018) explains, 200,000 West Bank 
Palestinians have been blacklisted since the instalment of the permit system. This 
                                                 
16 While certain permits may be received free of costs, such as a permit to pray in Jerusalem 
during Ramadan or Christmas time, work permits have to be applied, and paid for, by the 
Israeli employer who wants to hire a Palestinian labourer (Al-Qadi, 2018). The costs for work 
permits differ pending on the period the permit is valid for. As explained by Cédric Parizot 
(2018), an employer paid around 1200 NIS, 240 dollars, per Palestinian employee a month in 
2010. These costs are usually paid for by the Palestinian employee and can amount to nearly 
half of their income (Winer, 2018). Due to the high level of unemployment in the West Bank 
(17.6 per cent in 2018 (Gisha, 2019)), for many Palestinians working in Israel is the only 
opportunity to earn a living, even though they have to pay the high permit costs. For an in-
depth analysis of this permit system see Nasser Al-Qadi (2018a), Yael Berda (2018) and 
Cédric Parizot (2018). 
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may occur for numerous reasons and is usually only discovered when someone 
applies for a permit or tries to pass through a checkpoint (Piterman, 2007).  
For these 200,000 Palestinians, it is not possible to pass through a border 
checkpoint and legally enter Israel or Jerusalem. If they still want to travel to Israel 
or Jerusalem, they have to bypass these checkpoints. As stated earlier in this 
chapter, there are still several areas in which the ‘border’ between Israel and the 
West Bank is not walled. This is especially the case in the south of the West Bank 
and in the Bethlehem area (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). These gaps in the Wall are 
used by Palestinians with West Bank ID cards to enter Israel without the necessary 
paperwork (Berda, 2018). The largest group doing this are the men who work in the 
building sector in Israel. How many Palestinians use these gaps to enter Israel is 
unclear, although it has been stated by IDF officials that as many as 50,000 
Palestinians entered Israel illegally every day in 2016 (Pileggi, 2016). Entering Israel 
illegally can be very dangerous, since one can be beaten, fined, imprisoned or even 
killed if caught by Israeli forces (Mitnick, 2017).17 Furthermore, the Palestinians 
who do enter Israel without getting caught hold an especially precarious position 
within the Israeli economy: they are not legally protected from maltreatment, they 
are not insured in case of injury, and if a contractor decides to pay them less, or 
even nothing, at the end of a job, they cannot go to through any official channels to 
demand their salary.18 
1.3.3: Checkpoints as key technologies in the architecture of occupation 
As stated already, checkpoints represent key technologies that are used by the 
Israeli regime to monitor, discipline and/or selectively limit the mobility of 
Palestinians. This does not mean that they always work in a predictable way. 
                                                 
17 I have interviewed some Palestinians who enter Israel in this way. However, I was unable 
to find enough interviewees to include these passages in this study. For an analysis of illegal 
entries into Israel, see the work of Cédric Parizot (2012). 
18 For an analysis of the important role played by cheap Palestinian labour in the 
construction sector in Israel, see Andrew Ross’ (2009) Stone Men: The Palestinians Who Built 
Israel. 
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Rather, they are regularly closed altogether or temporarily restricted to specific 
groups of people – for instance, based on their hometown, age or the type of 
permit they carry.  
As will become clear in this thesis, checkpoints work as a field of (im)possibility by 
providing limited and relatively unpredictable ‘openings’ in a broader system of 
repression and control. More specifically, the checkpoints are one of the 
technologies employed by the Israeli government that results in making the daily 
commutes of Palestinian residents of the West Bank never entirely predictable. The 
following quote illustrates this point well. It is an excerpt of an interview I had with 
63-year-old Nathan, an employee of a Palestinian university. When I asked him 
what effects the checkpoints were having on university students, he recalled a 
conversation that he had with one. She was about to graduate and had commuted 
between her home in East Jerusalem and the university in Bethlehem through the 
border car checkpoint The Tunnels for several years. When he had asked her what 
this commute had been like, she responded in the following way:  
The worst part is coming in the bus up to the checkpoint and wondering, 
what will it be like this time? Is the soldier just going to wave the bus 
through? Is the soldier going to go and take a look at our IDs? Or is the 
soldier going to take all our IDs and make us sit there for an hour, an hour-
and-a-half, while each of them is checked? Are we going to be herded off 
the bus and made to stand in the sun while all of our IDs are checked? Or 
are we individually going to be interrogated? Are we going to be strip-
searched? 
(Nathan, interview, 22 May 2017) 
All checkpoints, border and internal, can be subjected to the sudden closures. 
Commuters may have to queue for a long period one day, while they can pass 
through the checkpoint swiftly the next. The checkpoints can be managed by calm 
soldiers/private security guards or violent ones. How any checkpoint may function 
34 
 
on a certain day is never predictable, nor does it provide insight into the workings 
of the same checkpoint the next day. This produces a permanent sense of 
arbitrariness, chaos and uncertainty that has become an integral part of life for 
those under occupation. In this unpredictable context, Palestinians keep on moving 
and thousands pass through checkpoints on a daily basis. Their experiences are the 
main focus of this thesis. 
 
1.4: Literature review: Israeli military checkpoints in the West Bank 
The Wall has been the subject of numerous academic analyses. These have 
provided valuable insights into the workings of the spatial regime imposed by the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank (Peteet, 2017). Examples are the research 
focused on the rhetoric used to legitimise the Wall (Bowman, 2007; Leuenberger, 
2016; Wills, 2016); the work that discusses the impact of the Wall and of the 
occupation in general on the lives of Palestinians (Azoulay & Ophir, 2009; Eklund & 
El-Atrash, 2012; Handel, 2009, 2011, 2016); and the work that analyses the 
different ways in which Palestinians resist the restrictions imposed on their 
mobility (Amir, 2011; Pallister-Wilkins, 2011; Parizot, 2012; Parson & Salter, 2008). 
Passing through checkpoints is a daily experience for most Palestinians and Jewish 
settlers travelling within the West Bank and to Israel. There are several academic 
works in which checkpoints are analysed as part of the broader geographies of 
occupation (see, among others, Grassiani, 2013; Handel, 2009, 2011, 2016; Ophir, 
Givoni & Hanafi, 2009; Parsons & Salter, 2008), but only few have focused 
specifically on checkpoints.  
Academic members of Machsom Watch have conducted the majority of the 
research that focused specifically on checkpoints. Machsom Watch is an Israeli all-
women organisation that opposes the occupation of the Palestinian Territories. 
One of its main tasks is to monitor and document the workings of the checkpoints 
in the West Bank (‘machsom’ means ‘checkpoint’ in Hebrew) (MachsomWatch, 
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2019). These authors discuss their experiences as Watchers (Kotef, 2011; Kotef & 
Amir, 2007; Mansbach, 2012, 2015), the possible impacts – positive and negative – 
the organisation itself has on the checkpoints (Braverman, 2012; Kaufman, 2008; 
Keshet, 2006), and the development of the terminal checkpoints (Braverman, 2011, 
2012; Kotef 2015; Kotef & Amir, 2015; Mansbach, 2009). These works, some of 
which are discussed in the following chapters, provide valuable insights into the 
workings of Machsom Watch and thorough analyses of the changes in the terminal 
checkpoints. However, they do not focus on the experiences of Palestinians passing 
through the checkpoints and tend to underplay the agency of the Palestinian 
commuters (Hammami, 2010). 
Other authors have incorporated the experiences of Palestinians passing through 
checkpoints in their work (Bishara, 2015; Hammami, 2004, 2010, 2015; Parizot, 
2009; Peteet, 2017; Razack, 2010; Tawil-Souri, 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2017; see 
Grassiani 2015 for an analysis of the experience of Israeli soldiers working inside 
checkpoints). Both Rema Hammami and Helga Tawil-Souri have extensively 
analysed the experiences of Palestinians passing through checkpoints. They have 
personally experienced the workings of checkpoints during the Second Intifada, 
when Hammami used to pass with her Jerusalem ID and Tawil-Souri, a diasporic 
Palestinian, with her American passport. They have accordingly studied the daily 
checkpoint passages of Palestinian residents with West Bank and Jerusalem ID 
cards, both focusing predominantly on Qalandiya Checkpoint in the Ramallah area. 
In their analyses, they discuss the ways Palestinians experience and resist the 
checkpoint regime19; by regulating the chaotic traffic at the checkpoints 
(Hammami, 2004, 2010); by using the checkpoint space as an economic hub (Tawil-
Souri, 2009); and by normalising the checkpoints in their narratives (Hammami, 
2015). These authors provide valuable insights into the diverse ways that 
                                                 
19 In this thesis I use the term ‘checkpoint regime’ to refer to the rules and regulations 
implemented at checkpoints and the intended workings of their machines and spatial 
formations/design.  
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Palestinians with Jerusalem and West Bank ID cards engage with the checkpoints in 
their daily passages. However, their work is mostly based on data collected during 
the Second Intifada. Checkpoints in the West Bank have changed a great deal since 
those years, from ad-hoc barriers made up out of dirt piles and concrete blocks to 
today’s complex assemblages of technologies of monitoring and control. This is 
especially the case for so-called ‘terminal checkpoints’, such as Checkpoint 300.  
A limited number of studies have focused on the workings of the border car 
checkpoints (Bishara, 2015; Parizot, 2009). These border car checkpoints are used 
by Jewish Israelis and by Palestinians with West Bank, Jerusalem and Israeli ID 
cards. As such, they illustrate the interplay between the slow and laboured 
checkpoint passages of Palestinians and the fast and smooth passages of Jewish 
settlers. Cédric Parizot (2009) has analysed the Meitar/Wadi Al-Khalil checkpoint, 
which is located in the south of the West Bank and mostly used by Jewish settlers, 
Israeli Bedouins and West Bank Palestinians. He discusses the differences between 
the passages of these three groups and how the Palestinian and Bedouin 
commuters engage with the checkpoint regime. Amahl Bishara (2015) has analysed 
how Israeli Palestinians smuggle West Bank Palestinians through car checkpoints 
into Israel in their yellow-plated cars. She argued that this defiance was possible 
because of the checkpoint knowledge of these smugglers regarding who is more 
likely to be stopped at these shared checkpoints and who is not. Bishara’s 
interviewees learned to manipulate the checkpoints’ regime through the use of 
their ‘privileged’ position as Israeli citizens and the knowledge of the 
implementation of categorisations – profiling – by checkpoint managers. Both 
these research projects shed light on the diverse ways in which commuters engage 
with the regime of shared car checkpoints. However, neither of these authors has 
included the experiences of Jewish settlers using these checkpoints, nor have they 
analysed these shared car checkpoints in relation to other pedestrian checkpoints 
predominantly used by West Bank Palestinians. 
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1.5: Aim and research questions 
With this thesis I aim to address five gaps in the academic debates in political 
geography concerning the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, its 
accompanying architecture of occupation and, most specifically, its checkpoints. 
There exists a rich and established body of literature on bordering and border 
technologies in political geography (see, amongst others, Adey, 2009; Amoore, 
2006; Martin, 2010, 2012; Van Houtum, 2010; Vaughan-Williams, 2009, 2010). I 
engage with this body of literature briefly in Chapter 2 of this thesis, but I position 
my thesis more explicitly in the debates concerning walling/checkpoints in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories specifically (Amir, 2011, 2013; Braverman, 2011, 
2012; Hammami, 2004; 2010, 2015; Kaufman, 2008; Keshet, 2006; Kotef, 2011, 
2015; Kotef & Amir, 2007; Mansbach, 2009, 2012, 2015; Pallister-Wilkins, 2011, 
2015a, 2016; Parizot, 2009, 2012; Parsons & Salter, 2008; Peteet, 2017; Razack, 
2010; Tawil-Souri, 2009, 2010, 2011b; Weizman, 2007) and, more generally, in the 
broader academic debates in the fields of political geography, political science, 
critical international relations and border studies concerning walling as a favoured 
border policy (Brown, 2010; Jones, 2009, 2012; Rosière & Jones, 2012; Till, et al., 
2013; Vallet, 2014). In the following paragraph, I will introduce what I perceive to 
be the five gaps in these academic debates that I wish to address in this study. 
The first gap I address with this project is related to the fact that the workings of 
checkpoints and the various experiences of the commuters passing through them 
have not been analysed in recent studies. As stated in the previous section, most of 
the existing research on checkpoints has been executed by academic members of 
Machsom Watch (Braverman, 2011, 2012; Kaufman, 2008; Keshet, 2006; Kotef, 
2011, 2015; Kotef & Amir, 2007; Mansbach, 2009, 2012, 2015). These authors 
provide important insights into the development of the checkpoints, but they have 
not included the experiences of Palestinian commuters in their analyses 
(Hammami, 2010). Other authors have incorporated such experience of the 
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Palestinians in their work (Hammami, 2004, 2010, 2015; Peteet, 2017; Razack, 
2010; Tawil-Souri, 2009, 2010, 2011b), but they largely refer to the years of the 
Second (or al-Aqsa) Intifada (2000-05). The checkpoint system currently in place, 
which is not static and keeps developing (this will become especially explicit in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis), only became operational after the Second Intifada. 
Furthermore, while these authors provide essential insight into the experiences of 
Palestinian commuters during this period, they focus predominately on the ways 
Palestinians resisted the checkpoints in general but also the specific checkpoint 
regimes in place at different checkpoints. In this thesis, I wish to build upon these 
two bodies of work by analysing the workings of three contemporary checkpoints. I 
aim to demonstrate how Palestinian commuters not only resist but are also forced 
to engage with and, in the process (re)produce, the checkpoints’ regime in various 
ways. Inspired by the analyses of Polly Pallister-Wilkins (2011, 2015a, 2016) and 
Nigel Parsons and Mark Salter (2008) of the role played by barriers in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, I use a biopolitical framework (Foucault, 1977, 1978, 2007, 
2013) to analyse checkpoints as technologies that monitor, discipline and 
selectively limit the mobility of Palestinians. Furthermore, engaging with Michel 
Foucault’s understanding of power as relational and productive (1977, 1978, 1982, 
2007) will allow me to analyse the checkpoints’ workings as the outcome of the 
many different forms of engagement and intervention by the commuters, the 
checkpoint managers and the checkpoints’ regime.  
The second gap I address in this thesis is the general lack of inclusion of machines 
in the analysis of checkpoints, most notably regarding the terminal checkpoints. As 
stated earlier in this chapter, one important aspect of terminal checkpoints is the 
presence of many machines, such as turnstiles, cameras, x-ray machines, metal 
detectors, and fingerprint- and iris-scanning devices. The introduction of the 
terminal checkpoints has been critically analysed in relevant academic work (Amir, 
2013; Braverman, 2011; Kotef & Amir, 2015; Mansbach, 2009), but these authors 
have only partially taken into account the role of the new spatial arrangements and 
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machines. The authors who did study the machines inside the checkpoints 
(Braverman, 2011; Mansbach, 2009) focused on what they argued the machines 
were failing to do – namely to create less tense and violent checkpoints. Their work 
provides unique insights into the rationale behind the terminal checkpoints and the 
workings of their machines. However, neither Daniela Mansbach (2009) and Irus 
Braverman (2011) included in their respective analyses the experiences of the 
Palestinian commuters subjected to these machines and the diverse ways in which 
they engage with them. Also, by focusing on the ways in which the machines are 
failing to work as they were ostensibly intended to by the Israeli military, these 
authors do not critically assess what these machines actually do. In this thesis, I 
therefore put particular emphasis on the interactions between Palestinian 
commuters, Israeli soldiers/security guards and the machines inside the 
checkpoints.  
A third gap is that, to my knowledge, analyses of the checkpoints have never 
included in a single project the experiences of Palestinians with West Bank, 
Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards as well as those of Jewish settlers. By including 
Palestinians with all three types of ID cards in the research project, I analyse the 
role played by the intricate system of categories that is implemented by the Israeli 
government. Furthermore, by including Jewish settlers, I can study the influence 
they have on the workings of the checkpoints. This allows me to investigate the 
different ways in which commuters engage with the checkpoints and how they 
enact their different degrees of freedom of movement. Moreover, by including the 
experiences of Jewish settlers with the checkpoints, I investigate not only the 
differences between their experiences and those of the Palestinians but also how 
these experiences are interconnected. 
A fourth gap in the academic debates stems from the absence, at the time this 
thesis project was conceived, of academic publications focused on Checkpoint 300, 
The Tunnels checkpoint or Al Walaja checkpoint, three important checkpoints 
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within the Israeli architecture of occupation. Checkpoint 300 is one of the busiest 
checkpoints in the West Bank, with up to 15,000 Palestinians passing through 
Checkpoint 300 each morning (ActiveStills, 2018). There are no data available on 
the number of commuters using The Tunnels and Al Walaja, but they are important 
gateways from the south of the West Bank to Jerusalem and Israel for Palestinians 
with Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards, as well as Jewish settlers. Furthermore, these 
three checkpoints are not characterised by the occurrence of spectacular violence. 
Due to this, these three checkpoints are especially suitable to analyse the ‘ordinary’ 
daily precarious geographies of Palestinian commuters. Moreover, Checkpoint 
300’s re-launch as a terminal checkpoint in 2005 means it is a site where one can 
study the functioning of these particularly planned checkpoints, and their 
biopolitical categories and machines. The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints, on 
the other hand, have almost no machines. By including these three checkpoints in 
one research project, I can analyse the influence of machines on checkpoint 
passages, as well as the differences between checkpoints used solely by 
Palestinians and checkpoints used also by Jewish settlers. 
A fifth gap I address with this thesis regards one of the methods of data collection I 
have used: namely go-along interviews (Ivison & Renold, 2013, 2014; Kusenbach, 
2003; Ross, Renold, Holland, & Hillman, 2009). The use of go-along interviews, 
which require a researcher to join her/his interviewee on “an outing” (Kusenbach, 
2003, p. 463), meant that I joined my interviewees on their daily commute in which 
they had to pass through a checkpoint. By using go-along interviews, a method that 
has not been taken up on a large scale in research projects focused on checkpoints 
or on the occupation in the Palestinian Territories in general (see, e.g., Griffiths, 
2017), I intended to directly experience the checkpoint passages together with my 
interviewees. While it may be possible to discuss how people interact with and co-
constitute places with in-depth interviews, combining these with go-along 
interviews allowed me to observe and experience these interactions through those 
same places. By putting myself into the midst of things, I was able, while 
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continuously reflecting on my positionality – which I discuss extensively in Chapter 
3 – to observe and experience the workings of the checkpoints in ways that would 
have be impossible otherwise. It also allowed me to experience what it meant to be 
engaged with the checkpoint regimes and their machines. As such, I experienced 
the-difference-that-my-body-made when screened by the checkpoint technologies 
and when qualified as a reflection of my gender, age and ID status (holding a 
passport from a European Union member-state). 
In line with the objective of addressing these gaps: 
The aim of this study is to analyse checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories as spatial political technologies that, through an interplay of human and 
non-human interactions, produce a set of selective, arbitrary and mutable 
geographies of mobility.  
The following research questions have been formulated in order to address this 
aim:  
1. How do the checkpoint managers implement biopolitical categories in the 
governing of mobile Palestinian and Jewish Israeli bodies? 
2. What role do the machines and the spatial arrangement of the 
checkpoints play in the checkpoint passages of the Palestinian and Jewish 
Israeli commuters?  
3. How do the Palestinian commuters, in particular, engage with, reproduce, 
but also redefine and/or resist the workings of the checkpoint regimes? 
 
1.6: Structure of the thesis 
To address this aim and the research questions posed here, this thesis is organised 
into seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 introduces the 
theoretical framework, where I position the thesis within the relevant academic 
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debates. The third chapter then offers a methodological reflection and a discussion 
of the methods I have chosen in order to address the main research questions. 
Three empirical chapters follow, in which I present the data I have collected and 
provide answers to the different research questions posed. These three chapters 
are followed by Chapter 7, which will offer concluding remarks and, again, position 
the thesis arguments within relevant academic debates. In this last chapter, I bring 
the analyses of the empirical chapters together and provide an overview of the 
answers I have formulated to the research questions posed.  
There is some overlap and repetition in this thesis, as is typical of theses by 
publication. This especially refers to the methodology sections and the discussions 
of the relevant academic literature. Nevertheless, I have two full chapters 
dedicated respectively to the theoretical framework and to the methodology in 
order to provide a more in-depth discussion of these elements in the drafting of 
the thesis. 
In Chapter 2: Theorising Checkpoints: Biopolitics, Walls and Materialities, I 
introduce the theoretical framework that underpins the rationale and design of my 
study. This theoretical framework is predominately informed by Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of biopolitics (1977, 1978, 2007, 2013). More specifically, I 
discuss Foucault’s definition of power as relational (1977, 1978, 1982, 2007) and his 
arguments regarding the control of population, security and the importance of 
circulation (2007). I add to this framework Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) formulation 
of the sovereign exception. After this, I discuss the literature on fortified borders 
and checkpoints in the fields of political geography, political science, border studies 
and critical international relations (IR). These sections lead me to explain why I 
frame checkpoints as spatial political technologies (Altin & Minca, 2017; Behrent, 
2013; Foucault, 1977, Katz, Martin, & Minca, 2018; and Minca, 2015a) aimed at 
monitoring, disciplining and selectively limiting Palestinian mobility. Parts of this 
chapter have been published as an essay on Society & Space (2017) and as a book 
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chapter in Urban Walls: Political and Cultural Meanings of Vertical Structures and 
Surfaces (2019), both co-authored with Claudio Minca.  
In Chapter 3: Being in the Field: Methodological Reflections, I turn to my fieldwork 
experiences. Here, I discuss the methods I have used while collecting data in 
Bethlehem during three periods of fieldwork – namely in-depth interviewing, go-
along interviewing and observations. In this chapter, I explain why I have chosen 
these methods specifically to respond to the research questions formulated, and 
embed the methods in the relevant literature. Here, I introduce the three 
checkpoints that I have chosen to study and discuss the interviews I have had with 
Palestinians and Jewish settlers. Furthermore, I elaborate on what it meant to do 
fieldwork in a militarised area, the choices I made to ensure my safety and that of 
my interviewees, and the ethical dilemmas with which I was confronted while in 
the field. Finally, the chapter offers some reflections on the limitations of this 
thesis. 
These opening chapters are then followed by three empirical chapters. Chapters 4 
and 5 are focused on Checkpoint 300. I dedicate two of the three empirical 
chapters solely to this checkpoint because Checkpoint 300, as argued earlier, is an 
especially important checkpoint in the broader architecture of the occupation given 
that it is one of the most frequently crossed checkpoints in the West Bank and 
functions as a gateway for many Palestinian commuters travelling from the south 
of the West Bank to Jerusalem and Israel. Furthermore, its relaunching as a 
terminal checkpoint in 2005 by the Israeli authorities made it an especially 
interesting case in order to study this type of particularly planned checkpoints and 
their associated regimes. The third empirical chapter, Chapter 6, analyses two 
border car checkpoints because a very important group of commuters does not use 
Checkpoint 300: Jewish settlers. This in-depth analysis of checkpoints that are used 
by Jewish settlers, Palestinians with Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards is necessary to 
better understand the workings of the checkpoints and the influence that Jewish 
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settlers have on their functioning. As such, these three empirical chapters will allow 
for a discussion of the effects of the intricate system of different ID cards and their 
associated levels of freedom that categorise the residents of Israel/Palestine.  
Chapter 4: Inside Checkpoint 300: Checkpoint Regimes as Spatial Political 
Technologies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories offers an analysis of Checkpoint 
300 through an examination of three checkpoint passages and the roles played by 
the machines that are present. In this chapter, detailed attention is paid to these 
specific checkpoint passages and to how the checkpoint regime engages with 
different bodies – and vice versa – addressing explicitly the use of the go-along 
interviews. The chapter discusses how the machines inside Checkpoint 300 work to 
make the checkpoint an arbitrary and violent place. By including the machines in 
the biopolitical analysis of the checkpoints, I analyse how the checkpoint regime is 
influenced, produced and challenged via the implementation of machines such as 
turnstiles, metal detectors, x-ray machines and biometric scanners inside the 
checkpoints. Furthermore, the chapter describes how Palestinian commuters 
engage with the arbitrary functioning of the machines, at times accepting them, 
other times manipulating or rejecting their (non-)workings. As such, the chapter 
addresses the second and third research questions. This chapter has also been co-
authored with Claudio Minca and has been published in the peer-reviewed journal 
Antipode in 2019.  
Chapter 5, entitled Checkpoint 300: Precarious Checkpoint Geographies and 
Rights/Rites of Passage in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, addresses how 
checkpoint managers in Checkpoint 300 use three biopolitical categories – 
gender20, age and ID card status – to continuously grant or take away the 
                                                 
20 I refer several times in this thesis to the use of ‘gender’ as a biopolitical category applied 
by the Israeli forces at the checkpoints. However, I do not analyse the role played by 
‘gender’ as a social construction and/or a part of the identity of Palestinian commuters or 
Israeli soldiers. For an analysis of the role played by gender/gendered identities at the 
checkpoints, see the work of Rema Hammami (2019), Hagar Kotef (2011), Hagar Kotef and 
Merav Amir (2007), Daniela Mansbach (2012) and Julie Peteet (2017). 
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‘privileges’ that are awarded to specific groups of Palestinians. Moreover, it 
describes how these Palestinian commuters engage with this arbitrary system of 
‘privileges’ by accepting, manipulating or twisting them. As such, it discusses how a 
set of selective and mutable mobilities are produced and reproduced inside 
Checkpoint 300 through the ways the checkpoint managers use several biopolitical 
categories, as well as the diverse ways Palestinian commuters engage with this 
regime. Hence, this chapter addresses the first and third research question posed. 
This chapter has been co-authored with Claudio Minca and was published in the 
peer-reviewed journal Political Geography in 2018.  
In Chapter 6, entitled ‘Checkpoint Knowledge’: Navigating The Tunnels and Al 
Walaja Checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the two other sites are 
discussed, namely the car checkpoints known as The Tunnels and Al Walaja. These 
two border car checkpoints are used by Palestinian commuters with Jerusalem or 
Israeli ID cards and by Jewish settlers. Chapter 6 shows how these checkpoints have 
been designed by the Israeli army in a low-tech way: besides cameras, there are no 
visible machines present. The only mechanism used to slow down cars is the bumps 
on the road, and, of course, soldiers and the guns with which they are armed. In 
this chapter, I discuss how the workings of the car checkpoints are influenced by 
the fact that Jewish settlers use them. This chapter analyses what influence the 
absence of machines has on the workings of the checkpoints, on the 
implementation of the biopolitical categories by the checkpoint managers and the 
interactions between the checkpoint managers and commuters. It indicates that 
even though the design of car checkpoints resembles benign tollbooths, through a 
tense interplay of human and non-human interactions, they produce arbitrary and 
mutable geographies of mobility. Furthermore, similar to the other two empirical 
chapters, it describes the diverse strategies the Palestinian commuters use to try to 
positively influence their passage. As such, the chapter addresses all three research 
questions posed. This chapter has been submitted as a single-authored article to 
the peer-reviewed journal Geopolitics and is currently under review.  
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A concluding chapter follows the three empirical chapters. In this chapter, I address 
again the main research questions and critically discuss the project’s outcomes and 
implications. I have included several ‘photo dossiers’ between the chapters with 
photos I have taken during the fieldwork periods and fieldnotes. These photo 
dossiers will hopefully illustrate the broader architecture of occupation that I 
described in the chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Photo Dossier I
The Wall
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Figure P.1: The Wall and its graffiti in Bethlehem (source: Rijke, June 2017). 
 
50 
 
 
Figure P.2: The Wall and its graffiti in Bethlehem (source: Rijke, May 2017). 
 
 
I had a coffee in Bethlehem tonight with my landlady Layla and Jane, a British 
woman staying in the same house as I am. We walk home and take a road that 
passes by a very dark section of the Wall. This area used to be a thriving area, but 
nowadays the Wall has cut the road in half and the once fancy shops are empty 
buildings [see Figure P.1]. At night there are no street lights and it is a little bit 
creepy. Layla says that she would normally not take this road alone, especially in 
the dark, but because we are together it is okay. We chuckle a bit, ensured that it 
will indeed be okay with the three of us. Suddenly we hear voices on the other 
side of the Wall, Hebrew speaking voices, they must be Jewish settlers! We look at 
it each other and then Layla whistles and laughs, a little embarrassed. Jane follows 
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suit and she whistles, and then she meows, loudly. The voices go silent. We laugh 
out loud and speed up our pace a little, like young school girls who have 
misbehaved. Tonight, in this moment and in this dark space next to the Wall, we 
were not intimidated. 
(fieldnotes, 10 May 2017) 
 
 
 
Figure P.3: A section of The Wall north of Ramallah made up of a 4.5 metre high 
electric fence with a security zone (source: Rijke, July 2016). 
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Figure P.4: The Wall in Bir Ouna, with The Tunnels highway passing over it  
(source: Rijke, May 2017). 
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21 This chapter includes excerpts from two publications: 
Minca, C. & Rijke, A. (2017). Walls! Walls! Walls! Society & Space  
Minca, C. & Rijke, A. (2018). Walls, walling and the immunitarian imperative. In: A. Mubi 
Brighenti & M. Kärrholm (eds). Urban Walls: Political and Cultural Meanings of Vertical 
Structures and Surfaces. London: Routlegde, 79-93. 
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2.1: Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss the theoretical framework that has informed this 
thesis. I will introduce the work of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, two 
theorists whose work constitutes the underlying – though not always explicit in the 
empirical chapters – base of my study. Firstly, I will describe Michel Foucault’s work 
on biopolitics, surveillance, circulation and power (1977, 1978, 1982, 2007, 2013). 
This will allow me to explain how I use a biopolitical framework to analyse 
checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a means of surveillance: as 
technologies that monitor, discipline and selectively limit the mobility of 
Palestinians.  
Foucault argued that it was important to address the questions ‘how is power 
exercised?’ and ‘what happens when individuals exert power over others?’ 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 337). Foucault defined power as relational: “an action upon an 
action, on possible or actual future or present actions” (Foucault, 1982, p. 340). 
Hence, power should not be analysed as something abstract, the focus should be 
on the exercise of power. This exercise of power operates in various ways: 
It incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases 
or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or 
forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting 
subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 341) 
As such, this understanding of power as relational and productive will allow me to 
analyse the checkpoints’ workings as the outcome of the many different forms of 
engagement and intervention by the commuters, the checkpoint managers and the 
checkpoint regimes.  
After discussing these aspects of Foucault’s work, I will describe how his work has 
been received, focusing most notably on Giorgio Agamben’s response to Foucault’s 
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work and his formulation of the sovereign exception (1998). Adding Agamben to 
my theoretical framework will allow me to investigate the manifestation of 
sovereign exception inside the checkpoints, as well as the ways in which Palestinian 
commuters engage with this. By framing the arbitrary workings of the checkpoints 
as neither accidental nor incidental, but, rather, as inherent to their spatial regimes 
and an expression of the sovereign exception, the workings of this exception and 
the coping mechanisms of the Palestinian commuters will be studied as a part of 
the same spatial regime of power.  
After discussing the work of Foucault and Agamben, I will review the literature on 
fortified borders and checkpoints in the fields of political geography, political 
science, border studies and critical international relations (IR). In this process, I will 
position checkpoints in the larger debates concerning walling. Moreover, I will 
indicate the importance of analysing the daily experiences of the checkpoint 
commuters when trying to understand the ways checkpoints are produced and 
reproduced in the interactions between the soldiers/security guards, the 
commuters and the checkpoints’ regimes – that is, the rules and regulations 
implemented at the checkpoints and the workings of their machines and spatial 
formations/design. To conclude the chapter, I explain why this theoretical 
framework has led me to conceptualise checkpoints as spatial political technologies 
aimed at organising and producing the bodies subjected to them. 
2.2: Foucault: Biopolitics, circulation and resistance 
2.2.1: Sovereign, disciplinary and biopower 
Michel Foucault was the first to introduce contemporary understandings of the 
concept of biopolitics in the 1970s. Foucault did not coin the term ‘biopolitics’. 
Although there is some debate concerning the origins of the term, Rudolf Kjellén, a 
Swedish (geo)political scientist, is said to have used it first in the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Minca, 2015b, p. 169). Foucault’s work is wide-ranging. His early 
work focused on the history of healthcare and the social construction of the 
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categories ‘sick’ and ‘healthy’ (Madness and Civilization, (1976) and The Birth of the 
Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (1963)), on the development of the 
Western prison system (Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977)), and 
on how man (sic) became the object of knowledge production (The Order of Things 
(1970)). His perhaps most famous work is The History of Sexuality (1978, 1985, 
1986, 2018), which comprises four volumes – the fourth (2018) so far only 
published in French – in which Foucault analyses sexuality in the Western world. 
Foucault passed away in 1984 and several of his lecture series have been published 
post-mortem on topics such as knowledge construction (1970-71), security, 
territory and population (1977-78), governmentality (1979-80) and practices and 
care of the self (1981-82). Here, I will engage with a specific part of Foucault’s 
work, namely his work on biopolitics, surveillance, circulation and power, drawing 
from some of the aforementioned publications.  
In a short chapter entitled ‘Right of Death and Power over Life’ in The History of 
Sexuality, Volume 1 (1978), Foucault argues that the ancient right of the sovereign 
to “take life or let live” was partly replaced by a power to “foster life or disallow it 
to the point of death” [original italics] (p. 138). Here and in subsequent publications 
(2007, 2013), Foucault discusses this development through the genealogy22 of 
three contingent and overlapping forms of power: sovereign power, disciplinary 
power and biopower. Sovereign power, which Foucault characterised as the 
sovereign’s right to bring death, was partly replaced – it never fully disappeared – 
by two other forms of power, namely disciplinary power and biopower. Disciplinary 
power, also called the ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’ by Foucault (1978), 
centres on “the body as a machine: its discipline, the optimization of its 
capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its 
docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls” (p. 139). 
                                                 
22 As explained by Una Crowley (2009), a genealogical analysis is a methodology based on “a 
historical perspective and investigative method, which offers an intrinsic critique of the 
present” (p. 341). 
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Biopower, on the other hand, is “focused on the species body, the body imbued 
with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes” 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 139). Hence, where disciplinary power targets the individual 
body, biopower targets the body as part of a population – what Foucault (2013) 
calls the ‘species body’: “it is, in a word, a matter of taking control of life and the 
biological processes of man-as-species (sic) and of ensuring that they are not 
disciplined, but regularized” (p. 67).  
These different forms of power, which Foucault argues should be analysed as 
relational and productive, are implied in diverse mechanisms and political 
technologies in society. Discipline targets the body for political subjection, breaking 
down individuals into components, which enables a governing body to classify 
them and separate the ‘normal’ from the ‘abnormal’. Discipline aims to make 
individuals visible, legible; one of the main objects of discipline is ‘to fix’ spatially, 
making it an “anti-nomadic technique”23 (Foucault, 1977, p. 218). The prison design 
of the Panopticon was used by Foucault to illustrate a space in which one can 
observe the disciplinary mechanism of power in its ideal form (1977, p. 205). The 
Panopticon design, which was introduced in the 18th century, ensured that every 
prisoner was kept in a single cell, without any contact with others, while being 
constantly visible to the invisible supervisor. Foucault described the Panopticon as 
a generalisable model, a way of defining power relations everyday life in Western 
Europe since the 18th century (Foucault, 1977). Other institutions that Foucault 
discussed to illustrate the workings of disciplinary power are schools, factories and 
military barracks. The objectives of these institutions are total control, visibility and 
the creation of passive, productive and self-disciplining subjects (Foucault, 1977).  
                                                 
23 Foucault elaborates on this characteristic of discipline: “discipline fixes; it arrests or 
regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals 
wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions’ 
(1977, p. 219).  
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Biopower functions differently: the aim is not to produce obedient individuals or 
complete control, but, rather, a ‘healthy’ population. As Foucault (2007) explained, 
“The apparatus of security [the term used by Foucault for the techniques used to 
produce a healthy population] ‘lets things happen’” (p. 45). Biopower is therefore 
not focused solely on distinguishing the ‘abnormal’ from the ‘normal’, or on 
creating ‘productive’ and ‘obedient’ subjects. The focus of biopower is the 
delimitation of phenomena within acceptable limits. An example was the 
establishment of the ‘normal level of mortality from smallpox’ in the eighteenth 
century with the help of statistics. As Foucault argued (2007): “It is a matter (…) of 
revealing a level of the necessary and sufficient actions of those who govern” (p. 
66). If the level of mortality from smallpox rose beyond a specific threshold in the 
population, the government intervened. If it stayed at or below that threshold, no 
intervention was necessary. As such, biopower focuses on making a population – 
not individuals – legible through the production of knowledge, in the form of data 
on death, fertility, hygiene, vaccinations, but also unemployment and per capita 
income.  
Foucault illustrated the three forms of power mechanisms with examples of how 
three different communicable disease epidemics were treated in France. The first, 
leprosy, illustrates how sovereign power and its connected juridical mechanism 
works. Lepers were excluded from society in the Middle Ages, with a strict division 
between those who were lepers and those who were not. Here, a ‘pure 
community’ was strived for (Foucault, 1977). The plague regulations in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were completely different. These entailed 
strict partitioning grids, with regulations stating when people could exit their 
homes, what food they could have and prohibiting contact with neighbouring 
homes. People were required to present themselves to inspectors at all times, 
ensuring permanent registration and perfect visibility. These regulations illustrate 
the disciplinary system. Thirdly, biopower and its connected security mechanism 
are illustrated by the governmental response to the smallpox epidemic and its 
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related inoculation practices in the eighteenth century. Here, the aim was not to 
completely control the area – and the people in it – in which the disease was 
present, or to separate the sick from the healthy, but to know how many were 
infected, who was infected, the mortality rates, and to inoculate the population 
through large-scale medical campaigns. So, while leprosy was met with exclusion 
(sovereign power) and the plague with quarantine (disciplinary power), smallpox 
was targeted through epidemics and medical campaigns (biopower) (Foucault, 
2007). However, as stated before, these forms of power should not be seen as 
exclusionary and all feed into each other. This is discussed further in sub section 
2.3: Using Foucault and Agamben in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
2.2.2: Circulation and resistance 
This partial replacement of sovereign power by disciplinary power and biopower 
was connected to the development of ‘governmentality’ – a term coined by 
Foucault which combines government and rationality (2007). In his lecture series 
Security, Territory, Population (1977-78), Foucault described governmentality as a 
form of government in which sovereign power, disciplinary power and 
‘governmental management’ (biopower) have “the population as its main target 
and the apparatuses of security as its essential mechanisms” (2007, p. 108). 
Governmentality is thus a logic of governing. He further specified governmentality 
as:  
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and 
reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of 
security as its essential technical instrument. 
 (Foucault, 2007, p. 108)  
The purpose of governmentality is not the act of governing itself, but the welfare of 
a population, improvement of its condition, health, wealth and longevity. These 
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processes were further described by Foucault (2007) in relation to the planning of a 
town in order to illustrate how the different mechanisms of power deal with 
“questions of space” (p. 11). Here, he argued that, for biopower to work in towns in 
Europe in the eighteenth century, circulation was essential: “it was a matter of 
organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a decision 
between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by 
diminishing the bad” (Foucault, 2007, p. 18). This was exemplified in his description 
of the change from walled medieval towns to towns that had been designed to 
allow for circulation of bodies, commodities and fresh air. Apart from increasing 
the health and wealth of the population, circulation in these towns was also 
necessary for allowing surveillance: “It is simply a matter of maximizing the positive 
elements, for which one provides the best circulation, and of minimizing what is 
risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while knowing that they will never be 
completely suppressed” (Foucault, 2007, p. 19).  
According to Foucault (1978), resistance is inherent to power relations: “Where 
there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance 
is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (p. 95). These ‘points of 
resistance’, as Foucault (1978) called them, are various and multiple, like the power 
relations to which they are inherent: “these [points of resistance] play the role of 
adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations” (p. 95). They can mobilise 
groups or individuals, but also fracture unities or bring about regroupings.  
This exercise of power is not “a naked fact” (Foucault, 1978, p. 345). Rather, it is 
influenced by and influences the space in which the relationship takes place. As 
Foucault stated: “The relations, the set of relations, or rather, the set of procedures 
whose role it is to establish, maintain, and transform mechanisms of power, are not 
‘self-generating’ or ‘self-subsistent’; they are not founded on themselves” (2007, p. 
2). An analysis of these relationships entails acknowledging that they are influenced 
by and always put into operation systems of differentiation (e.g., differences in 
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privilege, economic status, linguistics, etc.) and the material means that are used as 
enforcement (e.g., the threat of the use of weapons, but also systems of 
surveillance, archives, rules, etc.) (Foucault, 1978, p. 344).  
Furthermore, the effects of these mechanisms should not, according to Foucault, 
be described solely in negative terms. Since power mechanisms are framed too 
often as only repressing, censoring, concealing and masking, Foucault (1977) 
wished instead to analyse how these mechanisms produce realities, subjects and 
truths. This does not mean that the mechanisms analysed do not have destructive 
effects but, rather, that while analysing these mechanisms one should focus on 
what they produce. This can include violence and/or resistance. A focus on power 
as productive has been the red thread in this thesis, in which I analyse checkpoints 
for what they do in relation to their commuters as well as what these commuters 
do in their daily passages, during which they (re)produce, challenge and change the 
workings of the checkpoints.  
But before I turn to how Foucault’s notion of biopolitics has informed my thesis, I 
will discuss how his work has been received. Here, I focus specifically on the work 
of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, the second theorist whose work 
constitutes the underlying base of my study. 
  
2.3: Reception: Agamben and the sovereign exception 
In the introduction to their Biopolitics reader, Timothy Campbell and Adam Sitze 
(2013, p. 3) argued that today we are witnessing numerous crises that call for 
scholarly analyses of the relationship between ‘life’ and ‘politics’. They provide 
several examples, such as anxieties about overpopulation in ‘undeveloped regions’, 
struggles concerning healthcare, the global distribution of essential medicines, the 
global trade in human organs and the War on Terror with its normalisation of 
distant drone strikes, racial profiling and the creation of exceptional juridical 
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spaces. As explained by Campbell and Sitze (2013), while the work of Foucault had 
been used, especially since the end of the 1980s, by feminist and postcolonial 
authors like Donna Haraway (1989), Paul Gilroy (1994) and Anne Laura Stoler 
(1995), it was not until 1998, when the English translation of Giorgio Agamben’s 
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life was published, that Foucault’s work on 
biopolitics began to be seriously taken up within academic fields such as 
anthropology, geography, sociology and many more (see, for example, Adey, 2009; 
Anderson, 2010, 2011, 2012; Braun, 2007, 2008, 2014; Fassin, 2011; Ingram, 2008, 
2010, 2013; Lemke, 2011; Martin, 2010; Moran, Pallot, & Piacentini, 2012, 2013; 
Mountz, 2011; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015b, 2018a, b; Rabinow & Rose, 2006; Reid-
Henry, 2013; Rose, 2007; Salter, 2007).24  
In his highly influential Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998), Giorgio 
Agamben argued that the Foucauldian development of biopolitics needed to be 
corrected, or at least completed. Here, Agamben combined Foucault’s discussion of 
the inclusion of life into politics with Carl Schmitt’s notion of ‘the sovereign’ – he 
who decides upon the state of exception (for an in-depth analysis of Schmitt’s 
spatial conceptualisations see, among others, Minca & Rowan, 2015). As suggested 
by Agamben following Schmitt, the state of exception occurs when ‘a sovereign’ 
suspends the juridical order’s validity and legal protection of individuals.  
The ability to act like a sovereign is manifested in this possibility to decide on the 
state of exception – someone can decide to suspend the juridical order, but also 
decide not to do this, and it is this possibility to act or not to act that is at the core 
of the sovereign exception. When the sovereign exception is enacted, this is done 
through legitimate exceptions to the legal rules. As put forward by Claudio Minca 
(2017a),  
                                                 
24 For a more in-depth discussion of the use of Foucault’s work in geography, please see, 
amongst others, the edited volume by Jeremy Crampton and Stuart Elden entitled Space, 
Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography (2007) and the work of Felix Driver (1985, 
2002) and Chris Philo (1992, 2000, 2012). 
64 
 
A space of exception is created when, despite the existence of juridical 
order, a situation of perceived emergency strips an individual or a group of 
legal protection and, in some cases, even enables the killing of them 
without committing a crime. 
 (p. 2) 
Important here is the addition ‘without committing a crime’. Individuals in 
positions of authority, such as border guards, but also police, prison guards, 
teachers or government officials, can act outside of the juridical order at any 
moment in time, but the space of exception is only created when the decision to 
suspend the juridical order is not punished as a criminal act.  
Enactments of the sovereign exception are deeply relational and occur within 
specific power relations and spaces. According to Agamben (1998), the purest form 
of biopolitics – the total inclusion of life into politics – could be found in the (Nazi 
concentration) camps: “the camp is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the 
West” (p. 181). But the sovereign exception can occur in various places and to 
varying degrees, not always as total and violently as in the Nazi concentration 
camps. Here, I follow Claudio Minca’s (2006) argument that the sovereign 
exception must be localised in a specific place: “the repetition of the exception 
must, necessarily, be spatialized, for its very existence depends upon its (concrete) 
location outside of the juridical order” (p. 389).  
Agamben’s reworking of Foucault’s arguments, but also the original arguments of 
Foucault and the reworking of Foucault’s work by others, such as Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri (2000), Achille Mbembe (2003), Roberto Esposito (2008, 2011, 
2012) and Rosi Braidotti (2013), started to appear as the key analytical frame to use 
in analyses of the relationship between politics and life in numerous 
(predominately Anglophone) academic fields in the social sciences and the 
humanities. The scale at which this happened can be seen as an indication that 
perhaps we are experiencing a ‘biopolitical turn’ (Minca, 2015b, p. 165). Even just 
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within the spheres of cultural and political geographies, we can see a broad range 
of authors using Foucault’s work, such as those analysing affect and biopower in 
the War on Terror (Anderson, 2010, 2011, 2012), biopolitics and global health 
(Braun, 2007, 2008, 2014; Ingram, 2008, 2010, 2013), prisons and camps (Moran, 
Pallot, & Piacentini, 2012, 2013; Mountz, 2011), airports (Adey, 2009; Martin, 2010; 
Salter, 2007), and biopolitics and humanitarianism (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015b, 2018a, 
b; Reid-Henry, 2013).  
Important cultural and political geographical work has also engaged with 
Agamben’s work (Amoore & de Goede, 2008; Anderson, 2010, 2011; Coleman, 
2007; Cunha et al., 2012; Ek, 2006; Elden, 2007; Minca, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2017b). 
The application of Agamben’s theory has been met with criticism. This includes the 
deployment of the ‘state of exception’ concept and its usefulness in the analysis of 
contemporary refugee camps in, for instance, Europe and the Middle East (see, for 
instance, Katz, 2015; Martin, 2015; Owens, 2009; Ramadan, 2013) since Agamben 
largely focussed on Nazi concentration camps in his work. Here, although I do not 
wish to argue that checkpoints represent spaces of exception similar to the Nazi 
concentration camps, I do find the analytical lens of the state of exception useful to 
investigate the manifestation of sovereign exception inside the checkpoint, as well 
as the ways in which Palestinian commuters engage with this by accepting, 
reinstating and twisting the checkpoint regimes comprising their rules, regulations 
and the intended workings of their machines and spatial formations/design. By 
framing the arbitrary workings of the checkpoints as neither accidental nor 
incidental but, rather, as inherent to their spatial regime and an expression of the 
sovereign exception, the workings of this exception and the coping mechanisms of 
the Palestinian commuters can be studied as part of the same spatial regime of 
power. Next, I will discuss the work of two authors, Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir 
(2009) who have analysed the occupation of the Palestinian Territories with the use 
of Foucault’s insights and their work has been particularly influential on my own 
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analysis. Furthermore, I will elaborate on the role played by (withheld) violence and 
the sovereign exception in the occupation.  
 
2.4: Using Foucault and Agamben in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories 
2.4.1: Sovereign, disciplinary, and biopower 
The occupation of Palestine has been analysed with the use of Foucault’s and 
Agamben’s insights in numerous studies by geographers, political scientists, 
anthropologists and sociologists (see Alatout, 2006; Bornstein, 2008; Gordon, 2009; 
Gregory, 2004; Hanafi, 2009; Long, 2006; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015b, 2016; Parsons & 
Salter, 2008). I engage with some of these works later in this chapter. Here, to 
further discuss how the work of Foucault has informed my study and to explain the 
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories with the use of a Foucauldian 
framework, I wish to pay specific attention to the work of Ariella Azoulay and Adi 
Ophir (2009).  
Azoulay and Ophir (2009) discuss Foucault’s conceptualisation of the triad of power 
and then reflect upon the expressions of sovereign power, disciplinary power and 
biopower in the Occupied Territories. Firstly, sovereign power, which Azoulay and 
Ophir identify in Foucault’s work as expressed through the power mechanisms that 
establish general law, has not established a general law in the Territories. Instead, 
it functions in the occupation through a ‘ruling by decree’. As Azoulay and Ophir 
(2009) argue:  
The Occupied Palestinian Territories are not a legal vacuum. The abuse of 
life at the hands of the ruling power is not due to some withdrawal of the 
law, but occurs thanks to a savage proliferation of legalities and illegalities 
and the creation of an extensive juridical patchwork that has no lawfulness 
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of its own and that keeps changing the law itself, the regime’s authorities 
and immunity, and the subject’s own status before the law.  
(p. 114) 
Due to the frequent adoption of decrees in order to modify the juridical order, the 
overwhelming majority of the actions of the occupying regime in the Palestinian 
Territories can withstand juridical scrutiny. This been further explained by Yael 
Berda (2018) in relation to the permit system:  
The Israeli state views the permit system as a regime of privileges that 
hinges legally on the authority of central command to issue decrees. 
Contrary to a regime of rights, which obliges the state to avoid 
infringement of individual rights, a regime of privileges allows the 
sovereign to grant (or withdraw) services for certain populations, in an 
instantaneous administrative decision, so the subject is dependent on the 
grace and goodwill of the ruler. 
(p. 40) 
Because of the continuously changing nature of the decrees issued, Azoulay and 
Ophir (2009) argue that Palestinian subjects cannot – and are not supposed to – 
internalise the law nor behave accordingly. 
Secondly, disciplinary power is identified by Azoulay and Ophir (2009) as 
functioning most explicitly inside institutionalised sites of friction where 
Palestinians and Israeli forces meet, such as checkpoints. While Foucault’s 
disciplinary apparatuses were framed as being aimed at creating docile, reliable 
and productive subjects belonging to a specific ‘population’, Azoulay and Ophir 
(2009) argue that the disciplinary apparatus active in the occupation does not have 
this same aim. More specifically, the disciplinary power as exerted at these points 
of friction is never predictable. Due to the constantly unpredictable workings of the 
disciplinary apparatus at sites such as checkpoints, the only two things the Israeli 
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government intends for Palestinians to learn in their interactions with Israeli forces 
is “the absolute submission of the Palestinian to the agents of the Israeli ruling 
power and the need to relearn again and again what is expected in order to either 
please or avoid them” (Azoulay & Ophir, 2009, p. 115). Palestinians cannot – and 
are not supposed to – learn how to be reliable subjects, because the rules 
applicable to them change too often and too arbitrarily. As such, again and again, 
Palestinians are positioned as unruly and punishable subjects who break the (ever-
changing) rules.  
Thirdly, biopower, which is expressed through the governmental apparatus and in 
Foucault’s formulation is there to produce and assure the wellbeing of a specific 
population, focuses in the Israeli occupation on counting and classifying of 
Palestinians in the interest of the Israeli state. However, the counting and 
classifying is not aimed at the wellbeing of the Palestinian population but, rather, 
on ostensibly keeping the (Jewish) Israeli population ‘safe’. To reach maximal 
control, the occupation uses an intricate system of classification through which it 
tracks movement and locates individuals. In the process, it has created as many 
demographic distinctions as needed to make the population as legible as possible. 
In this system of counting and classifying, the checkpoints and permit system are 
essential for the creation of the necessary data.  
Azoulay and Ophir (2009) argue that this triad of sovereign, disciplinary and 
biopower can only be kept in place through the use of large-scale ‘withheld 
violence’ (p. 101-102), violence whose outbreak is imminent but not yet manifest. 
It may be actualised at any moment, but it may also never erupt. It delays, creates 
queues, undermines plans and its occurrence does not depend upon the obedience 
of its subjects. Even when one follows all the orders given by the agents of the 
Israeli regime, violence may still erupt. Similarly, when one does not follow the 
orders, violence may not erupt. As stated by Azoulay and Ophir (2009):  
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In areas and periods when violence suspends its victims all the more 
forcefully, such as in the crammed pens at checkpoints – full to bursting – 
where the crowd inches its way to the checkpoint posts (…), the formal 
difference between eruption and threat is entirely erased, and the body is 
incessantly vulnerable to all types of harm. 
(p. 109) 
2.4.2: Sovereign exception 
Azoulay and Ophir (2009) demonstrated how the occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories has been organised in such a way by the Israeli state that it allows for 
the exercise of sovereign power (Agamben, 1998). In this context in which the 
juridical order is based on (sovereign) ‘ruling by decree’, disciplinary power is 
aimed at creating an always unreliable and punishable subject, and biopower only 
produces a legible population, agents of the Israeli regime can strip individuals of 
their legal protection, without committing a crime or being held accountable 
afterwards. This becomes especially clear when going through the information that 
has been collected on investigations of civilian Palestinian fatalities in the West 
Bank from 2011 until 2015 by B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human 
Rights in the Occupied Territories.25 Between 2011 and 2015, 106 incidents in 
which a Palestinian civilian was killed by an Israeli soldier were investigated by the 
Military Advocate General’s Corps. The soldiers involved in the incidents were 
indicted in only two cases: one soldier was convicted to seven months’ jail time, 
                                                 
25 B’Tselem does not offer more recent data because since 2016 they “stopped referring 
complaints regarding harm to Palestinians by security forces to the military law enforcement 
authorities. This decision was made in view of the ineffectuality of trying to promote justice 
and protection of human rights through a system whose success is measured by its ability to 
continue to whitewash offenses”. As far as B’Tselem (2019) is aware, “no investigations were 
opened in cases occurring after September 2015 in which Palestinians were killed (…), with 
the exception of one case, the killing of 'Abd al-Fatah a-Sharif by Elor Azaria”. Azaria, an 
Israeli soldier, who shot and killed an incapacitated al-Fatah a-Sharif in Hebron in 2016, was 
convicted to 18 months’ jail time. He was freed after serving nine months (Kubovich & 
Landau, 2018). 
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the other to 18 months, although this conviction was shortened to nine months. In 
all other cases, the soldiers involved were acquitted. Their act of killing Palestinian 
civilians was not considered a crime. As stated by B’Tselem (2017d),  
Israel evades its responsibilities in matters concerning the actions of its 
security forces in the Occupied Territories, and has instead set up 
alternative systems that merely create a semblance of law enforcement – 
both in criminal law and civil law. As a result, those responsible for 
harming Palestinians go unpunished, and the victims receive no 
compensation for the harm they suffer. The few, isolated exceptions serve 
only to amplify the illusion that the law enforcement systems in place are 
functioning properly. 
In this thesis, I will analyse how the checkpoints’ regime allows for the exercise of 
sovereign power. The exercise of sovereign power by checkpoint managers is often 
as ‘eruptive’ (Azoulay & Ophir, 2009) and deadly as the cases investigated by 
B’Tselem; a recent example is the killing of Ahmad Manasra'. 26 In my thesis, 
however, I analyse much less eruptive examples. As will become clear in the 
upcoming chapters, smaller and less deadly examples of the exercise of sovereign 
power by checkpoint managers actually shed light on the less visible but equally 
oppressive daily precarious geographies to which Palestinian commuters are 
subjected. Before diving further into the literature on these checkpoints, I will turn 
to the academic debates focused on fortified borders/walling. 
                                                 
26 On 20 March 2019 two Palestinian cars were involved in an accident while passing through 
Al-Nashash checkpoint, located south of Bethlehem. When one of the drivers exited his car 
to check for damage, he was shot by an Israeli soldier from the watch tower located next to 
the checkpoint. Manasra’, who was on his way to pass through the same checkpoint, 
witnessed this and got out of his car to help the man who was shot. He brought this man to 
the nearest hospital – whether or not this man survived the shooting is unclear – and 
returned to collect the man’s wife and daughters who had remained inside the car. When 
Manasra’ got close to this car, he was shot with eight bullets by the same soldier and died on 
the spot (Al Jazeera News, 2019a). The killing of Manasra’ has not been subjected to a 
military investigation. 
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2.5: Walls and their openings 
Bordering practices and the associated mobilities of bodies on the move have been 
analysed in depth with the use of a biopolitical framework by scholars within the 
fields of political geography, political science, border studies and critical 
international relations (IR). The biopolitics of border security in particular is often 
analysed by this body of work from a ‘surveillance’ perspective, in which the 
collection of data through registration and the implementation of biometrics is 
used to identify those who need to be scrutinised and potentially stopped (see, 
e.g., Adey, 2009; Amoore, 2006; Martin, 2010, 2012; Murakami Wood, 2013; Pero 
& Smith, 2014; Van Houtum, 2010; Vaughan-Williams, 2009, 2010). Authors like 
Nick Vaughan-Williams (2010) and Rebecca Pero and Harrison Smith (2014) argue 
that, for biopolitical borders to be able to make this distinction – to be able to 
govern moving bodies – they need to allow circulation of these very bodies, 
together with the related commodities, information and money. Part of this 
literature has focused on specific sites, such as airports (Adey, 2009; Martin, 2010; 
Salter, 2007), while other work has paid attention to the presence of borders in our 
everyday spaces (Amoore, 2006; Warren, 2013). Furthermore, the term ‘border’ 
itself has been critically assessed through the analysis of the multiplication of 
borders (Vaughan-Williams, 2009) and the relational character of the process of 
‘bordering’ (Van Houtum, 2010). A full-fledged overview of this rich academic field 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. With my research project, I aim to contribute 
in particular to the debates concerning walling/checkpoints in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories specifically and, more generally, to the broader academic 
debates in the fields of political geography, political science, critical international 
relations and border studies concerning the re-emergence of walling as a favoured 
border policy. After briefly engaging with these broader debates concerning 
walling, I will introduce the work of several authors who have analysed border 
walls and their porous – or permeable – nature with the use of a biopolitical 
framework. They use this framework to underline the importance of this porosity 
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to the workings of border walls as surveillance technologies. Furthermore, I will 
discuss the academic literature on the Israeli checkpoints in the Palestinian 
Territories, focusing on the work that addresses the daily experiences of the 
commuters engaging with the checkpoints. 
It is estimated that border walls have been erected since 1990 BCE, with Hadrian’s 
Wall and the Great Wall of China as examples (Leuenberger, 2014). While the Berlin 
Wall fell in 1989, border walls have since re-emerged as a favoured policy among 
some politicians in Western liberal democracies, in Europe and far beyond, to keep 
out unwanted migrants and possible terrorists (Vallet, 2014). These walls are 
simultaneously material and symbolic manifestations of political boundaries and 
designated configurations of state power (Till et al., 2013). As illustrated by a rich 
body of academic work (see, among others, Brown, 2010; Jones, 2012; 
Leuenberger, 2014; MacCannell, 2005; Vallet & David, 2012), the walling of borders 
to block the arrival of unwanted ‘alien’ bodies of all kinds and provenances has a 
long history. However, despite these numerous and relevant precedents, there is a 
general consensus that the post-9/11 years have witnessed a global proliferation of 
new border walls (Vallet, 2014).  
Recent academic debates have revolved around why so many border walls are 
globally being built now and what the most immediate effects are. For example, 
authors such as Elisabeth Vallet (2014) and Wendy Brown (2010) suggest that post-
9/11 walls are different from those of the past, which were often built by nation-
states to claim territorial sovereignty and keep other countries’ governments from 
invading their territories. The new border walls are instead largely built as a 
response to the uncontrolled movement of individuals and non-state actors. In fact, 
the 9/11 attacks in New York (2001), and later the attacks in Madrid (2004) and 
London (2005), or more recently in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016), have shown 
how non-state actors may intervene violently as ‘enemy-others’. This fear of the 
‘enemy-other’ is connected in particular by Brown (201) in her book Walled States, 
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Waning Sovereignty to nation-states’ increased difficulty with governing their 
sovereign territory. Accordingly, the calls for new border walls may be understood 
as a response to the decline of sovereign power in a “globalized world [that] 
harbours fundamental tensions between opening and barricading, fusion and 
partition, erasure and reinscription” (Brown, 2010, p. 7). Such ‘enemy-others’, in 
these narratives, materialise in the figure of terrorists as well as of irregular 
migrants. The border walls, therefore, are meant to (presumably) control these 
uncontrolled movements and prevent unwanted enemy-others from ‘entering’ (on 
this, see, also Jones, 2012; Jones & Johnson, 2014; Vallet & David, 2012). As Reece 
Jones (2012) argues in Border Walls, with the implementation of the War on Terror 
after 9/11 and the fear of uncontrollable ‘enemy-others’, walling has become an 
expression of many nation-states’ urge to promote and enforce the management 
of a population that is as homogeneous as possible, and located within clearly 
demarcated borders, an urge that predates several post-9/11 political landscapes 
and has been developing long before 9/11 (Feigenbaum, 2010; Jones, 2012).27 Also, 
according to Marc Silberman, Karen Till and Janet Ward (2012), ‘walling’ is a 
material manifestation precisely of the wish to constantly and repeatedly 
reproduce a clear line between people who belong and people who do not.  
Remarkably, despite these border walls consisting of intricate combinations of 
visible techniques (e.g., bricks, chain-link fences and barbed wire) and less visible 
ones (e.g., such as infrared cameras and underground sensors) in practice they 
often remain rather porous and relatively unsuccessful in fully controlling the 
movement of such real-and-imagined-enemy-others (see Jones & Johnson, 2014; 
Till et al., 2013). As noted already in 2005 by Dean MacCannell, building 
impregnable fortifications is only possible in the imagination. The ‘effectiveness’ of 
                                                 
27 Famous pre-9/11 walls that are still active today are the demilitarised zone between the 
two Koreas (in use since 1953), the many walls – ‘peace lines’ – built in cities in Northern 
Ireland such as Belfast and Derry to separate Loyalist (Protestant) neighbourhoods from 
Republican (Catholic) neighbourhoods (of which the first were built in 1969), and the barrier 
separating Greek and Turkish Cyprus (installed in 1974) (Di Cintio, 2013).  
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the ‘new’ border walls in fencing off ‘migrants’ remains indeed questionable, since 
any reduction of the registered presence of refugees – highly publicised by pro-wall 
governments – normally corresponds to an increase of unregistered passages via 
smugglers’ routes or, alternatively, the deflection from the usual migrant routes 
towards more viable itineraries (Topak, 2014). So, if walls are not successful at 
stopping (irregular) movement, what do they do? 
2.5.1: Border walls as surveillance technology 
Biopolitical analyses of these border walls can shed light on this question. As 
Claudio Minca and I have argued elsewhere (see Minca & Rijke, 2017, 2018), 
whether or not walls are porous seems perhaps less important than understanding 
how they operate as an ’apparatus’28 conceived to perform materially and 
metaphorically the supposed radical difference between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. In 
fact, when leaders emphasise in their speeches the powerful materiality of border 
walls, they convey an almost epidermic sense of reality: the wall will be there, 
visible, touchable, real, impenetrable, monumental. If we look at the proliferation 
of border walls from the perspective of their visual but also almost tactile presence, 
we may wonder whether these ‘assemblages’ – wholes made up of a multiplicity of 
human and non-human entities (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980; DeLanda, 2006) – are 
actually about ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ or if they instead represent a spatial 
technology aimed at symbolically governing the body politic of the concerned 
countries: a sort of ‘self-fencing’, a practice to preserve the idea of a possible and 
final territorial integrity. Border walls, from this perspective, can be a theatrical 
                                                 
28 Apparatus, or in French ‘dispositif’, is a term that is used both by Michel Foucault and 
Giorgio Agamben. Foucault uses it throughout his work to “designate a configuration or 
arrangement of elements and forces, practices and discourses, power and knowledge, that is 
both strategic and technical” (Burchell, 2006, p. xxiii). As put slightly differently by Agamben 
(2009): “I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to 
capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, 
opinions, or discourses of living beings” (p. 14). In this thesis, I use the English term 
‘apparatus’.  
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performative presence of a strong, protective nation-state, claiming to be capable 
of keeping the ‘enemy-other’ out. 
Taking this one step further, one could argue that the relative porosity of border 
walls is key to their functioning. As argued by Polly Pallister-Wilkins (2011, 2015a, 
2016), walls need movement and circulation. While walls may be associated with 
blocking movement, she argued that walls play an important governance role by 
allowing movement: “filtering, bridging, disciplining, and constructing populations 
and practices of intervention in the milieu of circulation” (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a, 
p. 440). Hence, walls are important tools to control porosity, which is harnessed 
here, according to Pallister-Wilkins (2015a), for the purposes of governance. As a 
disciplinary tool, walls enclose and arrange elements within their confines, while 
they function biopolitically as a means to identify and categorise populations. The 
walls Pallister-Wilkins (2015a) has analysed include the Israeli Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. This wall, she argued, “enables Israel to comprehensively 
regulate Palestinian circulation, discipline and govern the occupied population 
using topographical, spatial and material forms of control working in conjunction 
with the forces of circulation” (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a, p. 451).  
Along the same lines, Stephane Rosière and Reece Jones (2012) argued that border 
walls are rarely in place just to stop movement. More specifically, they stated that 
“the effectiveness of these barriers is linked not to preventing movement but 
rather to creating an efficient system of selection that determines which types of 
mobility to allow” (Rosière & Jones, 2012, p. 232). Border fortifications are 
illustrative of the hierarchy of flows in force. While the unhindered flow of certain 
people and goods are essential for many transnational corporations and nation-
states, unwanted people and goods should be controlled – although not necessarily 
completely stopped. To illustrate this, they discussed the border between the 
United States (US) and Mexico, which is (becoming increasingly) fortified while it 
remains the most often-crossed border in the world. Rosière and Jones (2012) 
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coined the term ‘teichopolitics’29 to describe this biopolitical “practice of modern 
states and their regulation of individual lives and populations through an explosion 
of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and 
the control of populations” (p. 219).  
Nigel Parsons and Mark Salter (2008) also argued for the importance of including 
the ‘biopolitical practices of mobility regulation’ when analysing the Israeli 
occupation of the Palestinian Territories. In their view, “previous work on the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue has focused too heavily on the sovereign or disciplinary 
aspects of the conflict (laws, decrees, incarceration, and surveillance)” (Parsons & 
Salter, 2008, p. 702). While Parsons and Salter (2008) did recognise the importance 
of these mechanisms in the occupation, they argued that the role played by 
biopolitics and the allowance of circulation and flows in the occupation has not 
been fully acknowledged. Here, they used the Israeli Wall – what they call ‘the 
barrier’ – as an example. They stated that the barrier does not fully close off the 
Palestinian Territories:  
It radically constricts the flow of population (and goods). Palestinians can 
still pass through the barrier – the issue is then not enclosure, but control 
of porosity. Crucial to the workings of the barrier is the biopolitical control 
it reinforces in other kinds of Israeli state power such as identification, 
residency, and authorisation. 
 (Parsons & Salter, 2008, p. 703)  
To study walls as porous security technologies, one has to keep in mind that walls 
are not just cement, brick and barbed wire but also that, as argued by Pallister-
Wilkins (2016), “they include openings, checkpoints and gates that allow for the 
movement of people and goods” (p. 154). As Pallister-Wilkins (2016) continues, 
openings in walls do not “only channel and check, but also capture, categorize and 
                                                 
29 As Rosière and Jones (2012) explain, they have used term ‘teichopolitics’ because the 
ancient Greek word ‘teichos’ means city wall (p. 219).  
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create particular sets of data about the populations they govern, which makes 
them productive technologies, producing the very datasets that come to make up 
knowledge about particular populations” (p. 156).  
2.5.2: Walling and Israel/Palestine 
Before moving further forward, it is important to relate the Israeli Wall and its 
accompanying architecture of occupation to the post-9/11 walls discussed above. 
As described earlier in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the architecture of 
occupation – the Wall, checkpoints, settlements and their bypass roads, earth 
mounds and trenches and no-go military zones – is an inherent part of the 
occupation of the Palestinian Territories. This occupation is, as stated by Ariel 
Handel (2009), predominantly about “Palestinian space shrinking as Israeli space 
keeps growing” (p. 179). This architecture of occupation is in many ways different 
from the post-9/11 walls: it is not only located on a ‘border’ but scattered all over 
the West Bank; it is comprised of many types of barriers; its development started 
long before 9/11; it is aimed at controlling and slowing Palestinian movement 
within the West Bank as well as towards Jerusalem and Israel; and one of its most 
explicit outcomes is the growing presence of Jewish settlers in the West Bank.  
However, while the checkpoints studied in this thesis will be positioned firmly in 
the occupation of the Palestinian Territories and its specific politics, I do believe a 
discussion of the body of work that analyses post-9/11 walls and their inherent 
porosity is fruitful for the context of this research. It represents a debate to which 
this thesis speaks for two reasons. Firstly, as argued by Reece Jones (2012), the 
Wall built by Israel, and its accompanying architecture, does have broad similarities 
with other post-9/11 wall building projects. Its presence has been justified by 
reinforcing fear within Israeli society of an uncontrollable and barbaric ‘enemy-
other’ – personified in the figure of the Palestinian suicide-bomber. Moreover, it 
has been framed as representing a ‘border’ between a civilised Israel and a violent 
outside – where the outside is not only represented by the Palestinian Territories, 
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but all countries bordering Israel. Indeed, all Israel’s ‘borders’ are (partially) 
walled.30 Secondly, as the research of Pallister-Wilkins (2011, 2015a, 2016) and 
Parsons and Salter (2008) indicates, like the post-9/11 walls, the architecture of 
occupation is also inherently porous, and the checkpoints analysed in this thesis 
represent limited and unpredictable openings that need the flow and circulation of 
people for the registration and implementation of the security apparatus. 
 
2.6: Checkpoints as spatial political technologies  
Following the theoretical debates in political geography introduced in this chapter 
on bordering practices, walling and border fortifications, I use a biopolitical 
framework to analyse checkpoints as openings in the larger architecture of 
occupation aimed at monitoring, disciplining and selectively limiting Palestinian 
mobility. While doing this, I address the questions posed by Michel Foucault (1982): 
”how is power exercised?” and “what happens when individuals exert power over 
others?”(p. 337). I do so by focusing on the daily experiences of commuters passing 
through checkpoints, how the checkpoint regimes engage with them, and how they 
engage with and influence the workings of the checkpoints.  
As such, I analyse the experiences of Palestinian commuters, as well as of Jewish 
settlers, and the workings of the checkpoints as an expression of the power 
mechanisms at play, in which all entities involved in the checkpoints’ workings act 
in response to each other. Inherent to this analysis, I pay attention to the material 
means – the machines – involved in the checkpoints’ workings, and the diverse 
ways Palestinian commuters engage with and, in the process, influence the 
workings of the checkpoints. To do this, I frame the checkpoints as ‘spatial political 
                                                 
30 Borders is placed in between inverted commas because the location of its borders with 
the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Lebanon are disputed (Collins-Kreiner, Mansfeld, & 
Kliot, 2006).  
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technologies’, aimed at producing a set of selective, arbitrary and mutable 
geographies of mobility affecting the people subjected to them.  
‘Technology’ is a term that frequently appears in Foucault’s writing. Historian 
Michael Behrent (2013) explains that Foucault used the term ‘technology’ to 
indicate the dual role played by power relations in his work. On the one hand, 
technologies are described as procedures to control and manage human beings, 
“based less on overt violence than on the subtle manipulation of human 
behaviour” (Behrent, 2013, p. 84). On the other hand, Foucault used the term 
‘technology’ to discuss power as being both productive and creative: “a 
relationship that moulds, adapts, triggers, and stimulates individual behaviour, 
particularly by shaping bodily conduct” (Behrent, 2013, p. 60). An example of a 
technology analysed by Foucault as such is the aforementioned Panopticon 
(Foucault, 1977).  
Foucault most explicitly spoke of political technologies in Discipline and Punish 
(1977). In the first chapter of the book, he stated he wanted to “study the 
metamorphosis of the punitive methods on the basis of a political technology of 
the body in which might be read a common history of power relations and object 
relations” (p. 24). Later in the same chapter he continued that: 
There may be a ‘knowledge’ of the body that is not exactly the science of 
its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more than the ability to 
conquer them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be 
called the political technology of the body. 
 (Foucault, 1977, p. 26)  
This technology, as argued by Foucault (1977), is diffuse, “made up of bits and 
pieces” (p. 26), and “operates [as] a micro-physics of power, whose field of validity 
is situated in a sense between great functionings [of institutions and state 
apparatuses] and the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces” (p. 
26). As further elucidated by legal scholar Jonathan Simon (2013), “a political 
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technology of the body is a craft, system, or method for organizing bodies to 
produce specific effects that have a political value or purpose” (p. 62).  
I have found inspiration in the work of Claudio Minca and Stuart Elden that takes 
up the concept of ‘political technology’. Minca used this concept when analysing 
‘the camp’, which he defines as: “a spatial political technology aimed at governing, 
disciplining, and qualifying ‘migrants’” (Altin & Minca, 2017, p. 31; see also Katz, 
Martin, & Minca, 2018; and Minca, 2015a). In his discussion on the importance of 
analysing camps as inherent to our modern-day geo-political economies and not as 
exceptions, he argued that “camps were – and in many contemporary cases remain 
– part of a set of broader political technologies, aimed at controlling mobility and 
‘governing life’ through coercion and direct or indirect violent means” (Minca, 
2015a, p. 76). Furthermore, Minca (2015a) addressed the importance of analysing 
camps as spatial political technologies, arguing that one should analyse camp 
geographies as “an ever-present spatial formation in the management of custody 
and care characterizing many authoritarian regimes as well as contemporary 
democracies” (p. 74). While Minca focuses in his analysis on different moving 
bodies and different technologies (i.e. migrants and refugee camps) than I do in 
this study, I found his work insightful when deploying the term ‘spatial political 
technology’ in my analysis of checkpoints as spatial formations aimed at controlling 
mobility. In a different way, Elden (2013) argued in The Birth of Territory that 
territory should be understood as a political technology, “or perhaps better as a 
bundle of political technologies” (p. 322). Instead of seeing territory only as ‘the 
land’, Elden proposed to understand it as a sociotechnical construction. For him, 
territory comprises land in a political-economic sense, as in land use and possession 
of land, but it also comprises “techniques for measuring land and controlling 
terrain. Measure and control – the technical and the legal – need to be thought 
alongside land and terrain” (Elden, 2013, p. 323).  
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Hence, following Minca (2015a) and Elden (2013), I argue that framing checkpoints 
as political technologies entails analysing them as made up of specific practices and 
techniques aimed at organising and producing the embodied subjects subjected to 
them – at measuring and controlling. To do this, I focus on the everyday interplay 
between the checkpoint managers machines and the commuters subjected to 
them. I focus on how the checkpoints’ regime controls and selectively limits 
Palestinian mobility and the role played by ‘withheld’ and ‘eruptive’ violence in the 
workings of checkpoints (Azoulay & Ophir, 2009). Adding to this, in framing these 
political technologies as spatial political technologies, I add an explicit spatial 
element to the analysis and focus on how checkpoints produce selective, arbitrary 
and mutable geographies of mobility. 
To further develop my project’s theoretical framework, I wish to address the 
inclusion of material entities in the analysis. As described in this chapter, Foucault 
included material means as one of the factors that has to be analysed as a part of 
the power dynamics at play and as a factor influencing political technologies acting 
on bodies. To further develop this argument, I turn to the work of Reviel Netz 
(2004) and Randal McGuire (2013). While neither engages directly with the work of 
Foucault, their analyses of barbed wire and the wall between the US and Mexico, 
respectively, shed light on the important role played by non-human actors in the 
creation of specific geographies of mobility. 
In Barbed Wire, an Ecology of Modernity, Netz (2004) discussed the development 
of barbed wire from its initial design to control the movement of cattle and enclose 
grazing areas, to its use in war and camps to control the movement of humans (p. 
xii). In this process, one could argue that barbed wire became an important political 
technology, originally designed with one rationale in mind – to keep cows from 
walking away and to protect them from other animals and humans – but developed 
into doing much more than it was initially intended for: a technology used, for 
instance, to enclose the victims of murderous regimes such as Hitler’s Third Reich 
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and the Soviet Union under Stalin. Netz’s (2004) analysis of barbed wire illustrates 
the important role that non-human actors play – in which the interplay of human 
and non-human agency produces a specific set of relationships.  
This interplay is a continuous process and can produce unexpected outcomes. As 
described by archaeologist McGuire (2013) in his analysis of the wall in an 
American/Mexican border town, the local people living in this area continuously 
illegally breach the wall by climbing over it, tunnelling under it, throwing items over 
it or touching hands and sharing stories through the gaps between the bars. In 
these transgressions, the wall is, in McGuire’s (2013) words, ‘rematerialised’ and 
changed from an unbreachable barrier to a hindrance that can be (partly) 
overcome. As a response, the US government started rebuilding the border barrier, 
and in 2011 a new nine-metre-high steel construction was constructed (McGuire, 
2013, p. 474). But the people living in the area still found ways to breach each new 
wall. As such, McGuire’s (2013) analysis showed how the US border police, the 
inhabitants and the materiality of the wall are caught up in an endless interplay 
that produces selective, arbitrary and mutable geographies of mobility. 
Checkpoints, as in the cases of barbed wire and the wall between the US and 
Mexico, are characterised by relationships that incorporate the possibility and the 
actualisation of violence against the commuters – by constraining their mobility 
and by subjecting them to a regime of uncertainty and arbitrariness. They are the 
outcome of the interactions between Palestinian commuters, Israeli commuters, 
Israeli checkpoint managers and the machines and other materials present in the 
checkpoints. In my analysis, I focus on how these assemblages of biopolitical 
categories, material devices and barriers, procedures of control, calculative 
rationalities and selective practices – in other words, checkpoints – do things. 
Inspired by McGuire’s (2013) analysis, I pay specific attention to the messiness 
related to the daily practices of the checkpoints analysed. I not only look at how 
the checkpoints and their machines violently clash with Palestinians but also at 
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how Palestinians continuously engage with, and often transgress, the intended 
workings of the checkpoints and their machines and, in the process, produce an 
endless array of unexpected outcomes.  
In the next chapter, I will discuss the methods used in this PhD project to collect 
the necessary data in order to answer the research questions that were posed in 
the introduction of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Photo Dossier II
Settlements
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Figure P.5: Har Gilo (source: Rijke, June 2017). 
 
Figure P.6: A small Jewish settlement located southeast of Bethlehem  
(source: Rijke, May 2016). 
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Figure P.7: A Jewish settlement located in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City of 
Jerusalem (source: Rijke, June 2016).  
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I keep having to remind myself that so much of the built-up area around Bethlehem 
are not Palestinian towns. When you drive around, in almost any direction you 
look, you see settlements with their typical red roofs. Guts Etzion is not ‘a 
settlement’, as I used to think, but an entire area and it’s huge! 
(fieldnotes, 20 May 2016) 
 
 
 
Figure P.8: Beitar Illit settlement located southwest of Bethlehem and one of the 
largest Jewish settlements in the West Bank (source: Rijke, May 2016). 
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Omer takes me to Wadi Fukin, a village located south of Bethlehem. This area is not 
walled and many people enter Israel illegally here. On our way back to the car we 
bypass the Jewish settlement Beitar Illit. It is built on the hill that overlooks Wadi 
Fukin. Beitar Illit is one of the biggest settlements in the West Bank, with more than 
50,000 inhabitants. Wadin Fukin only has a population of around 1000. They are 
building more homes in Beitar Illit. Omer explains that the Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu stated that Beitar Illit should double in size and that he will support this. 
I don’t know what this would mean for the Palestinian inhabitants of the area, but 
it can’t be good… 
(fieldnotes, 7 June 2017) 
 
 
Figure P.9: The Palestinian village Wadi Fukin on the left with a new constructed 
section of Beitar Illit on the right (source: Rijke, May 2019).  
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3.1: Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss the fieldwork that I have done to collect the necessary 
data. I describe the sites I have studied and the methods that I have used to do so, 
explaining why I chose these methods specifically to answer the research questions 
formulated in Chapter 1 of this thesis. I will also discuss the ethical dilemmas and 
trade-offs that are inherent to doing research in highly-militarised areas such as the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
This thesis is based on data collected in 2016, 2017 and 2019 during a 7-month 
period of fieldwork spent in the Bethlehem area. The first fieldwork trip was 
preceded by a three-week stay at Ben-Gurion University in Beersheba, Israel, in 
April 2016, during which I finalised my research proposal and prepared my 
fieldwork. When I arrived in Bethlehem in May 2016, it was not for the first time. I 
had already spent three months there in 2013 to collect data for my master’s 
thesis31 and one month in 2014 to prepare my PhD proposal. On the basis of the 
theoretical framework described in the previous chapter, I implemented a 
combination of qualitative methods. These methods were positioned within an 
ethnographic research approach, in which the study of the daily activities of 
checkpoints commuters was enriched by a broader analysis of their interactions 
with the architecture of occupation in the Bethlehem area. A combination of 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews and go-along interviews was 
chosen to investigate the power relations at play at the checkpoints, and the 
diverse and arbitrary geographies that stem from them.  
                                                 
31 During the fieldwork for my master thesis, I analysed the ‘Wall Museum’, a project in 
which approximately 100 posters depicting stories of Palestinian women and children were 
attached to the Wall in Bethlehem. In that study I analysed what the Wall Museum meant 
for the women who had participated in it, how it connected to sumud, an Arabic word that 
can be translated as ‘steadfastness’ or ‘resilience’, and whether participating in the project 
had changed the relationships the women had with the Wall (see Rijke & Van Teeffelen, 
2014).  
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This combination of methods was inspired by the work of Gabrielle Ivinson and 
Emma Renold (2013, 2014), who analysed how gendered histories of place are 
repeated and ruptured in the conscious and unconscious relations of teenage girls 
in a semi-rural post-industrial area of Wales, and Gillian Rose, Monica Degen and 
Begum Basdas (2010), who investigated the influence of different mobilities on the 
materialisation of shopping malls. These methods provide researchers with a mix of 
data on the contexts analysed: responses from interviewees, observations made 
during go-along interviews, participant observations, photos and videos produced 
by the respondents themselves. Such an interrelated mix of data, as will be 
elaborated on later, enabled me to analyse what checkpoints ‘do’ relative to 
different bodies at different moments. The data collection was not restricted to 
specific moments (e.g., the planned interviews or the mornings I observed the 
checkpoints); rather, it was a continuous process throughout the periods I was in 
Bethlehem.  
Doing fieldwork in a highly militarised context, during which moments of ‘eruptive 
violence’ were positioned in an ever-present atmosphere of ‘withheld violence’ 
(Azoulay & Ophir, 2009), inevitably implies ethical considerations. Most specifically 
considering safety – of the people I interviewed, but also myself – and the power 
imbalances between us. Moreover, it meant that I was affected by the context of 
the fieldwork, something I will also address in this chapter.  
In the following sections I explain the choice of methods and embed these in the 
relevant literature. I explicitly position myself in the research (Haraway, 1988, 
Harding, 1986), choosing to remain visible throughout this thesis. I will elaborate 
on my positionality and experiences in the field and on how these have informed 
the research project in the upcoming sections.  
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3.2: Sites  
The initial decision to focus on the Bethlehem area was based on several 
considerations. Most importantly, it is an area that houses several large 
checkpoints. In this research project, I focused on three of these, namely 
Checkpoint 300, Al Walaja and The Tunnels. It is also an area where the Wall is 
explicitly visible in parts of the city. It is positioned in such a way that Rachel’s 
tomb, a religiously significant site for Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is on ‘the 
Israeli side’ of the Wall. Moreover, the area south of Bethlehem is an area that is 
particularly densely populated with settlements and their accompanying material 
barriers. Jewish settlers refer to this area as ‘Guts Etsion’. Furthermore, my earlier 
connections to Bethlehem meant that I was familiar with the city, its surroundings, 
the three checkpoints and already had a social network on which I could rely. 
Figure 1.2 on page 9 shows the presence of the Wall, settlements and checkpoints 
in the Bethlehem area.  
3.2.1: Selection of the checkpoints 
Several factors motivated the decision to focus specifically on the Checkpoint 300, 
The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints. Checkpoint 300 is one of the busiest 
checkpoints in the West Bank and a terminal checkpoint. This means that it is a 
highly controlled and specifically designed checkpoint. Also, my previous 
experience of living in Bethlehem meant that I was aware of the chaotic and 
arbitrary nature of Checkpoint 300. The inclusion of The Tunnels and Al Walaja 
checkpoints was necessary to shed light on the workings of so-called ‘shared 
checkpoints’. These checkpoints are used by Jewish Israelis and Palestinians with an 
Israeli or Jerusalem ID card. By analysing Checkpoint 300 and the two car 
checkpoints in the same research project, it became clear that, although these 
checkpoints are designed in a dramatically different way, they are very similar. All 
three can be analysed as spatial political technologies that produce arbitrary and 
mutable geographies of mobility. Due to the differences in design between these 
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checkpoints, the influence of the design and architecture of the checkpoints on 
their functioning, especially regarding the presence/absence of machines, became 
more explicit.  
Furthermore, while Qalandiya Checkpoint, a terminal checkpoint that is located 
between Ramallah and Jerusalem and that is infamous for the occurrence of 
spectacular violence, has been analysed in depth by authors such as Helga Tawil-
Souri (2009, 2010, 2011b, 2017) and Rema Hammami (2004, 2010, 2015), when I 
started working on this thesis, there was no other academic work focussed on 
these three checkpoints.  
Next, I will discuss the main methods I have used during my fieldwork to collect 
data, namely checkpoint observations and two types of interviewing techniques: 
semi-structured interviews and go-along interviews. 
 
3.3: Checkpoint observations 
How and when I observed the checkpoints was largely determined by their spatial 
regime and accompanying architecture. I spent up to eight hours each week during 
rush hour (from 4:00 to 8:00 am) standing inside Checkpoint 300 to observe its 
workings. This meant that several times a week I would arrive at the checkpoint at 
4:00 am and I would stay until 7:00 or 8:00 am. Due to the design of Checkpoint 
300 (see pages 18, 158 and 198 for maps of the checkpoint), I was able to stand just 
inside the checkpoint, in front of the first turnstile in the humanitarian lane/exit 
lane. This is a special lane for select groups of Palestinians, such as women, children 
and elderly, in order to avoid the large crowds in the main entrance lane (see 
Chapters 4 and 5 for a more in-depth discussion of this lane). There, I was only a 
few steps away from the exit of the checkpoint that leads to the Bethlehem side of 
the Wall and into Area A. This position also allowed me to step out of the 
checkpoint away from the checkpoint managers – which at times I felt was 
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necessary to avoid tense interactions with them. From this location, I could observe 
the passage of Palestinian commuters through the first turnstile. When I wished to 
go further into the checkpoint, I could pass the first turnstile and venture inside the 
main building of the checkpoint. Then I could observe the queues waiting to enter 
the metal detector and x-ray rooms, and pass through the second and third set of 
turnstiles. These led to the booths in which the IDF soldiers who checked every 
commuter’s paperwork were seated, through which I could pass, but from which I 
also could turn around and return to the Bethlehem side of the checkpoint. Hence, 
on most mornings I was able to walk around the whole checkpoint building, 
although at times the size of the waiting crowds made it difficult and even 
impossible to enter the main checkpoint building or the area in front of the first 
turnstile.  
During these observations, I was able to witness the intricate workings of the 
checkpoint regime and the selective geographies of mobility that are produced and 
reproduced on a daily basis. By being present inside Checkpoint 300 for at least 
eight hours each week, I could observe the interactions between Palestinian 
commuters and checkpoint managers and the arbitrary nature of the workings of 
the checkpoint. Moreover, I could witness how the Palestinians commuters 
responded to, reproduced and manipulated the checkpoint’s workings. More 
specifically, I was able to observe both routine and moments of exception, 
moments when the checkpoint functioned according to the rules and regulations, 
and moments when these rules and regulations were suspended. I observed 
mornings when all went smoothly, and mornings when I experienced the ‘withheld 
violence’ (Azoulay & Ophir, 2009) inside the checkpoint as almost tangible, or was 
the witness of occurrences of the checkpoint soldiers’ ‘eruptive violence’ directed 
at Palestinian commuters. What type of morning it would be would never be clear 
until I arrived at the checkpoint, nor was the atmosphere at the checkpoint stable 
once I got there – one moment and one interaction could change a smooth and 
quiet morning into a violent one. I was able to observe both the intricate daily 
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workings of the checkpoint and the way the Palestinian commuters reacted. These 
reactions ranged from accepting the decisions made by the checkpoint managers 
to manipulating the checkpoint regime and its machines, to even rejecting them 
completely. By sharing these observations during the go-along and in-depth home 
interviews, I was able to reflect with the interviewees on the checkpoint’s workings 
and their own engagements with its regime.  
During part of my checkpoint observations I went to Checkpoint 300 together with 
the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel team (EAPPI). 
The EAPPI, an organisation that provides an international presence in the West 
Bank (2019), is one of the international organisations active in the West Bank. One 
of the EAPPI teams’ activities is going to large checkpoints during rush hour to 
observe the workings of the checkpoint and produce reports afterwards. The EAPPI 
was generally accepted as a presence inside the checkpoint by the private security 
guards and the IDF. For about half of my checkpoint observations I went to 
Checkpoint 300 together with the EAPPI, as this had several advantages for me. 
Firstly, it made me less ‘visible’ to the checkpoint managers. While I had been 
invited by Ben Gurion University to work on my research, I decided not to make my 
role known to the Israeli soldiers and private security guards present inside the 
checkpoints, fearing I would be denied entry. Going to the checkpoint with the 
EAPPI meant that I was seen as being part of this organisation, and hence, also 
accepted. The ethical implications of being associated with such an organisation 
will be discussed later in this chapter. Secondly, joining the EAPPI also meant that I 
did not have to observe the checkpoint alone. Getting up in the middle of the night 
to stand in a closed-off, tense and highly militarised space for several hours can be 
an intimidating task. By going to the checkpoint together with two or three other 
people, I tried to minimise the risks associated with being in such a context. When I 
got further into my fieldwork, I felt more comfortable with going to the checkpoint 
alone, which I ended up doing quite regularly. However, during the first period of 
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my fieldwork and also when the checkpoint regime got more violent during 
Ramadan in 2017, I was happy I did not have to do this alone.  
During my checkpoint observations, I often wrote down notes on my mobile phone 
and took pictures. While taking pictures, I had to make sure that I was not caught 
by an Israeli soldier/security guard since photography was not permitted inside 
Checkpoint 300. However, a more pressing ethical issue arose. I had visited the 
checkpoint before and had seen foreigners photographing the long queues. I was 
very hesitant to do this because it felt inappropriate and insensitive. While some 
my interviewees encouraged me to take pictures ‘to show the world what is 
happening’ (a comment I heard more often during my checkpoint observations), 
other interviewees told me that they did not want me to photograph them – they 
indicated that they felt this would dehumanise them further. To address this ethical 
problem, I ensured that I either did not photograph people’s faces or explicitly 
asked a person’s consent to take their photograph. If they responded negatively, 
which did happen at times, I would put the camera (or my mobile phone) away. 
The decision to take photographs was based on my belief that the photographs 
would help me to illustrate the context analysed in this thesis.  
As I discuss more at length in the section on ‘limitations of the study’ on page 135, 
this form of intense observation was not possible at the car checkpoints. I tried to 
find a spot to observe these checkpoints from a distance. However, to be able to 
see anything of the workings of the checkpoints meant getting close enough to be 
spotted by the soldiers at work. I also did not wish to disclose my research 
objectives to the soldiers managing these checkpoints and the risks of either 
getting stopped, arrested or hurt were too large to walk around in the area. To 
observe these car checkpoints, therefore, I passed through them at least once a 
week, alone or during go-along interviews.  
Besides these specific moments of observation, I was also confronted with 
checkpoints during my travels in the West Bank. Travelling anywhere inside the 
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West Bank, to East Jerusalem or Israel entails passing through at least one 
checkpoint or taking elaborate detours instead. My own passages were, of course, 
dramatically different from the passages of Palestinians – something I will 
elaborate on later in this chapter.  
Bringing it even closer to home, due to the location of the house in which I was 
staying, Checkpoint 300 was an inherent part of my daily life. The checkpoint was 
located only a few minutes’ walk from my home, and the car lane was positioned at 
the end of the street that my balcony faced. This meant that the checkpoint was 
never far away. There were many sounds specific to life in Bethlehem, such as the 
muezzins making the call to prayer and the shouts of the drivers of service (shared) 
taxis looking for passengers. There were also the sounds of the occupation: the 
sirens of military vehicles, the buzzing of drones, the explosions of tear gas and 
sound bombs, or the sound of guns being fired (or fireworks, and one quickly learns 
to recognise the difference). However, the checkpoint itself had its own specific 
soundscapes. The honking of the cars lining up to pass through the checkpoint, for 
instance, was a continuous presence in my daily life. The car horns functioned like a 
clock – they would start at around 3:30 am, and stop at around 5 or 6 am, 
depending on the speed of the soldiers. Then they would start again at around 4 
pm, and stop again at around 7 or 8 pm. The honking would start for the last time 
of the day at around 10 or 11 pm and last for about an hour, all indicating the rush 
hour comings and goings at the checkpoint. Other sounds also poured out of the 
checkpoint, such as the shouts of people trying to pass through and the orders 
given by soldiers over the intercoms. Silence during these expected moments of 
rush hour also became a signal, as it often indicated that something had happened 
and that the checkpoint was closed. Living this close to the checkpoint and the 
Wall, but also moving around in the West Bank, meant that the architecture of 
occupation was an inherent part of my daily life. So, as stated earlier, ‘doing 
research’ was not something that happened at certain moments. In many ways, I 
was always doing research. 
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To record my experiences, I kept a fieldwork ‘diary’. In this diary I wrote down my 
observations at the checkpoints and during the interviews, but I also wrote about 
my life in Bethlehem. This is important to do meticulously as one easily forgets the 
finer details of observations (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011). While certain 
moments may seem trivial at the time, these moments can later be essential when 
working through one’s observations. A morning inside the checkpoint when 
‘nothing happens’ becomes insightful when looking at violence as something that 
may or may not occur. At the end of each day or at least every other day, I would 
write notes in my diary, either in short key words, or in a long narrative style. This 
diary was initially meant to remain private and I did not censure myself. The notes, 
which I usually wrote down in a mixture of English and Dutch, were at times filled 
with emotions, such as anger, sadness and frustration with the occupation. They 
also contained worries about the fieldwork, about my own position and about how 
I dealt with being ‘in the field’.  
Since the observations recorded in this diary turned out to be instrumental in my 
analysis, sections of these notes have been included in this thesis. They have been 
translated into English when necessary. They have been rewritten to ensure 
anonymity, and the language has been altered when deemed necessary. I used 
several ‘locations’ for this diary during the fieldwork, such as my phone, notebooks 
and my laptop. I made sure that in the end all was chronologically organised on my 
laptop. Besides recording observations that might be important for my research, 
this was a way to create a space in which I could reflect on my own vulnerabilities 
and failures. It also helped me to become aware of the implications of the unequal 
power relations between me and my interviewees, of my own positionality and my 
own personal viewpoints. This became especially important when reflecting on my 
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interviews with Jewish settlers. In this way, the diary was a way to keep myself 
from falling for the ‘god trick’ (Haraway, 1988)32.  
Apart from this diary, I also wrote weekly reports to my supervisors while I was in 
the field. At first, they were intended to keep my supervisors updated on my 
progress and possible struggles, but in the end these reports were important 
weekly moments in which I structured my thoughts, formulated questions and 
described my observations. The tone of these reports was different from my diary, 
as they were not meant to remain private. Moreover, they were also in many ways 
an exercise of analysis. They made me ‘translate’ my daily observations, questions 
and frustrations into a more ‘academic’ tone and they were instrumental in starting 
to formulate my arguments. Parts of these weekly reports are reproduced in this 
thesis between the chapters, accompanying the photo dossiers of the architecture 
of occupation.  
 
3.4: Interviewing 
Besides observing and passing through the checkpoints that I analysed, I conducted 
61 interviews with 25 Palestinians and 11 Jewish settlers. I used two interviewing 
‘styles’, namely semi-structured interviews (Hesse-Biber, 2007; Ivinson & Renold, 
2013, 2014; Rose, Degen, & Basdas, 2010), usually at the home of the interviewee, 
and go-along interviews (Kusenbach, 2003; Ross, Renold, Holland, & Hillman, 
2009). I often spoke to an interviewee twice, conducting both a semi-structured 
                                                 
32 Donna Haraway (1988) used the term the ‘god trick’ to critique the belief in objectivity in 
science: “seeing everything from nowhere” (p. 581). With this term, and her work on 
situated knowledges in general, Haraway critiqued the premise of a researcher being an 
objective observer, collecting data that represent the truth about what is ‘out there’. The 
diary I kept made sure I stayed aware of my emotions, opinions and, hence, my positionality.  
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interview and a go-along interview. I have interviewed 14 interviewees once. The 
other 22 interviewees were interviewed at least twice.33 
Besides these 61 interviews, I have also interviewed two internationals living in 
Bethlehem, one Dutch and one New Zealander; one Israeli scholar who is 
specialised in analysing Israeli settlements; and two members of Machsom Watch. I 
have also joined Machsom Watch on a checkpoint watch of Qalandiya Checkpoint 
and on a daylong observation of the old city of Jerusalem on a Friday during 
Ramadan in 2016. Except for the Israeli scholar and the two women from Machsom 
Watch, all interviewees wished to remain anonymous, hence pseudonyms are 
used.  
The Palestinians and Jewish settlers I interviewed were selected because they 
regularly travelled to Jerusalem or Israel, and passed through either Checkpoint 
300, The Tunnels checkpoint or Al Walaja checkpoint on their routes. All 
Palestinians lived in Bethlehem or in the surrounding villages, namely Beit Sahour, 
Al Walaja, Al Khader and Beit Jala, with the exception of three men living in Jaba’, a 
village located southwest of Bethlehem. Of the 25 Palestinians, ten were women 
and 15 men. They travelled through the checkpoints for various reasons: some 
worked for different types of employers (Israeli, Palestinian or international), some 
travelled as students, and some for leisure. All of the settlers I interviewed lived in 
Har Gilo, a settlement located south of Jerusalem and north-east of Bethlehem (see 
Figure 1.2).  
The hill on which Har Gilo has been built has been used as an army base since 
Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire, first by the Turkish army, then by the 
Jordanian army and now by the Israeli army. The settlement Har Gilo was 
established in 1972 as a so-called ‘field school’, an institute focused on nature 
conservation that provides education, executes research projects and is active in 
                                                 
33 See Appendix 1 for a table with an overview of the main characteristics of these 
interviewees.  
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conservation (Lazaroff, 2009). The first inhabitants of the settlement were 
employees of the field school. The field school was closed in the 1990s, but the 
settlers never left. Today, over 1,200 residents live in Har Gilo, which also still 
functions as an army base.  
I decided to interview settlers living in Har Gilo because of its location and 
demographics. Har Gilo is located 1.8 km south of Jerusalem and just on the 
Palestinian side of the Green Line. To travel to Jerusalem or Israel, the inhabitants 
of Har Gilo have to pass through a checkpoint. The two closest and convenient 
checkpoints are The Tunnels and Al Walaja. Furthermore, its inhabitants constitute 
a diverse group. While, at first, only employees of the field school moved to Har 
Gilo, a second wave consisted predominantly of people who moved to Har Gilo to 
get away from overcrowded Jerusalem and wanted to live in a more rural area. As 
explained by Dror Etkes, the Israeli scholar I interviewed who specialises in 
analysing Jewish settlements, during the last decade a group of Jewish Israelis 
moved to Har Gilo because of the financial benefits of cheap housing. Secular Jews 
make up most of the population of the settlement (interview, Dror Etkes, 1 June 
2016).  
Har Gilo is located on the route of the Wall and next to the Palestinian towns Beit 
Jala and Al Walaja (see Figure 1.2). Both towns have been negatively impacted by 
Har Gilo and the Wall. Al Walaja is particularly affected: it has lost most of its 
agricultural land and when the construction of the Wall is finished, the village will 
be completely surrounded by the Wall. Furthermore, Al Walaja is especially known 
for regular home demolitions by the Israeli army due to an almost complete 
absence of building permits provided by the state of Israel (Al-Qadi, 2018b).  
I used my personal network in Bethlehem to set up my first interviews with 
Palestinians. I then used the snowball technique and asked my interviewees if they 
could introduce me to others. I also conducted informal interviews during my 
checkpoint observations and recruited more interviewees through those. It was 
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more difficult to set up my first interviews with settlers from Har Gilo. I did not 
know anyone who lived in Har Gilo, or in any other settlement, nor did I know 
anyone otherwise connected to Har Gilo. When Har Gilo was a field school it was a 
member of the Society for Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI). I emailed the SPNI 
and I was provided with the email address of a resident who was happy to be 
interviewed. After this, I used the snowball technique to recruit more interviewees.  
The interviews with the two Israeli women of Machsom Watch, the Israeli scholar, 
and the New Zealand and Dutch nationals living in Bethlehem were less informative 
for the research project presented here. However, they did shed light on the ways 
in which ‘different bodies’ were treated by the checkpoint technology. They also 
provided me with the opportunity to reflect on my own experiences passing 
checkpoints as an ‘other body’ and they made it possible for me to understand the 
larger dynamics at play concerning the Israeli politics, the settlement policies and 
the role the checkpoints play in this.  
3.4.1: Semi-structured interviews 
After my initial contact with interviewees, I first conducted a semi-structured in-
depth interview. This interview would usually take place at the home of the 
interviewee. During this interview I discussed the daily commute of the 
interviewees and also, more generally, the influence of the multitude of barriers in 
their lives. In-depth interviewing is a method recognised for helping researchers 
gain insight into the daily experiences of their respondents (Hesse-Biber, 2007) and 
was propagated by Gabrielle Ivinson and Emma Renold (2013, 2014) and Gillian 
Rose, Monica Degen and Begum Basdas (2010) as a useful method to combine with 
the use of mobile methods.  
During the in-depth interviews, I discussed the daily checkpoint experiences of my 
interviewees, how they engaged with the checkpoint managers and to what extent 
they experienced their checkpoint passages as predictable. More specifically, the 
interviews enabled me to examine with my interviewees how the checkpoints 
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worked, and which rules were in place and how often these were followed or 
suspended. We discussed their interactions with the soldiers and private security 
present, and the strategies the interviewees used to try to positively influence their 
checkpoint passages. This made it possible to discuss the checkpoints as openings 
in the larger regime of enclosure in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the role 
played by arbitrariness inside the checkpoints, the categories used and suspended 
by the checkpoint managers and the endless interplay between the checkpoint 
managers, checkpoint machinery and my interviewees. We also talked about how 
the checkpoints had changed over the years. Moreover, I discussed my checkpoint 
observations with the interviewees, which enabled me to not only further assess 
the checkpoints but also my own analysis.  
These in-depth interviews were semi-structured, which meant that I used a topic 
list during the interviews to ensure certain issues were discussed.34 This topic list 
was critically assessed and adapted while in the field. The majority of the 
interviews were recorded, always with the consent of the interviewees. Four 
interviews were not recorded, due to the fact that these interviews were 
unplanned and I did not have my mobile phone or recorder with me. During these 
four interviews I made notes and afterwards I wrote up a detailed description of 
the interview as soon as possible.  
After the in-depth interview, I asked my interviewees if I could join them on their 
daily commute during a go-along interview. Most interviewees agreed to this, but I 
was unable to have go-along interviews with all, usually due to interviewees’ 
personal reasons or because of the nature of their commute.35 Of the 25 
Palestinians I interviewed, I joined 12 once and four twice on their daily commute, 
and I joined five of the 11 Jewish settlers once on their daily commute. 
                                                 
34 See Appendix 2 for the topic list. 
35 I was unable to join two Palestinian interviewees on their commute because this entailed 
entering Israeli illegally.  
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3.4.2: Go-along interviews  
Go-along interviews entailed that I joined my interviewees on their usual routes in 
which they had to pass through one of the three checkpoints analysed here 
(Kusenbach, 2003; Ross, Renold, Holland, & Hillman, 2009). Gabrielle Ivinson and 
Emma Renold (2013, 2014) described how the use of mobile methods allowed 
them to explore experiences associated with everyday practices, places, routines 
and rituals. They used go-along interviews, together with photo-elicitation, in-
depth interviewing, film-making and participant observations to analyse how 
gendered histories of place influence the way girls use those places.  
Ivinson and Renold (2014) also argued that by putting themselves ‘in the midst of 
things’, they were able to observe the ways their interviewees engaged with 
different places on their routes, while they also experienced those routes 
themselves, which would have not been possible through static in-depth 
interviewing alone. This possibility for the researcher to experience the route taken 
was also argued by Gillian Rose, Monica Degen and Begum Basdas (2010) to be one 
of the advantages of go-along interviews, which they called ‘walk-along 
interviews’.36 By experiencing the interviewees’ routes, a diverse set of data can be 
generated, where the conversation taking place is not the only data collected, but 
also the movement, sounds, smells and rhythms. Whereas with in-depth 
interviewing the researcher can discuss the ways people interact with and co-
constitute places, Rose, Degen and Basdas (2010) argue that with the use of walk-
along interviews, researchers can simultaneously discuss and observe it.  
The interviews were done travelling by car, public transport and/or on foot. The ID 
card held by the interviewee generally determined the mode of transportation. As 
stipulated in the introduction, Palestinians with a West Bank ID are not allowed to 
                                                 
36 Rose, Degen and Basdas (2010) joined their respondents on foot on their usual route in 
shopping malls. As the modes of transportation have been diverse in my research project, I 
prefer the term go-along interviews, following authors such as Margarethe Kusenbach 
(2003) and Richard Carpiano (2009). 
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drive their Palestinian cars (green-white number plates) inside Jerusalem or Israel. 
They are not allowed to own an Israeli car (yellow number plate), so they are 
forced to pass through checkpoints on foot and use alternative transportation. 
Hence, the interviews with Palestinians with a West Bank ID entailed going on foot 
through Checkpoint 300 and using public transport to get to our intended 
destination. My interviews with Palestinians with Jerusalem or Israeli ID cards and 
Jewish settlers entailed driving through the checkpoints in their private cars, 
predominately using the Al Walaja and The Tunnels checkpoints. I also joined one 
Palestinian interviewee with a Jerusalem ID card while she passed through 
Checkpoint 300 in her car on her way to work in Bethlehem, but most of my 
interviewees preferred to take the detour from Bethlehem to drive through The 
Tunnels or Al Walaja checkpoint. 
I was living in Bethlehem, which has been categorised as Area A, so I met the 
Jewish settlers I was interviewing either at their homes in Har Gilo or on the road 
leading up to Har Gilo, which is located in Area C. I met the Palestinians with a West 
Bank, Jerusalem or Israeli ID card either at Checkpoint 300, their place of work or 
their home. I did not use a list of preconceived questions or topics during the go-
along interviews. Since I had done an in-depth interview with them before the go-
along interview, I had prepared myself at times to pay extra attention to certain 
issues concerning their interactions with checkpoints. The route was decided on by 
my interviewees, as long as the route would lead through one of the three 
checkpoints. Moreover, I did not record these interviews since carrying a recorder 
or using my mobile phone as one while passing through the checkpoints could 
draw too much attention. During the interviews I wrote down key words or 
sentences on my phone, and afterwards I wrote extensive notes.  
The go-along interviews allowed me to observe and experience the daily 
engagements of my interviewees, both Palestinian residents and Jewish settlers, 
with the checkpoint regimes. During these go-along interviews, I was able to 
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further discuss the checkpoint experiences that my interviewees had already 
brought up during the in-depth home interviews, and observe their passages 
directly. While remaining firmly planted in my own positionality, something I 
elaborate on later in this chapter, I could witness the interactions first-hand and 
experience them directly. These experiences consisted of feeling the cold and 
warm temperatures to which commuters are exposed while passing through a 
checkpoint on foot, the tiredness in my body from waking up early and queuing, 
the surprise when the checkpoint lanes turn out completely full upon arrival and 
frustration when turnstiles remained closed for no apparent reason. Seeing the 
interactions between my interviewees and the checkpoints’ managers and 
machines enabled me to discuss with my interviewees the rules and regulations, 
and the many exceptions used. Moreover, by joining both Palestinians and Jewish 
settlers on their passages, I was able to compare the differences in their 
experiences and the workings of the different checkpoints. I could compare the 
smooth, air-conditioned car ride through a checkpoint with a Jewish settler on a 
10-minute commute from Har Gilo to Jerusalem, with the hot, tiring commute of 
two Palestinian interviewees from Al Walaja, the village located right next to Har 
Gilo, to Jerusalem, that took over 90 minutes on a quiet checkpoint morning. This 
enabled me to analyse the checkpoints within the larger occupation regime. 
Moreover, I got to experience the differences between how my white body was 
approached and how my Palestinians interviewees’ bodies were, shedding light on 
the differences that bodily appearances make when being engaged with by the 
checkpoint technology.  
As such, the go-along interviews also allowed me to experience the differences in 
my own positionality and how I was assessed by my interviewees and the 
checkpoint managers. Inside the car with the Jewish settlers or Palestinians with 
Jerusalem and Israeli ID I felt relatively invisible. My white skin, blond hair and blue 
eyes meant that I was presumably often identified as a settler by the checkpoint 
managers, which was also noted by my interviewees. For instance, as 27-year-old 
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Palestinian Catholic clergyman named John, who had special permission to pass 
through car checkpoints with his wife due to her Jerusalem ID card, told me: “You 
would be good to have in the car when passing the checkpoint” (interview, 22 May 
2017). During my fieldwork period, I was never stopped in a car while driving 
through these two car checkpoints. While at times I experienced this as frustrating, 
wanting to observe from up close what happens when one is stopped, it also meant 
that the contrast with Checkpoint 300 and what Palestinians have to deal with 
when passing through that checkpoint became all the more acute.  
Inside Checkpoint 300, I never felt invisible. As I stated before, I joined the EAPPI 
during my checkpoint observations, but during my go-along interviews I was alone 
with my interviewees. While passing through Checkpoint 300 on a go-along 
interview, I was never challenged by a checkpoint manager.37 As a white woman 
with a Dutch passport, my passages were not only different from the passages of 
my Palestinian interviewees; my presence also influenced the checkpoint’s 
workings. As clearly stated by one of my Palestinian interviewees when discussing 
Checkpoint 300: “it is easier to pass through the checkpoint when you are here 
with us” (Mahmoud, interview, 18 July 2016).  
Hence, including my experiences in the analysis enabled me to investigate the 
workings of the implementation of biopolitical categories at the checkpoints, the 
role played by machines in the checkpoint passages and my own personal 
experience of the exercise of sovereign power. By discussing these experiences 
with my interviewees and comparing my experiences to theirs, I gained more 
insights into the workings of the checkpoints as limited openings in a larger system 
of enclosure. Because I wanted to include these insights into the analysis, I share 
                                                 
37 I was challenged several times by soldiers at Qalandiya Checkpoint regarding the reason 
for my passage, including once with an interviewee, although after a short explanation I was 
always allowed to pass. While it remains unclear why I was treated differently at Qalandiya 
Checkpoint, this could be connected to the fact that it is a place that is more often 
characterised by ‘eruptive’ violence than Checkpoint 300 (Mulder, 2016; Murphy, 2016).  
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my personal observations in all three empirical chapters. This is most explicitly 
done in Chapter 4, where I analyse the interplay between the checkpoint 
managers, commuters and machines at Checkpoint 300 through an in-depth 
discussion of three checkpoint passages. One of these checkpoint passages was my 
own ‘last’ checkpoint passage in 2017.38 In this description of my checkpoint 
passage, I reflect upon what I observed during several mornings that I was present 
inside Checkpoint 300 from 4:00 to 8:00 am. My experiences are not positioned 
within this research as being equally important as the experiences of my 
interviewees. Furthermore, the majority of the experiences that are discussed do 
not revolve around my personal passages but around what I observed of the 
passages of others while inside the checkpoint. By placing myself in the midst of 
things, I was able to observe and experience the workings of the checkpoints in 
ways that would have been impossible otherwise. As such, these reflections shed 
light on the workings of the checkpoints analysed and will be present throughout 
the thesis.  
 
3.5: Language 
The majority of the interviews were conducted in English. A translator had to be 
present at six of the 61 interviews. Doing ethnographic research while not speaking 
the native languages well enough to be able to conduct interviews in those 
languages means that one becomes dependent on translators. In my case, the large 
majority of my interviewees were comfortable enough in English to conduct the 
interview in that language. While many Palestinians and Jewish Israelis do speak 
English as a second language, the proficiency of the majority of my interviewees in 
English sheds light on their position within Israeli and Palestinian society. It 
indicates their levels of education, the possible regularity of their interactions with 
                                                 
38 When I wrote Chapter 4 in 2017-18, I did not expect I would return to Bethlehem again. 
However, I did return in 2019.  
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foreigners and their cultural backgrounds (several of my interviewees had either 
lived in a country where English was the first language for a specific period during 
their lives or, in case of the Jewish settlers, had migrated to Israel from such a 
country). This means that the majority of my interviewees belonged to a specific 
socio-economic segment of Israeli and Palestinian society – a segment that has 
usually received some form of higher education, has a job and a certain level of 
economic security. If I had interviewed more Palestinians who, for instance, worked 
as day labourers in Israel, it would have been very likely that I would have needed a 
translator to be present more often (see page 133-135 for a discussion of the 
limitations related to the selection of interviewees in this research project). 
Translation is never a neutral or clear-cut process (on the politics of translation, 
see, amongst others, Burja, 2006; Eco, 1995; Minca, 2016; and Temple & Young, 
2004), and it is essential to reflect on the translation process and the role of the 
translator in the research project.  
Five out of the 45 interviews with Palestinians were conducted in Arabic. During 
these interviews an Arabic-English translator was present, because while I do speak 
some Palestinian Arabic, my proficiency is not enough to conduct interviews. Three 
of these interviews were translated by the same translator, 46-year-old Omer. 
Omer was more than ‘just’ a translator because he also acted as a ‘fixer’: he 
regularly recommended people I could approach for an interview, set up several 
interviews for me and drove me around in the Bethlehem area to show the 
different types of material barriers present. Omer, a Palestinian police officer active 
in Bethlehem, was very knowledgeable about the politics of occupation, the permit 
system, the checkpoints and other barriers present inside the Palestinian 
Territories. As described by Janet Burja (2006), local translators can offer crucial 
assistance besides the act of translating when working in dangerous or sensitive 
areas.  
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Omer indeed offered me crucial assistance, including arranging interviews with 
people who illegally crossed into Israel, a practice that can be severely punished by 
the Israeli army. I had already tried by myself to find interviewees to discuss this 
topic and although many people knew someone who crossed illegally, they did not 
want to be interviewed. Omer was able to set up several interviews with people 
who crossed illegally and mediated during these interviews, at times changing my 
questions – while always letting me know in English that he had done so – or 
suggesting how to approach the topic.39  
Omer and I also had many informal conversations during which I made notes and I 
have recorded two interviews with him, one in 2016 and one in 2017. We knew 
each other through a shared friend before he started acting as my translator/fixer. 
Due to this, we had already discussed my research project and objectives on 
multiple occasions. He often offered me extra information during the interviews to 
explain certain statements made by interviewees, always clearly indicating when he 
was speaking for himself and when he was translating. I was very comfortable with 
the assistance provided by Omer, but I remained aware of the influence he had on 
my research project through his translations and his recommendations regarding 
whom to interview. While I conducted most of my interviews in English and have 
arranged the large majority of my interviews through other means (either using 
other contacts inside Bethlehem or by approaching Palestinian commuters by 
myself while inside Checkpoint 300), the influence of Omer on my research project 
should not be underestimated (on this see, for instance, Burja, 2006; Rabinow, 
1977). By remaining relatively independent from Omer, I tried to ensure that his 
influence was not too significant. However, it remains difficult for me to establish 
the exact extent of it. 
                                                 
39 He, for instance, suggested never to use the term ‘illegal crossing’, but to talk about 
‘sneaking into Israel’.  
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I used different translators for two interviews with Palestinian interviewees. During 
these interviews I felt less comfortable with the quality of the translation. Long 
Arabic sentences were translated into very short English answers and at times the 
translator would answer the question posed, instead of translating my question 
into Arabic for the interviewee. Because I had recorded these interviews, I was able 
to ask a Palestinian friend to translate certain sentences for me afterwards to check 
the quality of translation. Although the translations were not necessarily incorrect, 
as translation is always a process, these translators offered less extended 
translations than Omer usually provided me with. Luckily, these interviewees did 
not travel regularly through the checkpoints analysed, so these two interviews 
were less relevant to my research project. 
One of the 16 interviews with Jewish settlers was conducted in Hebrew, with a 
Hebrew-English translator present. While 25-year-old Esther, the interviewee, did 
speak some English, she felt her English was not proficient enough to speak 
comfortably. I had been put into contact with her by another interviewee, 21-year-
old Palestinian Hajar. Hajar, who holds an Israeli ID card, was a former colleague of 
Esther’s. After I told her I was interviewing residents of Har Gilo, she suggested 
setting up an interview with Esther. When Esther explained she preferred to speak 
Hebrew, this created a complicated situation. I did not speak any Hebrew and I did 
not have any personal contacts that would be able or willing to travel to Har Gilo 
and translate from Hebrew to English. I came to an ambiguous solution. When it 
seemed that I could not conduct the interview, I asked Hajar for a suggestion. She 
suggested that she could do the translation herself since she spoke fluent Hebrew 
and English. As a Palestinian, she had never entered a settlement before, but she 
carried an Israeli ID card, which meant that she was legally allowed to do so, and 
she ensured me it would not be a problem.  
Entering Har Gilo was indeed not an issue, but during the interview a conflict arose 
between Hajar and Esther. Halfway through the interview Esther was discussing 
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attacks of Palestinians on Jewish settlers and she said that she felt less safe in the 
area after these attacks. Here, Hajar asked me if she could ask Esther a question. I 
agreed and Hajar asked Esther why she thought Palestinians attacked Jewish 
settlers. They got into an argument, in which Esther stated that she thought these 
people were mentally ill, while Hajar argued that the occupation had driven these 
Palestinians to despair. After letting them argue for a while, something they did in 
English – perhaps to ensure I would understand? – I tried to resume control of the 
conversation and asked Esther another question. Hajar translated my question and 
Esther gave a long response in Hebrew. Hajar gave a short translation, after which 
Esther corrected her and gave a much more elaborate answer herself in English. 
After this incident, there were several more instances in which she corrected 
Hajar’s translation. During this interview it became clear that the relationship 
between Esther and Hajar had a negative influence on the translation, since after 
the conflict between them, Hajar seemed less inclined to translate Esther’s 
answers. Although I asked Hajar to translate Esther’s responses more fully, and 
Esther corrected Hajar’s translations several times, this tense dynamic could not be 
circumvented anymore.  
There was no translator present when I observed the checkpoints. I did not want to 
ask Omer to join me on my checkpoint observations because he did not have a 
permit to pass through a checkpoint for the entirety of my fieldwork periods. This 
made it impossible for him to join me inside the checkpoints. And even if he did 
have the necessary paperwork, I was keenly aware of the fact that he would not 
have had the same freedom of movement as I had. While I was able to walk around 
inside the checkpoint and observe its workings for hours, Omer, or any other 
Palestinian translator, would not have been treated in a similar manner. During my 
checkpoint observations, the language barrier did play a role in my interactions 
with commuters because the labourers queuing up at 4:00 am were less proficient 
in English than my interviewees. Fortunately, often when I wanted to talk to 
someone with whom I could not communicate in English, another Palestinian 
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commuter would volunteer to translate for me. However, there were times in 
which I was unable to communicate with someone and my observations could not 
be complemented with informal interviews. It was also difficult to understand the 
small comments between the queuing commuters, or what was happening in 
moments of chaos. But after spending enough time in the checkpoint, I did gain a 
certain proficiency in ‘checkpoint Arabic’, knowing how to ask why someone was 
turned away; since when a certain gate had been closed; if soldiers had used 
pepper spray, etc.  
 
3.6: Questioning checkpoints: ethics 
While any research project entails a critical discussion of the ethics involved, I 
believe the nature of this research project necessitates an elaborate discussion. 
This pertains to doing research in a conflict area, and hence issues concerning my 
safety and that of my interviewees. It also concerns my position as a researcher, 
which, at times, became unclear due to my political and ethical ideas about the 
occupation. Furthermore, it entails discussing my decision to interview a group 
with whose politics I disagreed, namely Jewish settlers.  
3.6.1: Safety  
This morning the checkpoint is absolutely packed; I haven’t seen it this bad 
in a long time. When I get to the first turnstile, Abdel [a 19-year-old 
merchant who sells produce at the checkpoint] walks up to me and quietly 
tells me not to tell the soldiers what I am doing here or that I often take 
pictures. I ask him why he is saying this, he knows I never talk to the 
soldiers. He explains he thought that they could ask me and I could get in 
trouble. I immediately become nervous and try to see which soldiers are 
here and if I have seen them before. I don’t recognise them, and I decide 
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to lay low today and observe the checkpoint from the Palestinian side of 
the Wall, just to be sure.  
(fieldnotes, Tuesday 6 June 2018) 
Analysing the experiences and emotions of the researcher in the field can deepen 
the understanding of the context studied. This is especially important for 
researchers working in violent contexts, as explained by Antonius Robben and 
Carolyn Nordstrom (1995). They argue that this can show how the lived 
experiences of violence of the informants and the researcher are connected to the 
ways of knowing and reflecting about violence. Life in a conflict zone can be 
experienced as deeply confusing as this is a context that is filled with worries and 
uncertainties. The majority of the researchers who do research in these contexts 
might not be used to these extremes. But also when speaking of the researchers 
who might be more familiar with volatile contexts, attention to fieldwork 
conditions and how to cope with these is necessary. As Robben and Nordstrom 
(1995) argue:  
The emotional intensity of the events and the people studied, the political 
stakes that surround research on violence, and the haphazard 
circumstances under which fieldwork is conducted (...) weave their way 
through the whole of the anthropological encounter. 
(p. 3) 
Generally speaking, when I felt possible risks were involved in the decisions I took, I 
learned to trust my ‘gut instinct’. Since I had already spent several months in 
Bethlehem before starting this PhD project, I had learned to hear the difference 
between gunshots and fireworks, to distinguish teargas from the smell of burning 
garbage, to assess whether or not certain areas were safe to enter or better 
avoided. However, this ‘gut instinct’ only goes so far, and uncertainties are always 
associated with doing research in violent contexts. I therefore used several ‘tactics’ 
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to limit the possible risks by which I was confronted during the fieldwork. Firstly, 
during my fieldwork in general, but especially during my checkpoint observations, I 
always had to assess the ‘atmosphere’ of the context I was stepping into. Was it 
tense? Did people seem worried? Was it busy? Was it loud? Was it too quiet? Were 
soldiers present? Private security guards? How did they seem? Were they looking 
at me? These questions were not only important for my own safety, but also for 
the people I engaged with at the checkpoints.  
I quickly learned to always ask Palestinians when in doubt. In relation to the 
checkpoints this often meant turning to the ‘merchants of the checkpoint 
economy’ (Tawil-Souri, 2009), who were selling phone cards, coffee and 
sandwiches, as the excerpt from my fieldnotes at the beginning of this sub-section 
shows. If they warned me that a morning was especially tense or violent, I would 
stay out of sight of the checkpoint managers and of the crowd of waiting 
commuters on the Bethlehem side of the checkpoint. This was not only important 
inside Checkpoint 300. Whenever I was in doubt about the risks associated with a 
certain action, such as visiting Qalandiya checkpoint at 4:00 am or entering places 
that were known for sudden outbursts of violence, like specific areas in East 
Jerusalem and Hebron, I always discussed this with several Palestinian contacts – 
often with Omer, who, as a police officer, was able to give me an overview of the 
possible risks. But I also discussed this with the Palestinian family with whom I 
lived, with Palestinian friends, with my regular taxi driver and, at times, with certain 
interviewees. Based on their feedback I would decide whether or not to proceed. I 
did, for example, visit Qalandiya checkpoint at 4:00 am, but decided not to go by 
myself. Instead, I joined two members of Machsom Watch on their checkpoint 
watch. Furthermore, I did not travel to Qalandiya from Bethlehem during the night, 
but spent the night in a hostel in Jerusalem. I was then picked up from the hostel 
by the members of Machsom Watch who I was joining that morning. In this way I 
did not have to use public transport at night by myself.  
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Secondly, I always had an in-depth home interview with an interviewee before 
joining them on a go-along interview. This meant that we had already discussed the 
interviewee’s route. As such, I could make sure that the route that would be taken 
during the go-along interview would not expose me to too much danger, which 
would have been the case with interviewees entering Israel illegally. While I did 
interview Palestinians who illegally entered Israel on their commute, I did not have 
go-along interviews with them due to the risks associated with this. Furthermore, 
having the in-depth interview before the go-along interview also ensured that I had 
already met the interviewee before stepping into their car or walking with them 
through a checkpoint. While stepping into a stranger’s car could be a risky exercise 
for any researcher, as a female researcher, I was especially aware of my possible 
vulnerability. I had agreed with my supervisors before going on fieldwork that if I 
felt unsafe with an interviewee, I would not propose a go-along interview. Though I 
never felt unsafe with an interviewee, I did always assess the risks associated with a 
go-along interview before proposing it.  
Thirdly, I always tried to avoid as much as possible any interactions with Israeli 
soldiers, border guards, private security people or police officers. This was 
important during my checkpoint observations, as I will discuss in the next section, 
but also during my daily life in the West Bank. While they were a rare sight in the 
centre of Bethlehem, as Bethlehem has been designated as Area A, the house I 
lived in was actually located on a small strip of the north of Bethlehem that has 
been designated as Area C. This was because of the location of Checkpoint 300, the 
Wall and because of Rachel’s Tomb, an important religious site in Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam. Several times during my fieldwork I was confronted with 
Israeli soldiers or border guards in the area in which I lived. For example, during the 
days preceding Ramadan when Checkpoint 300 was spatially extended unto the 
area located right next to it to deal with the large crowds of Muslim worshippers 
travelling to Jerusalem on Fridays to pray in the Al Aqsa mosque (see the photo 
dossier on pages 260-264), and the time when Israeli soldiers were posted on the 
120 
 
streets around my home in 2016 after an explosive had been thrown over the Wall 
in the area. During these periods, I tried to take alternative routes to avoid any 
interaction with these soldiers, but this was not always possible – especially not 
during the week soldiers were posted on the streets in 2016. Hence, during that 
week I avoided leaving home after dark, and if I did leave my home after dark, I 
only did this together with others.  
Lastly, it was important to ensure my interviewees complete anonymity and safe 
storage of the recordings and notes of the interviews. To ensure the safety of the 
data, I recorded the interviews anonymously while keeping a separate document in 
which I wrote down the identity of the interviewees in a coded manner 
understandable only to me. I also used code words in my notes and transcriptions 
when it concerned a topic that could endanger my interviewees.  
3.6.2: My position as a researcher 
As I stated earlier, part of my checkpoint observations was undertaken in the 
company of the EAPPI. The EAPPI teams I joined always asked for permission from 
their headquarters before I could go with them to Checkpoint 300. I never wore a 
vest of the EAPPI or partook in their activities (which inside Checkpoint 300 mostly 
entails counting the Palestinians passing through), and I was very explicit when 
speaking to Palestinians about who I was and what I was doing. However, I cannot 
deny that Palestinian commuters and the Israeli soldiers and security guards 
probably often thought I was a member of the EAPPI. What impact this had on my 
checkpoint observations is difficult to say. The decision to join the EAPPI enabled 
me to stay inside the checkpoint without being questioned by the soldiers/security 
guards present, but it may have also caused Palestinians to view me as an NGO 
worker/activist instead of a researcher.  
Inside the checkpoint, I usually tried not to engage with the soldiers, but there have 
been several times that I did step out of my role as ‘observer’ and tried to talk to 
the soldiers in an attempt to positively influence a negative situation – behaving 
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more like an NGO worker/activist perhaps rather than a researcher. These were 
occasions when a ‘neutral’ role was ethically unacceptable to me. However, this 
decision was not easy to make. Firstly, this was not in line with the goals of my 
research project. I was there to observe and collect data, not to intervene in the 
situation at hand. While my presence inside the checkpoint undoubtedly influenced 
the workings of the checkpoint, even when I was only passively observing, I was not 
there to change the checkpoint. These actions may have blurred the categories of 
researcher and activist (further) – something I elaborate on later in this chapter. 
Secondly, as has been critically discussed by several Machsom Watch members, 
one can wonder if mediating between soldiers and commuters at the checkpoints 
actually contributes to normalising the system in place. Especially inside terminal 
checkpoints, such as Checkpoint 300, which have been introduced as 
‘humanitarian’, one must be aware of the role played by checkpoint observers in 
normalising the presence of the checkpoints themselves. As put by Machsom 
Watcher Yehudit Keshet in her 2006 book Checkpoint Watch: Testimonies from 
Occupied Palestine, “recognition [by the army] of CPW [Machsom Watch] and its 
concerns also posits the army as a humane defender, with nothing to hide. As one 
officer said, where else in the world would an army allow civilians to monitor its 
operations in the field?” (p. 117). However, while fully aware of these issues, on 
certain mornings, it seemed wrong to ignore the pleas for help based on such an 
ethical deliberation. An example is this incident on 5 June 2017: 
It is almost 7 am and there is still a long queue for the humanitarian lane. 
The gate of the lane is closed and the security guard is sitting with the 
soldier inside the booth. They do not seem interested in dealing with the 
people in the humanitarian lane. The EA’s [volunteers working for the 
EAPPI] tried tapping on the window and speaking to them, but when the 
soldier and guard only shrugged, they gave up. I hear a baby crying and 
some women in the front of the queue turn to me and ask me to do 
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something. This morning has been particularly bad, violent and frustrating, 
and I decide I need to do something other than just watching... I walk up 
to the booth and knock on the window. The window is opened by 
someone and I address the security guard, assuming he is in control. He 
responds in Hebrew. I turn to the soldier and ask if he speaks English. He 
responds positively and I tell him there are many people who have the 
right to pass through the humanitarian lane and that there is a baby that 
has been crying for a long time. He says the young men need to get out of 
this lane, and then he will rethink opening the gate. I walk back and tell 
the people in the queue; fully aware of the fact I am actually helping the 
checkpoint regime now... It feels wrong, but the baby is not just crying 
anymore and has started wailing. The people in the front of the queue tell 
me they are trying to get the young men out of the lane, but that the 
young men do not listen to them. I apologise and walk back to my spot, 
feeling even more helpless and now also an accessory to the regime.  
(fieldnotes, Monday 5 June 2017) 
Here it becomes clear how the role of the researcher may become blurred when 
conducting ethnographic research, and even more so when conducting research in 
a conflict area. Observing the mistreatment of people, the injustices and violence 
directed at them, was at times difficult to cope with. However, while I could, for 
instance, have made the choice to become a member of the EAPPI and intervene 
more directly in the workings of the occupation of the Palestinian Territories, I 
always remained aware of the fact that I wanted to be there as an academic. I 
knew I would be writing about these instances and that I was not there to 
intervene but to observe and learn, and this helped to keep my focus in place. But 
at times this was still a difficult position to take. Would my writing improve the 
situation for the Palestinians I was observing? What did it mean for me to 
acknowledge that I was there to get the information I needed from my 
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interviewees, to use this data to further my own career, and not give anything 
tangible ‘back’? How does an academic give back in a meaningful way? These 
questions were not new, nor did they surprise me, as I had already conducted a 
research project in Bethlehem in 2013 and at the time had struggled with the same 
difficulties concerning my privileges as a white Dutch woman. However, these were 
still questions with which I needed to deal. On a more personal level, there were no 
clear answers to these questions. But these questions did nonetheless help me to 
remain aware of the power imbalances between my interviewees and me (Rose, 
1997).  
One way in which I tried to respond to these power imbalances was with the way in 
which I handled the interviews. I would bring a topic list to the in-depth interviews, 
but I would often let the interviewee steer the conversation. Besides the fact that 
this opened my eyes to many more dynamics that were at play than I had thought 
of beforehand, I also did not assume I would know better which issues were 
important to discuss with regards to the architecture of occupation. This was even 
more explicit in the go-along interviews, when the interviewee took me ‘along’. 
They determined the route, the method of transportation, the speed and the time 
and date we met. I did not bring a topic list with me and let the interviewee ‘lead 
me’ with regards to not only the route but also the conversation. I did try to bring 
up issues we had previously discussed during the in-depth interview. 
I also made sure that I remained aware of my own positionality and how I was 
possibly ‘read’ by my interviewees. This entailed keeping in mind how an 
interviewee could ‘position’ me and how this could affect the relationship I had 
with this interviewee. In this regard, there were important differences to keep in 
mind between the Palestinians and Jewish settlers I interviewed. The Jewish 
settlers often reminded me of the fact that Europeans were experienced as being 
too critical of the settlements and the state of Israel, and consequently were seen 
as pro-Palestinian. I did not explicitly contradict their assessment but generally 
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responded that I was interested in how they experienced the many material 
barriers in their lives. In all cases, this seemed to take away any suspicions.  
In relation to my Palestinian interviewees, especially the ones I met inside the 
checkpoint, I always had to remain aware of possibly being seen as an NGO worker. 
This could mean that they felt ‘obliged’ to answer my questions, perhaps creating a 
false relationship of reciprocity based on the premise that I was there to ‘help’ 
them and this entailed they should also ‘help’ me. It could also mean that they 
expected me to do something for them after the interview. Although I was always 
explicit about my role, this did not mean this problem did not occur.  
A good example is a conversation I had with Mahmoud. An EAPPI volunteer had 
introduced me to Mahmoud and Sara. After our initial meeting I felt that it was 
clear to Mahmoud and Sara why I wanted to speak to them and what my position 
was. Mahmoud spoke fluent English and at times translated for Sara who was less 
comfortable in English. After I had interviewed them several times (see Chapter 4), 
Mahmoud asked me if I could get his daughter a job in the Netherlands. I explained 
that unfortunately I could not arrange something like that and that getting asylum 
in the Netherlands was very difficult at that time. He then asked if I could get her a 
job for my ‘employer’ in Bethlehem, to which I again responded negatively. I 
explained that I was not employed in Bethlehem. I told him that I would be happy 
to ask around if any of my Palestinian contacts would know something, but that I 
myself did not have such connections. Upon hearing my response, Mahmoud 
seemed very disappointed. Here, it became clear that Mahmoud had hoped, 
perhaps even expected, that I would do something for his family after he had 
invested his time in me. This could have been because I was introduced to 
Mahmoud and Sara by an NGO-worker, but perhaps also by my white skin and 
Dutch nationality. While I felt I had tried to be as explicit as possible to Mahmoud 
and Sara about my role, these expectations were deeply entrenched in the long-
standing colonial/neo-colonial relationships between humanitarian aid workers and 
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Palestinians that have been in place for over 60 years (see, amongst others, Hanafi 
& Tabar, 2003; and Turner, 2012).  
3.6.3: Interviewing settlers 
These questions concerning ‘giving back’ to an interviewed population have often 
been discussed in the social sciences, and the importance of posing these questions 
and reflecting on one’s position in relation to one’s interviewees is evident. The 
importance of creating a space for the voices of the oppressed (Brooks, 2007) and 
creating an empathetic relationship with interviewees (Blee, 1998) is by now taken 
for granted in most fields in social sciences research. However, a less discussed 
topic concerns interviewing so-called ‘unloved groups’ (Fielding, 1990). Which 
group represents an ‘unloved group’ is very much determined by the context of the 
research project, as well as the position of the researcher executing the project. For 
me, the Jewish settlers I interviewed represented an ‘unloved group’.  
I wanted to include interviews with Jewish settlers in my research project to 
understand the checkpoints’ regime, especially when comparing the fluid and fast 
movement of the settlers with the slow and laboured movement of Palestinians. I 
often wrote in my fieldnotes how smooth and easy it was to travel with settlers 
through the checkpoints, and how the bodily experience was so different from my 
go-along interviews with Palestinians: an air-conditioned and short car ride from 
Har Gilo to Jerusalem felt very different from the warm and tiring go-along 
interviews I had with my Palestinian interviewees. These two opposed commutes 
are at the core of the architecture of occupation and regimes of mobility, and 
hence needed to be analysed together. However, this did not mean that I was not 
confronted with ethical issues, or my own emotions, while interviewing Jewish 
settlers.  
When I was preparing my fieldwork, when I was in the field and when I started to 
write when I got home, it became clear that interviewing settlers involved several 
ethical dilemmas. I do not claim I always necessarily agreed with my Palestinian 
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interviewees, but I had never before interviewed a group of people who quite 
regularly expressed racist viewpoints. Nor a group with whom I fundamentally 
disagreed politically. 
Firstly, I struggled with the question whether or not I ran the risk of normalising the 
presence of the settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In the interviews, I 
was not interested in why they were living there, what their opinion was of 
Palestinians and how they saw the future of Israel/Palestine. This was, after all, not 
the focus of my research. In one way, this meant that I was not concerned with 
being used as a platform to distribute potential racist propaganda in my 
publications (Blee, 1998). The narratives the settlers used to justify their presence 
in the Palestinian Territories would not appear in my publications, as I would only 
write about how they experienced the checkpoints. However, at the same time, by 
not questioning their choice of living in a settlement and discussing their 
experiences with checkpoints in a similar manner as I had discussed this with 
Palestinians, I worried my attitude towards the settlers was too ‘apolitical’, and as 
such, would normalise their presence in the Palestinian Territories. Because of this, 
I felt ‘in conflict with my own politics’ as I believe settlements are a very important 
part of the architecture of occupation and that they should be dismantled. In the 
end, even though I did not question the presence of the settlers in the Palestinian 
Territories, I do believe that by focusing on the daily experiences of my 
interviewees, my research shows the injustice that is inherent to the checkpoints’ 
regime and the role that the presence of the Jewish settlers plays in this.  
Once I started to find settlers who were willing to be interviewed, they were often 
keen to tell me their stories, even if I was not interested in how they legitimised 
their presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In the interviews, the settlers 
I interviewed often felt misunderstood. They wished to show me that they were 
not all ‘religious extremists’, opposing themselves to ‘those real settlers in Hebron’. 
As 46-year-old Ariel explained, “in Hebron is the hard-core of Israel which believes 
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that this is all ours. We are not like this. They think all of it, even the Al Aqsa 
[mosque], should be ours” (interview, 9 July 2016).  
The wish for their insights to be shared was also stated by 42-year-old Miriam. I 
explained to her the aim of my research – trying to understand the ways 
Palestinians and Jewish settlers interact with the material barriers. She responded 
that she thought it was important for their experiences to be recorded, because 
the experiences of Jewish settlers with the architecture of occupation had not been 
recorded so far. As she explained, “we are not seen as interesting. The community 
outside [of Israel] sees us as the rulers. So it is not interesting to see how we live 
and see things. It is much more interesting to see how the victims live inside this 
conflict situation” (interview, 6 June 2016). While I wanted to interview Jewish 
settlers to better understand the workings of the architecture of occupation – a 
research project inherently inspired by a wish to better understand the lives of the 
occupied – interviewing settlers remained an ambiguous part of my research. Even 
entering the settlement was something I had to get used to. As I wrote in my diary:  
I hate walking on this road [towards Har Gilo]. Cars drive too fast, there is 
no sidewalk and it is never clear who is who... I am scared people 
miscategorise me as a settler, but then I also have trouble categorising 
people myself. The lines blur here... it is so much more comfortable when 
there are only Palestinians. 
(fieldnotes, 4 June 2017) 
This comment should be seen in the context of multiple violent incidents between 
Palestinians and Jewish settlers in the time that I have been travelling to 
Israel/Palestine. Being miscategorised as a settler did not only mean that I felt 
embarrassed when walking past Palestinians, but also that I felt less safe. While I 
have never felt unsafe in Bethlehem, or at least not in the presence of Palestinians 
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in Bethlehem, the fact that the categories blurred on this road made me 
uncomfortable. As I stated in my diary in 2016: 
While I am becoming more used to the road that leads up to Har Gilo, this 
relative comfort immediately disappears when I walk past a Palestinian. 
Then I find it important to show them I am not an Israeli, to say good 
morning in Arabic, to take pictures, to act like a foreigner or tourist. Then, 
all of a sudden, I am uncomfortable again. 
(fieldnotes, 24 June 2016) 
In my interviews I did not aim to discuss the settlements or the viewpoints of the 
Jewish settlers regarding Palestinians. However, most of the settlers introduced 
these topics themselves. They often also asked my opinion. Depending on how the 
interview had developed, I tried to be as truthful as I could. At the same time, I was 
steering the conversation towards the topics I was interested in, namely the 
experiences of the settlers with checkpoints and the larger architecture of 
occupation.  
An example is a discussion I had with 46-year-old Ariel. I had already interviewed 
Ariel and his wife Hanna a number of times and I felt pretty comfortable around 
the couple. We had discussed my checkpoint observations and the fact that I was 
living in Bethlehem. They had mostly responded with curiosity. The morning of 10 
July 2016, I joined Ariel on his way to work during a go-along interview. In the car 
we discussed whether or not Palestinians with an Israeli or Jerusalem ID could buy 
a home in Har Gilo. He said that legally they would be allowed to, but that it would 
be considered strange. He continued saying that he believed that ‘people should 
stick with their own kind’. He used the example of Israeli Jews migrating to the 
Netherlands and stated that it would be best for all if these Jews would live in their 
own village. I responded that in the Netherlands it is usually seen as negative if 
people of different religious or ethnic backgrounds live segregated lives. He found 
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this remarkable and explained that he considered it much better if people did. 
Here, I decided to let it go and said that I was sure other people agreed with him on 
this. I wrote in my notes that “I do not agree with him on this, but that does not 
matter so much right now” (Fieldnotes, 10 July 2016). 
I then asked Ariel about the wall that had been built around Har Gilo. Ariel started 
to describe how the residents of the settlement had reacted, and we continued 
discussing the various dynamics of the architecture of occupation. Ariel’s beliefs 
provide an insight into his relationships with walls, barriers and checkpoints. 
Interestingly, he thought they were not necessary. Ariel and I did have more heated 
discussions, more often than not about the influx of Muslim refugees in Europe and 
the increase in the number of terrorist attacks. He thought the latter was a direct 
effect of the former. During these discussions I did not hold back as I felt I had the 
right, as a European, to explicitly state my opinions. We often agreed to disagree, 
but also continued speaking about other things and, in the end, I interviewed Ariel 
and Hanna five times, four times in 2016 and once in 2017. 
However, there were other times when I experienced discussions as being much 
more difficult. An example is an interview I had with Rachel and Daniel, a couple 
living in Har Gilo. During the interview, they kept justifying the existence of the 
checkpoints by referring to ‘violent Palestinians’. At the end of the interview 54-
year-old Rachel, upon hearing I lived in Bethlehem, tried to convince me to live 
somewhere else, since ‘all Palestinians would kill me’. I tried to stay friendly but 
also explicitly disagreed with her, especially since it concerned my own experiences 
and safety. Afterwards I wrote in my diary how difficult this interview had been: 
“they have such problematic ideas. And I really struggled with this. It might be 
because the checkpoint has been so incredibly bad the last couple of weeks, but I 
seriously had to pinch myself to keep a straight face” (fieldnotes, 17 June 2017).  
These interviewees used ‘my safety’ to illustrate their fears. There was one incident 
that really affected me. After having interviewed 64-year-old David for over an 
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hour, he asked me how I envisioned a future for Israel/Palestine. I truthfully 
responded that I considered that a one-state-nation, where all inhabitants are 
treated as equals, seemed like the best-case scenario. David argued that this was 
impossible:  
One of the problems here is the Muslims... they are a violent people. You 
can see it in Daesh [the Arabic term often used to indicate the terrorist 
group ISIL/ISIS]... but in all groups. They are much more violent than 
others. I don’t know if it is a gene or not. 
(interview, 11 July 2016) 
The explicit racism that was expressed made it difficult for me not to respond in an 
angry way. Not only because of the nature of the comment, but also because I am 
married to a Tunisian-Dutch Muslim, making these comments even more personal. 
I abruptly ended the interview and let myself out. Afterwards, I worried whether I 
had behaved unprofessionally, storming off like that, but I felt that I had stayed 
true to my values. Later, David contacted me, seemingly unaware of what had 
happened during these last minutes of the interview and suggested that he could 
get me in touch for an interview with a Palestinian man who had worked in Har 
Gilo. I accepted his suggestion and did not bring up his racist comment again.  
 
3.7: Methods of analysis 
I collected many pages of data using the methods described here. These included 
hundreds of pages of fieldwork notes, dozens of audio files and over twenty weekly 
reports. The first step of data analysis was the transcription of the interviews. 
During this process, I became more acquainted with my data, started to recognise 
recurring themes and formulated new questions to ask during interviews. This 
process became even more explicit in my weekly reports. Examples of these 
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reports and my fieldnotes can be found between, and also at times in, the 
following chapters.  
Hennie Boeije (2010) described data analysis as a process of segmenting and 
reassembling that should be alternated with data collection. Segmenting data 
entails fragmenting the data and categorising these fragments. In this way, central 
themes become clear. Data are reassembled through recombining the categories of 
the segmentation process. To do this, I created a Word document per theme, in 
which I combined all the data I had pertaining to this theme. I would add segments 
of interviews, but also segments of my weekly reports and fieldnotes to this 
document. In the end I had 11 documents, with the following themes: Barriers; 
Checkpoints; Coping with fear by settlers; Different ID cards; Gender inside 
checkpoints; Mixed spaces; Permits; Phones; Profiling by soldiers; Ramadan versus 
not Ramadan; Transport. 
Not all themes were equally informative for my thesis, but creating these 
documents helped me to ‘organise’ my thoughts. An important next step of data 
analysis is coding. Order is created through coding and the necessary categories for 
the process of segmentation become clear. To code the data, I used the software 
programme Atlas.ti. I used two ways of coding: ‘open coding’, during which I 
created codes while I was rereading my interviews and fieldnotes, and ‘selective 
coding’, in which my weekly reports and other initial thoughts and ideas were used 
to create codes in a more ‘top-down manner’. Thus, the coding was not 
determined solely by the content of the interviews and fieldnotes, but also by my 
theoretical framework. In the end, I had 164 codes.40 These codes helped me to 
structure my data.  
I have coded all my data even though I have not used all of it. This means that 
several codes in the code list do not reappear in the empirical chapters. An 
                                                 
40 See Appendix 3 for the code list. 
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example is the code ‘fear/lack of fear’. This was a code that predominantly came up 
in the transcriptions of the interviews with settlers – 274 times, making it the code 
that I used most often. However, in the analysis and then the writing of the articles 
that represent the body of this thesis, the fear experienced by settlers turned out 
to fall outside the research aim of this project. The fear the settlers experienced 
was often part of the narratives they used to legitimise the presence of the 
checkpoints, soldiers and the occupation in general. During the interviews this 
often came up, although I did not ask the Jewish settlers about these 
legitimisations. Other codes have been essential in writing the upcoming three 
chapters, most notably the codes ‘Checkpoint 300’, ‘Checkpoint The Tunnels’, 
‘Checkpoint Al Walaja’, ‘interaction soldiers’, ‘behaviour soldiers inside checkpoint’, 
‘how to behave in a checkpoint’, ‘arbitrariness checkpoints’, ‘confusion 
checkpoint’, ‘gender’, ‘ID card’, ‘age’, ‘turnstiles’, ‘materiality checkpoint’, ‘Me: 
feeling inside checkpoint’, and ‘how to recognise an Arab/Jew’. Because I used 
Atlas.ti, I could see which larger themes came up in the interviews and my 
observations, and in which parts of the data the codes were present. The downside 
of using a programme like Atlas.ti can be that the text fragments that were not 
coded are excluded from further analysis. However, during the writing of the 
chapters, I regularly reread the documents I had uploaded completely to ensure I 
did not exclude any section of the data too quickly in earlier phases. 
 
3.8: Limitations 
During the fieldwork, I was faced with several challenges that have impacted this 
research project. Some of these challenges have already been discussed in this 
chapter – most notably those issues concerning safety and language. Here I will 
address some of the difficulties I faced while trying to find interviewees, organising 
go-along interviews and while conducting checkpoint observations.  
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3.8.1: Finding interviewees 
As described earlier, I have predominantly used my personal network in Bethlehem 
to find Palestinian interviewees. After finding several interviewees in this way, I 
used the snowball technique to find new interviewees. This was a successful 
method as it allowed me to contact people I did not already know and because I 
was able to interview 25 Palestinians. This exceeded my expectations – in my 
research proposal I had initially expected to interview only ten.  
However, the use of the snowball technique also meant that it was difficult for me 
to reach certain groups of checkpoint commuters who were not part of the same 
social network as my interviewees. As a result of this, I did not succeed in arranging 
an interview with someone who was part of the largest group of checkpoint 
commuters in Bethlehem, namely Palestinian labourers who queue up at 4:00 am 
to work at Israeli construction sites. Although I was not able to formally interview 
someone belonging to this group, I did conduct several informal interviews while 
inside Checkpoint 300. These interviews were usually very short, most notably due 
to the fact that the commuters were on their way to work and because checkpoint 
managers were often watching us as we talked. Moreover, the language barrier 
that I was confronted with inside the checkpoint (see page 115-116) often limited 
conversation. The subjects we were able to discuss included the times the 
checkpoint had opened, whether or not the humanitarian lane was open, how long 
the commuters had to wait that morning and if the checkpoint managers were 
particularly difficult that morning. 
The real challenge concerning the recruitment of interviewees came up while 
searching for Jewish settlers to interview. I also used the snowball technique, but 
this technique was less successful than it had been with Palestinian interviewees. 
While I already had several Palestinian contacts in Bethlehem before starting the 
research project, I did not know anyone inside Har Gilo. At first, the contact I had 
gained via the SPNI (see pages 105), 42-year-old Miriam, had provided me with the 
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contact information of several residents of Har Gilo who would be open to being 
interviewed. However, even after having some contacts inside Har Gilo, it remained 
challenging to find people who were willing to be interviewed. More specifically, 
after the initial phase of finding interviewees via Miriam and the interviewees I met 
through her, I was not able to find more interviewees via this starting point. The 
metaphorical snowball stopped rolling down the hill.  
Unfortunately, I was unable to find a new starting point to initiate the snowball 
technique again. This was partly due to the fact that I did not live in Har Gilo, which 
meant that I was less likely to spontaneously meet interviewees in my daily life. 
Furthermore, I still knew only a small number of settlers compared to the 
Palestinians I was in contact with. Hence, compared to the ease that I experienced 
in finding new Palestinian interviewees, finding a new social network of Jewish 
settlers was very difficult. Also, as I was reminded of by several of the settlers I 
interviewed, the residents of Har Gilo may have also been afraid of being criticised 
for their choice to live in a settlement. As told by Miriam herself during our first 
interview: “the subject you are trying to research is a very touchy one... It will be 
difficult to find people who would be willing to speak to you. It is inevitably a 
political subject and they would be worried about your political position” 
(interview, 6 June 2016).  
Miriam had been quite pessimistic during our first interview, stating that it would 
be very difficult to find more than a few people. In the end I was able to interview 
11 Jewish settlers. In my research proposal I had initially expected to also interview 
only ten Jewish settlers and while this number was still much smaller than the 
number of Palestinians I interviewed, I was still happy that I was able to speak to 
this many people in such difficult circumstances. 
Regarding both Palestinians and Jewish settlers, in certain periods during my 
fieldwork it was more difficult to find interviewees or to plan interviews. This 
pertained to the month of Ramadan in the case of the Palestinian interviewees, 
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and Passover in the case of the Jewish settlers. There were also periods of 
heightened tension, such as the Nakba day41 in 2016 and 2017. I was aware of the 
difficulties I could face during these periods. There were also less predictable 
events that negatively influenced my ability to find new interviewees. An example 
is the 40-day hunger strike by 1500 Palestinian prisoners (BBC News, 2017) and the 
visit of US president Trump to Bethlehem (Baker & Fisher, 2017). Both events 
occurred in 2017 and, during both, tensions rose.  
Unfortunately, because I expected that interviewing the checkpoint managers 
would draw too much (un)wanted attention to me from the Israeli army, I was not 
able to interview the soldiers and private security guards who managed the 
checkpoints. This means that the checkpoint managers are only present in this 
research through the comments of my interviewees and my own observations.42 
3.8.2: Go-along interviews 
Although I had intended to have both an in-depth interview and a go-along 
interview with all interviewees, I was not always able to. I was unable to join nine 
of the 25 Palestinians I had interviewed for a go-along interview for a variety of 
reasons. In some cases, it was the result of personal reasons of the interviewee, 
such as a lack of time. With others, it was because the commute we had discussed 
during the interview was no longer taking place due to retirement or a change in 
career. In two cases, it was because they entered Israel illegally, bypassing 
checkpoints.  
                                                 
41 In May each year the Nakba is commemorated. The Nakba – Arabic for ‘catastrophe’ – is 
the term used by Palestinians to commemorate the exodus of 750,000 Palestinians during 
the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This war resulted in the creation of the state of Israel. During the 
yearly commemoration of the Nakba, there are numerous demonstrations in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. These demonstrations, which are usually centred around the demand for 
the end of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, are often met with violent 
responses from the Israeli army (Sa’di & Abu-Lughod, 2007). 
42 See Erella Grassiani’s (2013) Soldiering Under Occupation, Processes of Numbing Among 
Israeli Soldiers in the Al-Aqsa Intifada for an in-depth analysis of the experiences of Israeli 
soldiers serving in the occupied Palestinian Territories. 
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I was not able to join six of the 11 Jewish settlers on their daily commute. As said 
before, it was difficult to find Jewish settlers to interview, and it turned out to be 
equally difficult to schedule a go-along interview with the settlers who had already 
agreed to an in-depth interview. It is not clear to me why this was so difficult to set 
up. Interviewees either provided personal reasons, such as a lack of time, or did not 
respond to my request for setting up a go-along interview. 
I was unable to have a go-along interview with the six interviewees (five 
Palestinian, one Jewish settler) who had preferred to have a translator present 
during the in-depth interview. These interviewees often gave personal reasons for 
not being able to have a go-along interview with me or did not respond when I 
contacted them. The language barrier may have negatively influenced the 
willingness of the interviewees to have a go-along interview with me. 
3.8.3: Checkpoint observations 
During my checkpoint observations, I was confronted with several challenges. It 
was usually relatively easy to gain access to Checkpoint 300. There have been only 
a handful of occasions when it was impossible for me to observe the workings of 
Checkpoint 300 at all due to an intense atmosphere and a large crowd. However, it 
was not always possible to enter the main building of the checkpoint. This was 
most often the result of large crowds waiting to pass through the checkpoint. This 
happened especially on the mornings that the humanitarian lane was closed. Then I 
could only enter the main checkpoint building via the general entry tunnel, and the 
large crowd could make this an impossible exercise. On these mornings, I usually 
could still observe the first turnstile from the humanitarian lane. Even when it was 
closed, I could still see this section of the checkpoint through the gate. However, on 
some occasions even this was impossible due to the checkpoint managers. On such 
mornings the checkpoint managers would send me – or us, when I was there with 
the EAPPI – away. I would usually then position myself on the Bethlehem side of 
the checkpoint, out of sight of the checkpoint managers. From this position it was 
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still possible to see part of the workings of the first turnstile. The times when the 
checkpoint managers sent me away were usually at the end of rush hour. This 
meant that before that I could observe the checkpoint for several hours.  
As discussed earlier, I was not able to observe the car checkpoints in a way similar 
to how I observed Checkpoint 300. It was impossible to observe the workings of the 
car checkpoints in such an intensive way. This was mostly due to their architecture: 
I could observe Checkpoint 300, a pedestrian checkpoint, from areas that were 
specifically meant for pedestrians, while the car checkpoints could only be 
approached by car. Furthermore, the atmosphere at the time of my fieldwork was 
quite tense. During the time of my fieldwork, there were multiple occasions when 
Palestinians, but also once a Jewish settler, were shot when walking up to a car 
checkpoint (Al Jazeera News, 2018; Ma’an News Agency, 2016; McKernan, 2017). 
The West Bank in general is highly militarised, but this is especially the case for 
checkpoints. Hence, it seemed ill-advised to stand around and observe the car 
checkpoints. I did collect data on the two car checkpoints. I interviewed several 
Palestinians who used these checkpoints and all the settlers I interviewed used 
these checkpoints. Moreover, I passed through these car checkpoints as often as 
possible, usually once a week. However, I have collected considerably less data on 
their workings than I have collected on the workings of Checkpoint 300.  
 
3.9: Up next 
In the upcoming chapters, the data that has been collected with the use of the 
methods described here will be analysed. In these chapters I will describe how the 
checkpoints function as spatial political technologies that produce selective, 
arbitrary and mutable geographies of mobility. Firstly, in Chapter 4, entitled Inside 
Checkpoint 300: Checkpoint Regimes as Spatial Political Technologies in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, three checkpoint passages are analysed that shed 
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light on the interactions between Palestinian commuters, Israeli soldiers/security 
guards and the machines operating inside Checkpoint 300. In this chapter, specific 
attention is paid to the role played by machines inside Checkpoint 300 and how 
these machines work towards the functioning of the checkpoint as an arbitrary and 
violent site. It also addresses how Palestinian commuters engage with these 
machines, at times accepting, at other times manipulating or rejecting their 
workings. Chapter 5, entitled Checkpoint 300: Precarious Checkpoints Geographies 
and Rights/Rites of Passage in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, provides an 
analysis of three categories that are used by the checkpoint managers and 
Palestinians inside Checkpoint 300, namely gender, age and ID card status. In this 
chapter, the arbitrary system of ‘privileges’ that is at play inside Checkpoint 300 is 
discussed, together with the ways in which Palestinian commuters engage with this 
system: accepting, manipulating or twisting the categories used by the checkpoint 
managers. In Chapter 6, entitled ‘Checkpoint Knowledge’: Navigating The Tunnels 
and Al Walaja Checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Al Walaja and 
The Tunnels checkpoints are discussed. In these low-tech car checkpoints, two 
geographical regimes of mobility meet: one aimed at the fast movement of Jewish 
settlers, the other at the slow and controlled movement of Palestinians. I will 
discuss how these low-tech car checkpoints produce, through the interplay of 
human and non-human interactions, arbitrary and mutable geographies of mobility 
for the Palestinian commuters using them. The absence of machines inside these 
checkpoints is addressed, as well as the diverse strategies used by Palestinian 
commuters to enhance their chances of passing the checkpoints unhindered. As 
such, all three empirical chapters describe how the checkpoints, as spatial political 
technologies, are the outcome of the interplay between their managers, 
commuters and machines, and how, through this interplay, arbitrary, mutable and 
selective geographies of mobility are created.  
 

Photo Dossier III
Other Barriers
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Figure P.10: The entrance of Beit Jala, which has an internal car checkpoint with a 
gate that can be closed by the Israeli army and a sign that warns (Jewish) Israeli 
citizens that they are entering Area A  (source: Rijke, May 2016). 
 
 
I’m in an airport shuttle bus from the airport in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. All of a 
sudden I see a sign on another road: ‘This road leads to Area A and is forbidden for 
Israeli citizens’. Instead of driving straight to Jerusalem and staying inside Israel, 
this driver is taking a route that leads through the West Bank. Now that I am aware 
of this, I can see many different barriers around me. At certain points the Wall, but 
also more signs signifying the entry into Area A, checkpoints, road blocks and 
settlements. This act of driving through the West Bank by the Jewish Israeli driver is 
an explicit example of the erasure of the Green Line. Perhaps to avoid traffic, or to 
claim this space, the Jewish Israeli driver has entered the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. 
(fieldnotes, 26 April 2019) 
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Figure P.11: The Tunnels road, which is off limits for Palestinians with a West Bank 
ID. This also applies to the majority of the people living in Beit Jala, the Palestinian 
village that the road passes underneath (source: Rijke, July 2016). 
 
  
Figure P.12: One of the barriers inside Hebron (source: Rijke, July 2016). 
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Figure P.13: A barrier temporarily placed by the Israeli army on the busy road in 
Bethlehem that leads to Checkpoint 300 (source: Rijke, June 2016). 
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Figure P.14: A permanent barrier blocking one of the roads that leads to Al Walaja 
village (source: Rijke, May 2016).  
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43 This chapter is published as: 
Rijke, A. & Minca, C. (2019). Inside Checkpoint 300: Checkpoint Regimes as Spatial Political 
Technologies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Antipode, 51(3), 968-988. 
Chapter 4
Insid  Checkpoin  300
Checkpoint Regimes as 
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Abstract 
As a part of the architecture of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, 
the Israeli government introduced in 2005 a series of so-called terminal 
checkpoints as “neutral border crossings”, to minimise the impact of these barriers 
on Palestinian lives through a different design and the use of several machines, 
such as turnstiles and metal detectors. In this article, we analyse terminal 
Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem, framing it as a spatial political technology aimed at 
controlling the movement of Palestinians. More specifically, we investigate the 
interactions between Palestinian commuters, Israeli soldiers/security guards and 
the machines operating inside Checkpoint 300. We conclude by suggesting that 
Checkpoint 300 is a porous barrier whose regime is produced, reproduced but also 
challenged by such interactions, and that, despite the new “neutral design”, 
Checkpoint 300 is a place still filled with tension and violence, often exercised by 
the machines and their “decisions”.  
Keywords: checkpoints, political technologies, architecture of occupation, 
Palestinian mobility, Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
 
4.1: Introduction 
In 2003, the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) launched the programme ‘Another Life’ in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories aimed at “minimizing the damage to the 
Palestinian life fabric in order to avoid the humanitarian crisis that will necessitate 
the IDF to completely take over the provision of food and services to the 
Palestinian population” (Weizman, 2007, p. 149). As explained by Israeli architect 
Eyal Weizman, one of the objectives of this programme was to reduce the 
disruption of the ordinary lives of Palestinians caused by the proliferation of 
checkpoints in those territories. In the aftermath of the occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories (West Bank and the Gaza Strip) in 1967, the mobility of 
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Palestinians was in fact still relatively unconstrained. While Palestinians needed 
personal permits to enter Israel and East Jerusalem44, this restriction on mobility 
was of relatively low impact (Keshet, 2006). However, this changed dramatically 
after the first checkpoints appeared in the early 1990s. Since the 1990s, in fact, an 
increasingly dense network of checkpoints was established to intensify the control 
over the movement of Palestinians, a process accelerated after the construction of 
“the Wall” started in 2002, during the Second (or al-Aqsa) Intifada (2000-2005). The 
Wall – in certain points a 9-metre high concrete barrier – has been the focus of rich 
and detailed scholarly work (see, among others, Azoulay & Ophir, 2009; Handel, 
2009, 2016; Jones et al., 2016; Sorkin, 2005). Inspired by existing debates, here we 
approach the Wall as part of what Weizman (2007, p. 6) has famously defined as 
the ‘architecture of occupation’, made of checkpoints, fences, Israeli settlements, 
bypass roads, road blocks and no-go military zones. Due to this architecture of 
occupation, Palestinians are often unable to travel inside the West Bank or to East 
Jerusalem and Israel without taking several detours and passing through 
checkpoints. These daily journeys may entail long queues, the arbitrary 
implementation of rules by checkpoint ‘managers’, humiliating and, at times, 
violent encounters with IDF soldiers/security guards.  
As a part of ‘Another Life’, the IDF had originally planned to introduce a set of 
newly conceived checkpoints, the terminal checkpoints, located on the ‘border’ 
between Israel and the West Bank45, and accordingly minimise the number of 
checkpoints inside the West Bank. This second step, however, was never 
implemented; in 2005, two years after the programme was launched, B’Tselem, the 
Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
                                                 
44 East Jerusalem was annexed by Israel in 1967. 
45 A clear border between Israel and the Palestinian Territories is in practice difficult to 
identify since Israel, following the Oslo Accords, partly or completely controls 82% of the 
West Bank (Area C, 60% is under full Israeli control; Area B, 22% is under partial Israeli 
control), but also due to the checkpoints and the presence of over half a million Israeli 
citizens living in illegal settlements inside the West Bank (B’Tselem, 2017c). 
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registered 53 active checkpoints inside the West Bank and on the Israeli border 
(B’Tselem, 2005), while in January 2017 it reported a total of 98 checkpoints, of 
which 59 inside the West Bank (B’Tselem, 2017a). While the number of checkpoints 
was not reduced, numerous new terminal checkpoints were nonetheless opened as 
‘international border crossings’, although usually located inside the West Bank. In 
comparison with the checkpoints that were already active in the West Bank, which 
had often been created in a seemingly ad-hoc style, these terminal checkpoints 
were specifically planned, large airport-like structures. They were introduced to 
ostensibly address humanitarian concerns – such as long waiting times under the 
burning sun or on freezing cold days, and lack of toilets and water and minimise the 
encounters between Palestinians and Israeli forces thanks to the deployment of 
elaborate technological devices, something confirmed by the high-ranking Israeli 
military personnel interviewed by Israeli geographer Irus Braverman (2011, pp. 
279-280). One important aspect of this reconceptualisation of the checkpoints was 
in fact the introduction of new ‘machines’, such as turnstiles, cameras, x-ray 
machines, metal detectors, fingerprint- and iris-scanning devices. Along the same 
line of thought was the introduction in 2006 of private security guards, portrayed 
as professional officers who would operate border crossings with the objective of 
“taking the army out of the checkpoints” (Braverman, 2011, p. 150). The terminal 
checkpoints were thus supposed to represent neutral border crossings, with fixed 
‘passage regulations’ (Handel, 2009). However, as noted by Israeli scholars Hagar 
Kotef and Merav Amir (2015), they remain places of tension and arbitrary power 
enactments directed at Palestinian bodies.  
This article is focussed on one of the busiest checkpoints in the West Bank, 
Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem. According to ActiveStills, an NGO involving Israeli, 
Palestinian and international reporters, an average of 15,000 Palestinians currently 
passes through Checkpoint 300 each morning (ActiveStills, 2018). In previous work 
we have discussed the biopolitical interventions of Checkpoint 300 to differentiate 
the Palestinian population via the relatively arbitrary use of specific categories like 
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gender, age and ID status (Rijke & Minca, 2018). Here, we analyse ‘terminal’ 
Checkpoint 300 as a political technology operationalised via the use of specific 
material devices: turnstiles, metal detectors, fingerprint- and iris scanning 
machines, and we reflect on how these intervene in the workings of the whole 
checkpoint machinery. We look in particular at the ways in which Palestinians 
commuters and Israeli soldiers/security guards interact with these material devices, 
since we consider such interaction essential to the functioning of the checkpoint as 
a spatial political technology. After briefly engaging with the existing literature on 
terminal checkpoints in the West Bank, we describe our methodology and some of 
the key machines inside Checkpoint 300 together with their specific functions. We 
then present our direct experience of three ‘passages’ and reflect on how the 
power of those machines is exercised on different bodies at different moments and 
how, in interacting with the machines, Palestinian commuters accept, manipulate 
or reject their workings. But before stepping into Checkpoint 300, it may be useful 
to introduce the broader context of what has been famously named the ‘land of 
the checkpoints’. 
 
4.2: The land of the checkpoints  
The Occupied Palestinian Territories have been coined the “land of the 
checkpoints” by Palestinian Israeli Knesset member Azmi Bishara (2004), who has 
also described Israel as the “state of the checkpoints”, the Israelis as “the owners of 
the checkpoints” and the Palestinians as the “people of the land of the 
checkpoints” (in Braverman, 2011, p. 264). Checkpoints in the West Bank take 
many different forms (Tawil-Souri, 2009), ranging from airport-like constructions, 
to car barriers resembling tollbooths, to sheds located in between two fences 
(B’Tselem, 2017a).  
The checkpoints’ regime in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the 
introduction of the terminal checkpoints has been critically analysed by relevant 
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academic work. The appearance and functioning of terminal checkpoints are 
described by political scientist Daniela Mansbach (2009) as a move by the Israeli 
government to normalise the control of Palestinian movement and uncouple the 
checkpoints from the military occupation. The intention of ‘civilising’ the 
checkpoints is connected by Hagar Kotef and Merav Amir (2007) to the Israeli 
government’s intention to create the illusion of the end of the occupation. While 
the material design of terminal checkpoints and the introduction of new 
technological apparatuses have represented very important changes in how 
checkpoints work, most of the research focused on checkpoints in Israel/Palestine 
– led predominately by Israeli and Palestinian academics such as Rema Hammami 
(2004, 2010, 2015), Yehudit Kirstein Keshet (2006), Hagar Kotef and Merav Amir 
(2007, 2015), Ilana Kaufman (2008), and Helga Tawil-Souri (2009, 2010, 2011b) – 
has taken only partially into account the role played by the new spatial 
arrangements and the machines. However, two Israeli authors, Daniela Mansbach 
(2009) and Irus Braverman (2011), have analysed in detail the architectural changes 
inside the checkpoints designated to become terminals. Both authors highlight the 
failure of such changes in developing seemingly ‘neutral’ and ‘civilised’ border 
crossings. Braverman (2011) focuses in particular on ‘welcome’ signs, queues, 
turnstiles, and electronic sensors, and on how they have been put in place to make 
the checkpoints seem more ‘neutral’ and ‘civilised’. Braverman argues that, while 
the increased presence of ‘things’ in the checkpoints may be in line with the Israeli 
goal of ‘decreasing the tension in the checkpoints’ and ‘civilising’ them, it 
dehumanises the Palestinians moving through them. Due to this, she concludes, 
the terminal checkpoints are places filled with tension and violence, far from 
representing ‘neutral and civilised border crossings’. Mansbach’s (2009) and 
Braverman’s (2011) studies are both based on data collected during interviews with 
high-ranking Israeli military personnel and female Israeli activists of Machsom 
Watch – a volunteer organisation of Israeli women opposing the occupation of the 
West Bank – and on their own direct involvement with Machsom Watch. Their 
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perspective provides a unique insight into the rationale behind the terminal 
checkpoints and the workings of their new machines, while at the same time it 
opens up space to consider the diverse experiences and the complex interactions 
of the thousands of Palestinians who pass through these checkpoints on a daily 
basis.  
In this article we thus place particular emphasis on the interactions between 
Palestinian commuters, Israeli soldiers/security guards and the machines operating 
inside Checkpoint 300. Here, the power of machines such as turnstiles, metal 
detectors and fingerprint- and iris-scanning technologies cannot be separated from 
the power of the soldiers and security guards and the things they are armed with – 
such as guns, pepper spray, teargas canisters and handcuffs. As Braverman (2011) 
puts it: “the threat of violence is always implicit in the physical state of things at the 
border crossing” (p. 267). Indeed, the material devices analysed here often produce 
dramatic and subtle violent effects on those who are exposed to them.  
Looking at the checkpoint from this perspective, we found inspiration in Reviel 
Netz’s analysis of barbed wire. In his Barbed Wire, an Ecology of Modernity (2004), 
Netz discusses the development of barbed wire from its initial design to control the 
movement of cattle and enclose space, to its use in wars and camps to control the 
movement of humans (p. xii). In this process, barbed wire has become an 
important spatial political technology, originally designed with one rationale in 
mind – to keep cows from walking away and protect them from other animals and 
humans – but developed into doing much more than it was initially intended for; a 
technology used, for instance, to enclose the victims of murderous regimes such as 
Hitler’s Third Reich and Stalinist Soviet Union. Similar to the power geographies 
generated by barbed wire, checkpoints may be conceived as specific spatial 
formations generating new political geographies and new relationships of power 
for all those who are involved, in different ways, with their workings. A spatial 
political technology is a technology that produces, via the interplay of human and 
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non-human agency, a specific set of relationships. At Checkpoint 300, these 
relationships incorporate the possibility and the actualisation of violence on the 
commuters, by constraining their mobility and subjecting them to a regime of 
uncertainty and arbitrariness. The machines and the other materials making the 
checkpoint, we claim, are constitutive elements of how this political technology 
works and is effective. In addition, this is a spatial political technology, in the sense 
that it is based on specific spatial arrangements and that it produces a specific 
political geography (related to the broader architecture of occupation). In line with 
Netz's (2004) understanding of barbed wire, we thus treat checkpoints as 
geographical formations capable of implementing specific strategies of control and 
limitation on the mobility of people and things. We focus here on what makes the 
‘checkpoint regime’ an effective and complex political technology: the workings of 
the machines and material barriers; the combination of calculative rationalities 
(see, among other, Crampton & Elden, 2006; Elden, 2006, 2007) and procedures of 
control and management; and the selective spatial practices of movement 
management and resistance to this very management. 
 
What is more, checkpoints also represent limited and unpredictable ‘openings’ in 
the occupation of the Palestinian Territories: according to Nigel Parsons and Mark 
Salter (2008), “the barrier does not incarcerate the OPT [Occupied Palestinian 
Territories]; rather, it radically constricts the flow of population (and goods). 
Palestinians can still pass through the barrier – the issue is then not enclosure, but 
control of porosity” (p. 703). Accordingly, we wish to conceptualise Checkpoint 300 
as a spatial political technology aimed at controlling movement, as a porous barrier 
made of the endless interplay among Palestinian commuters, Israeli 
soldiers/security guards and control machines. In previous work on Checkpoint 
300, we have shown how many Palestinians are able to negotiate, and in part 
subvert, the impact of the arbitrariness implemented by the occupation forces. 
Here, we propose to analyse how the checkpoint regime, with its brute 
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materialities, is produced, reproduced and challenged by Palestinians commuters 
and Israeli soldiers/security guards. As such, we wish to complement Mark Griffiths 
and Jemima Repo’s (2018) recent work on Checkpoint 300, where it is discussed as 
a biopolitical technology aimed at ordering and managing the lives of Palestinians, 
rendering their bodies instrumental to the realisation of the colonial project of the 
Israeli state in the Occupied Territories. Also inspired by Randall McGuire’s (2013) 
analysis of the wall in an American/Mexican border town, we thus not only look at 
how the checkpoint and its machines violently clash with Palestinians’ bodies, but 
also at how Palestinians continuously engage with and often transgress the 
intended workings of the checkpoint and its machines and, in the process, produce 
endless unexpected outcomes. 
 
4.3: Inside Checkpoint 300  
This research is based on a six-month period of fieldwork spent by the first author 
in the Bethlehem area in 2016 and 201746 during which she has used multiple 
methods to collect data, including in-depth home interviews, go-along interviews 
and participant observation. In particular, she has spent an average of eight hours 
each week at Checkpoint 300, often during rush hour from 4:00 am to 8:00 am, and 
has passed through multiple checkpoints in the West Bank on numerous occasions. 
For this article, we have adopted a mobile methodology to three strategically 
selected moments/passages of Checkpoint 300, all from the entrance on the 
‘Bethlehem side’ to the exit on the ‘Jerusalem side’47. The go-along interviews, 
during which the first author joined her interviewees on their commute to work or 
school through the checkpoint, were especially important in analysing the 
                                                 
46 In addition to a four-month period in 2016 and a two-month period in 2017, the first 
author spent one month in 2014 and three months in 2013 in Bethlehem; these periods have 
helped formulating the questions discussed here. 
47 These terms should be interpreted loosely here as Checkpoint 300 is not located on the 
“border” between the Bethlehem municipality and the Jerusalem municipality, or on the 
Green Line, but inside the Bethlehem municipality. 
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interactions taking place inside the terminal checkpoint, as they provided her with 
a diverse set of data, and allowed her to connect the conversations with the 
interviewees to the smells, the sounds and the rhythms accompanying and 
affecting each passage. Following Gabrielle Ivinson and Emma Renold (2013) and 
Gillian Rose et al. (2010), we have combined go-along interviews with in-depth 
interviews and participant observation. Ivinson and Renold (2013) have used go-
along interviews, together with photo-elicitation, in-depth interviewing, film-
making and participant observation, to analyse how gendered histories of place are 
repeated and ruptured in the conscious and unconscious relations of teenage girls 
in a semi-rural post-industrial area of Wales. The use of go-along interviews 
allowed them in particular to explore everyday practices, routines and rituals in 
which a complex combination of fear, discipline but also sense of independence 
and love for the outdoors came together. Go-along interviews, according to Rose et 
al (2010), offer the researcher the possibility to directly experience the route taken 
by the interviewees: while during in-depth interviews it may be possible to discuss 
how people interact with and co-constitute places, go-along interviews allow to 
observe and experience these interactions through those same places. By putting 
herself ‘into the midst of things’, the first author was thus able to observe and 
experience the workings of the checkpoint in ways that would have been 
impossible otherwise. For Mark Griffiths, who, as a researcher, attended ‘political 
tours’ in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the use of mobile methods reveals to 
the researcher – while firmly planted in her/his own positionality – something 
about the embodied experience of life-under-occupation (2017).  
By joining her interviewees on their daily commute, the first author had the 
opportunity to be present during the interactions here examined, witnessing their 
effects first-hand, but also experiencing them on her persona. This included feeling 
the pressure of the crowd and the hard materiality of the turnstiles on her own 
body, hearing the sounds of turnstiles and metal detectors, feeling cold and hot 
temperatures during the passages, fatigue in her legs and back after standing still 
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for long periods, frustration when a turnstile did not turn without any apparent 
reason, and tension in getting close to heavily armed soldiers or private security 
guards. However, the embodied experiences of the first author were positioned 
within existing ‘power geometries’, where different bodies were caught up in the 
midst of things in different ways (Tolia-Kelly, 2006). As a white woman with a Dutch 
passport, she engaged and was engaged with by the machines and related 
disciplinary regime inside Checkpoint 300 in ways that were always different from 
those experienced by her Palestinian interviewees. This different treatment also 
influenced the checkpoint’s workings, as clearly stated by one of her interviewees: 
“it is easier to pass through the checkpoint when you are here with us” (Mahmoud, 
interview, 18 July 2016). While the first author experienced several mornings when 
her presence did not seem to make the soldiers more lenient or the passages 
easier, on many other occasions she was informed by interviewees or other 
commuters that she had positively influenced their own passage. Aside from these 
important practical implications, it is perhaps important to state that the first 
author was always aware of the fact that, while for the commuters the checkpoint 
regime was a fact of life they could not avoid, going through Checkpoint 300 for her 
was a deliberate choice related to her research project and that she could, in any 
moment in time, simply leave and return to Europe. While it is difficult to say how 
this awareness affected the material here discussed, at the same time it is key to 
recognise that this subjective condition certainly influenced the ways in which she 
experienced the workings of the machines and of the whole checkpoint regime on 
her body and persona. 
The following pages discuss in detail three ‘passages’ through Checkpoint 300: (1) a 
quiet go-along interview with Mahmoud and Sara; (2) a crowded morning shared 
with Nisreen; and, (3) the first author’s final passage in June 2017. The first author 
approached Mahmoud, Sara and Nisreen after learning from her contacts in 
Bethlehem that they travelled through Checkpoint 300 on a daily basis. Mahmoud 
and Sara were interviewed three times in 2016, once at home and twice on a go-
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along interview. Nisreen was interviewed three times in 2016, once at home and 
twice on a go-along interview, and once in 2017, at home. These interviews often 
included sharing dinner or breakfast and were conducted in English, a language 
both Nisreen and Mahmoud were fluent in, while Sara at times used her husband 
as a translator. The three passages here analysed certainly do not tell us 
‘everything’ about the checkpoint regime (Griffiths, 2017); however, they are 
illustrative of specific engagements with the checkpoint regime: Nisreen being a 
woman travelling by herself and Mahmoud and Sara being a couple – their 
experience of the passages being different from, for instance, that of the large 
groups of men who line up at 4am hoping to find a contractor to employ them for 
the day. We have elaborated on the implementation of categorisations like 
‘gender’, ‘age’ and ‘ID card’ by the checkpoint regime and their implications for the 
commuters elsewhere (Rijke & Minca, 2018). Here, we discuss these three 
passages, out of many possible others, because we believe that, despite their 
specificity, they help in showing how the checkpoint works as a spatial political 
technology exercised on different bodies and in different moments. Before 
engaging directly with these passages, however, it is helpful to spend some time on 
the checkpoint design in relation to the different ‘stages’ characterising each 
passage, and the devices that contribute to make it work as a spatial political 
technology: the entry lanes, the turnstiles, the metal detectors/x-ray machines and 
the checking stations.  
 
158 
 
 
Figure 4.1: A map of Checkpoint 300 based on the first author’s fieldnotes and 
drawings during her multiple passages of the checkpoint (source: Iulian Barba Lata). 
 
4.3.1: Entry Lanes 
At arrival on the Bethlehem side, there are three tunnels located next to each other 
(see Figure 4.1). The tunnel on the right is the deactivated humanitarian lane. 
Terminal checkpoints have ‘humanitarian lanes’ that, at specific times, can be used 
by select groups of Palestinians, such as women, children and elderly, who are 
allowed to use the lane to avoid the pressure of large crowds in the main entrance 
lane (on the workings of the humanitarian lane in Checkpoint 300, see, again, Rijke 
& Minca, 2018). The first author has seen this humanitarian lane in use in 2013 and 
2014, but since then it has been de facto closed. Next to the humanitarian lane is 
the general entry lane. This is a broad and well-lit tunnel used by the majority of 
the people entering the checkpoint from the Bethlehem side. During rush hour this 
lane can receive thousands of people at the same time. The third tunnel, located 
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next to the Wall, is the exit lane. This lane is used by people exiting the checkpoint 
on their way from Jerusalem to Bethlehem.  
Since the original humanitarian lane is closed, the exit lane also functions as a 
humanitarian lane. The three tunnels are made out of steel bars, stones and a 
corrugated zinc roof (see Figure 4.2). These tunnels constrain the flow of 
commuters, shaping and directing their mobility. As it has been argued by Peter 
Adey (2008) in his analysis of the affective role played by the design of airports: 
The architect … [tries] to give the passenger ‘no option’ … The 
passenger is faced with a situation in which forwards or 
backwards are the only directions they may go. The airport 
creates an environment that invites an automatic response from 
the passenger. (…) Obstacles such as walls, glass and metal 
barriers produce a maze-like effect that restrict the passengers' 
(…) response. 
(p. 444, see also Adey’s other work on airports, 2009, 2010) 
Similar to the role played by walls, glass and metal barriers inside airports, the 
tunnels leading into Checkpoint 300 give the commuters no other options on their 
route to the first turnstiles: one can only move forwards or backwards. 
4.3.2: The turnstiles 
Each passage includes four turnstiles, which represent an important component in 
the management of people’s movement through Checkpoint 300 (Braverman, 
2011). Together with fences and walls they create a ‘funnel effect’, as they 
“channel a human mass from a wider, somewhat disordered space, through a 
narrow, covered, box-like passageway, and then out into an open space” (Peteet, 
2017, p. 100). These turnstiles are made out of steel arms (see Figure 5.3). 
According to technical engineer Tal Arbel, cited in Eyal Weizman’s Hollow Land 
(2007), the turnstile arms here are 55cm long, that is about 20-25cm shorter than 
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the standard turnstile arms commonly used in Israel. As Arbel explains, the Israeli 
Ministry of Defence asked the manufacturer to reduce the length of the arms, so 
that they can easily press against the body of Palestinian commuters, ensuring that 
nothing is hidden under their clothes (Weizman, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The general entry tunnel of Checkpoint 300 (source: Rijke, May 2017). 
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Consequently, the turnstiles are structured in ways that ensure that Palestinians 
only pass one-by-one. Practically, this also means that they press against each and 
every body, entrap larger individuals and elderly using walking equipment, 
separate parents from their children, and workers from their equipment (on this 
see also Griffiths & Repo, 2018). In Checkpoint 300, the turnstiles have three 
arms.48 
Turnstiles are one of the devices introduced to maintain the distance between 
Israeli soldiers and commuters and reduce the friction inside the checkpoints 
(Braverman, 2011). Soldiers in fact lock and unlock the turnstiles from inside their 
control room, without having to be in (physical) contact with the commuters. The 
control rooms are bulletproof fortress-like constructions with thick walls and 
opaque windows located behind the turnstile or even completely out of sight, 
making it impossible for Palestinians to see the soldiers or communicate with them. 
On top of each turnstile there are two lights: green meaning ‘go!’, red meaning 
‘stop!’. Hence, technically, no contact is necessary between Palestinians and Israeli 
soldiers, since the turnstiles should ‘tell’ the commuters whether they are allowed 
to move on or they need to stop. However, the lights often do not work as 
expected; green at times could mean: stop! or red: go!; other times they are just 
off. The frequent ‘failure’ of the lights entails that other ‘expressions’ of the 
turnstiles are read by commuters to know when they can move forward, such as 
the ‘click’ one hears when the turnstile is activated or the rotation of the arms 
when pressing against them. However, these two ‘expressions’ depend on one’s 
proximity to the machine, forcing commuters into physical contact with the 
turnstile before they can determine whether or not it is activated.  
 
                                                 
48 In other checkpoints in the West Bank, such as Qalandiya Checkpoint, the turnstiles have 
four arms, making the space between the arms even smaller. 
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Figure 4.3: First turnstile passages at the end of the general entry lane  
(Rijke, May 2017). 
 
4.3.3: Metal detectors and x-ray machines 
After entering the main building – with its pink and green walls, benches, (fake?) 
plants, cameras and an air bridge that provides soldiers/private security guards an 
overview of the whole building and allows them to keep everyone at any moment 
at gunpoint – one passes through the second turnstile and is confronted with a 
metal detector and an x-ray machine. These machines allow soldiers to see what 
everyone is carrying and alert them to the presence of metal objects, in this way 
replacing any direct contact between Palestinian commuters and Israeli 
soldiers/security guards with the “ostensibly less intrusive act of seeing” 
(Braverman 2011, p. 281) (on body scanners at border crossings see Amoore & Hall, 
2009; Bellanova & Fuster, 2013; Martin, 2010; Redden & Terry, 2013). From here, 
the soldiers/guards are visible, since the control rooms in this part of the 
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checkpoint are well-lit and the windows transparent. However, this does not mean 
that one can easily communicate with the soldiers/guards since most of them 
speak only Hebrew, a language that many Palestinians do not master (Kotef & 
Amir, 2015). This difficulty in communication is enhanced by the fact that inside the 
control rooms there is a loudspeaker used by the soldiers/security guards to give 
the Palestinians commands, but seemingly no technology installed to hear possible 
responses, which explains why Palestinians have to shout or communicate via 
signs. The indirect interaction reliant on sensory technology is described by the 
Israeli army officials as being more humane (Braverman, 2011, p. 282), since a 
commuter can be alerted by ‘the machine’ that s/he is carrying something with 
her/him, and in this way avoid being touched by anyone. The decision about 
whether or not someone may continue without problems is made solely by the 
machine. If one responds ‘correctly’ to the loud beep of the metal detector, by 
turning back and removing the suspect item, the machine will remain silent, a sign 
that the commuter is allowed to continue. This process can take place several 
times, without any interaction with the soldiers inside the control room.  
4.3.4: Checking stations 
After passing through the metal detector, and the third turnstile, commuters have 
to show their permit/ID card/passport/entry card at one of the checking stations. 
As explained by Hanna Barag, a member of Machsom Watch: 
There are 12 checking stations and they are never all open, even when it is 
very busy. This is one example of how the inefficiency, the long lines, the 
long waits for Palestinians, is an outcome of purposeful behaviour of the 
Israeli government.  
(interview, 30 July 2017) 
This was confirmed during the first author’s passages when she never found all the 
stations open. 
164 
 
To travel to Israel and East Jerusalem every Palestinian with a West Bank ID needs a 
magnetic ID card and a permit49, both issued by the Israeli District Coordination 
Office (DCO). A magnetic ID card is only granted to individuals who are not 
blacklisted as a security threat by the DCO, or who have no misdemeanour on their 
or their immediate family members’ record (Berda, 2018). Once the magnetic ID 
card is obtained, one can apply for a permit. Our interviewees often joked about 
the presumed existence of some 101 different permits Palestinians can apply for 
(Omer, interview, 23 June 2016)50 including work permits, permits to go to school, 
to the hospitals, the mosque or the church, but also to reach one’s land or visit a 
foreign embassy in East Jerusalem to apply for a visa (Alqasis & Al-Azza, 2015). All 
checking stations have fingerprint scanners and sensors that read the magnetic ID 
cards, and one station has an iris scanner. 
It is thus time to move to the three ‘passages’ during which we have observed how 
these machines exercise their power on the bodies of any individual passing 
through the checkpoint, but also how the commuters differently respond to the 
machines, again, sometimes going along with their rationale, other times tricking 
them, or completely subverting their workings.  
 
4.4: The passages 
4.4.1: Mahmoud & Sara – 28 June 2016 
Arriving on the Bethlehem side of the checkpoint I am early for my interview. When 
walking up to the entrance, I pass by several street vendors selling coffee, tea, 
                                                 
49 Five different ID cards/passports categories are present in the OPT: (1) Palestinian West 
Bank ID cards; (2) Palestinian East Jerusalem ID cards; (3) Palestinian Gaza ID cards; (4) Israeli 
passports (held by some Palestinians); (5) other passports (also held by some Palestinians). 
These categories are connected to different levels of freedom of movement. For more see 
Helga Tawil-Souri’s in-depth analysis of the ID cards politics in the Occupied Territories 
(2011a). 
50 All names used are fictitious, since the interviewees asked to remain anonymous. 
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sandwiches, cigarettes, but also tools, household items and canned food. At 
6:20am I meet Mahmoud and Sara for a go-along interview. It is the third week of 
Ramadan and the checkpoint seems calm this morning. The sun is shining, and it is 
already getting warm. This is the second interview with this married couple and 
when they get out of a ‘service taxi’ (a shared taxi) I recognise them immediately. 
They are travelling from their home in Al-Khader, a village south of Bethlehem, to 
their work in the old city of Jerusalem. They are both in their fifties and have been 
working in Jerusalem for almost twenty years. After brief greetings, we enter via 
the general tunnel, which is almost empty.  
Mahmoud and Sara are in a rush. The tunnel goes uphill (see Figure 4.2) and soon 
Sara is out of breath and slows down. Mahmoud softly tells her to hurry up, ‘yalla’, 
since they cannot be late for work. They live approximately 12 kilometres away 
from their work but have left their home at 6am to ensure they arrive at their 
destination by 7:30am. We approach the end of the tunnel, walk through an 
opening in the Wall, and are confronted with the first turnstile. On a quiet morning 
such as this one we pass through the turnstile one by one and, since the turnstile 
lights do not work, we push our bodies against the arms and move on without any 
friction. We continue and cross the empty, un-used parking lot located between 
the first section of the checkpoint and the main building (see Figure 4.1).  
We then enter the main building where there is only one man waiting at the 
second set of turnstiles. While lining up for the turnstile, we are unable to see the 
next room due to a sharp corner. We can see, however, at least one camera 
watching us. The turnstile lights seem intact but are off. We hear someone passing 
through the metal detector, beeping twice, and then all becomes quiet. Mahmoud 
is impatient and pushes against the turnstile. The arms, however, do not move. The 
man and Mahmoud shout to the soldier. After a few minutes, the soldier shouts 
something back and the man, Mahmoud and Sara start moving back. Mahmoud 
explains that they asked the soldier if the turnstile would open and he answered 
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negatively. Here, the design of the checkpoint not only creates confusion and 
delays, but also leaves one at the mercy of the invisible person in the control room.  
This morning, the soldier responded after only a few minutes, but I experienced 
situations in which the turnstiles remained deactivated and I had to wait for much 
longer before it became clear which one I could use, again without seeing the 
soldier in control. We try another turnstile. It is locked when we push against its 
arms, but after a few seconds we hear a clear ‘click’. Mahmoud immediately moves 
forward, pushing the turnstile without hesitation. I follow him and Sara and enter 
the next room. Here our belongings must be scanned by the x-ray machine and our 
bodies by the metal detector. Mahmoud quickly walks through the metal detector, 
which beeps loudly, to a big pile of trays located on the other side. He walks back 
with one tray, provoking another loud beep, and puts his belongings (belt, phone, 
coins) on the tray. There is no reaction from the soldiers in the control room. I put 
my own items into Mahmoud’s tray, and walk through the metal detector. No 
beeping, the machines have appraised us and deemed our possessions acceptable. 
We move on. 
We pass the third turnstile, which is unlocked, and walk up to the stations where 
our documents will be checked. Only four stations out of twelve are open today, 
but it is a quiet morning and the queues are short. After a few minutes, it is our 
turn. Mahmoud and Sara pass easily, they both have work permits, and after 
pressing their finger and magnetic card on the scanners, the soldier inside the 
booth flicks her hand: their data have been read and accepted by the scanning 
technologies, and they can move forward to the final turnstile. I do not submit any 
biometric data but simply hold up my passport, show my entry card, and pass the 
final turnstile. As a white European woman this proves to be an unproblematic final 
check. We exit the building and take the bus to Jerusalem. It has required only 8 
minutes to go through the checkpoint, but due to the indirect and busy bus route – 
Palestinians with a West Bank ID are not allowed to drive their cars in Israel and 
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East-Jerusalem – we need another 45 minutes to reach our destination just outside 
the old city where Mahmoud and Sara work. 
4.4.2: Nisreen – 14 July 2016 
On Thursday July 14th, ten days after the end of Ramadan, I meet 54-year-old 
Nisreen at 6:15am for a go-along interview. She travels through the checkpoint five 
times a week to go to work and has been doing this since the first checkpoints 
appeared on the road between Bethlehem and Jerusalem in the 1990s. Nisreen 
lives right next to the checkpoint, so we meet on her front porch and walk together 
to the entrance. While we arrive at the same time I did with Mahmoud and Sara, 
this morning the general entry tunnel is full of people waiting to pass. We walk 
calmly, while several men run towards the general entry tunnel, hoping to get in 
line as quickly as possible. When asked if the tunnel is full because more people 
want to pass the checkpoint that day, Nisreen responds that there is an equal 
amount of people every day. Long queues, she says, usually depend on the soldiers 
and on how many checking stations are open. Nisreen does not enter the general 
entry lane, but directs me towards the exit/humanitarian lane. We thus bypass 
hundreds of men waiting and dozens of young men climbing the bars that separate 
the two lanes to skip the queue. We reach the door giving access to the 
exit/humanitarian lane where three Israeli soldiers are checking people’s ID cards 
or permits, their (heavily armed) bodies blocking the opening of the door. We, two 
women, are allowed to pass easily.  
We cross the empty parking lot and enter the main building. Again, it is very busy. 
The queues for the three turnstiles leading to the metal detector/x-ray machine are 
long and messy. When we get to the front we are confronted with the second 
turnstile. This time, all three metal detectors/x-ray machines are in use and the 
turnstiles are seemingly activated and deactivated based on the amount of people 
in the metal detectors/x-ray machine room. We wait a few minutes for the room to 
clear, but then we hear the familiar click and the turnstile allows us to pass. We 
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enter and, again, there are no trays available, so Nisreen has to walk back and forth 
through the metal detector, causing a loud beep both times, to get one. No 
response from the soldiers. During my first interview with Nisreen, a few weeks 
ago, she mentioned how unpredictable the metal detectors are: “the soldiers can 
play with the sensitivity of the machine. The same shoes, the same item of 
jewellery, sometimes they beep and sometimes not” (interview, 23 June 2016). 
While she felt that the level of sensitivity of the metal detector was higher during 
periods of increased tension between Israelis and Palestinians (such as in October 
2015, when 68 Palestinians and 10 Israelis were killed [Benoist, 2016]), she also 
indicated that often there seems to be no specific reason for the increase in 
sensitivity: “this is the checkpoint. Every day a surprise” (interview, 23 June 2016). 
The metal detector’s ‘unpredictability’ sheds light on what happens when machines 
do not work as expected. While this does not necessarily mean that they are failing 
or behaving in conflict with their rationale, since they nonetheless assess the 
bodies of the commuters, their unpredictability significantly affects the commuters’ 
mobility and daily whereabouts: one day one may pass without problems and the 
next day the machine may ‘decide’ otherwise – its loud beep forcing people to 
move back and forth, often several times, shedding their possessions in the 
process, to be able to pass. 
When asked what she does when the machine beeps, Nisreen explains that she 
normally continues: “I beep very often and if he [the Israeli soldier] does not tell 
me to turn back, I don’t turn back. If they don’t say anything, I don’t even look at 
them” (interview, 23 June 2016). However, at times the soldiers decide that the 
beep of the machine does matter, and consequently ask her to move back and 
forth until the metal detector remains silent. To avoid this, she preventively checks 
with a magnet if her clothes or jewellery could possibly activate the metal detector, 
avoiding to wear these items on busy mornings or during tense periods. She even 
takes the magnet with her when shopping:  
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Especially when I go to buy boots, I take the magnet and check them. If the 
magnet ‘catches’, it means that there is something in the sole that will 
make the machines beep. If they are nice and comfortable, I might still buy 
them, but if I am already doubting and the magnet catches, I won’t.  
(interview, 23 June 2016) 
The unpredictability of the metal detectors is something I experienced as well. 
While on certain days the same shoes, watch or belt would not elicit a beep, on 
other days everything seemed to activate the detector. When the sensitivity of the 
machine is higher, confusion dominates the experience of Palestinians engaging 
with this section of the checkpoint since they need to pass through the machine 
over and over again until deemed acceptable.  
This morning, the machine does not find anything suspect and we move on without 
beeping, passing the third turnstile, towards the checking stations. Surprisingly, the 
queues are very short here. Nisreen says that she does not understand why the 
first part of the checkpoint was so full this morning, perhaps there were problems 
at the metal detectors and x-ray machines? While in line, next to us a Palestinian 
man is having trouble getting his finger scanned. He is wearing clothes covered in 
paint and rubs his finger before he presses it against the scanner, over and over 
again. Nisreen suggests that he may have paint on his finger, or calluses. After 
several attempts he is denied passage and has to return back through the 
checkpoint. Despite having his permit and magnetic ID card with him, the machine 
has ‘decided’ that he is not allowed to pass since he cannot be ‘read’ biometrically. 
He will need an appointment with the DCO to submit new fingerprints. When we 
get to the front of the queue the soldier checking the paperwork does not even 
look at us. Nisreen puts her magnetic card and finger on the scanners and looks at 
the soldier, while the soldier still ignores her. After a few seconds, she pushes 
against the final turnstile and goes through, having been categorised by the 
scanning devices as biometrically acceptable to travel to Jerusalem. I walk up to the 
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station and hold my passport and entry card up to the glass. Again, the soldier does 
not look up. After a few seconds, Nisreen indicates I should just pass the turnstile, 
which indeed is activated. I join her on the other side, puzzled by the lack of 
interest of the soldier as my passage was not submitted to and assessed by the 
scanning technologies in place. Again, my white body and EU passport are enough 
to allow me to pass. We exit the checkpoint and take the bus to Jerusalem, where 
Nisreen works.  
4.4.3: First author’s last passage – 24 June 2017 
This morning I am on my way back home to the Netherlands. While I have been 
returning several times to Bethlehem since 2013, I have now completed my 
fieldwork and leaving Bethlehem feels somehow like a farewell. I am able, with my 
EU passport, to return to a country with no occupation, no Wall, no checkpoints, no 
guns, tear gas, night raids or constant arbitrary changes in my daily life. I am leaving 
behind dear friends who do not even have the possibility of passing through this 
checkpoint and visiting Jerusalem. While I have always been aware of my privileges, 
especially when experiencing how I was treated by the checkpoint regime 
compared to my Palestinian interviewees, my return to a safe and predictable life 
in Europe marks in a painful way the insurmountable differences produced by my 
passport and white body.  
I enter the general lane, walk up the hill pulling my suitcase, and quickly run out of 
breath. Walking through the tunnel I cannot help but recall this lane during the 
past weeks: whether due to an increased number of permits issued, the mood of 
soldiers, the limited metal detectors and/or checking stations operating – nobody 
seemed to know – almost every morning between 4:00 am and 8:00 am during the 
Ramadan the checkpoint was overcrowded. One specific morning comes to mind: 
on Thursday June 8th, I arrived at the checkpoint at 4am and the general entry 
tunnel was completely full. I continued to the first turnstile via the 
exit/humanitarian lane and during the four hours in which I observed this turnstile, 
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it was locked on numerous occasions. Why the turnstile was locked and when it 
would be unlocked was never communicated to the commuters ‘in waiting’. The 
pressure of the crowd was very high. I could see how tightly packed the queue was, 
hear the shouts of the men frustrated by the situation, feel the heat produced by 
their bodies, thousands of them, stuck in such narrow space. The unpredictable 
functioning of the turnstile, combined with the chaotic atmosphere due to the long 
queue, resulted in a frantic pressure of the crowd once the turnstile was finally 
unlocked, with the bodies of the men in the front heavily pushed against the steel 
fence and the turnstile. Despite the limited space between the turnstile arms, on 
mornings such as these, two, three or even four Palestinians pushed through at the 
same time. The turnstile was slowed down dramatically by these attempts, while 
the soldier inside the control room was shouting through the loudspeaker ‘wahid 
wahid’ (‘one by one’ in Arabic) – one of the few Arabic sentences used by 
soldiers/security guards at the checkpoints (Kotef & Amir, 2015); then the turnstile 
was locked again for a few minutes. On mornings like these it became painfully 
clear how the unpredictable functioning of the turnstiles, arguably introduced by 
the Israeli army to “decrease human friction and promote orderliness” (Braverman, 
2011, p. 279), together with their unyielding steel nature, enhanced the chaos and 
friction. However, many commuters were able to trick the machine by not 
following the instructions to pass one at a time, and in the process overcome the 
first hurdle of the checkpoint spatial regime.  
Let us return to my ‘last passage’: I continue through the first turnstile and cross 
the empty parking lot. The main building is completely empty. Unsure about which 
one of the turnstiles is activated I walk up to the first one and push against the 
arms a few times. I don’t know if there is anyone inside the control booth of this 
turnstile, since I can’t see it, so I decide to call out. After shouting ‘hello’ and ‘is 
anybody there’ a few times without getting a response, I give up and try the second 
turnstile. Here, I hear the click indicating that the turnstile is activated, and that I 
am watched by the cameras and the soldier in charge. Manoeuvring myself through 
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the turnstile, I reach the room with the metal detector and the x-ray machine. I 
hoist my suitcase on top of the belt of the x-ray machine and walk through the 
metal detector, which beeps loudly. I decide to keep on moving, ignoring the 
machine and trying my luck to see if the soldiers will let me pass. As stated by 
Nisreen, often the beep does not elicit a response from the soldiers. This lack of 
interaction was described by another of our interviewees as ‘dehumanising’. Saba, 
a 52-year-old resident of Bethlehem, who used to regularly commute through 
Checkpoint 300, explained that in this section of the checkpoint  
It is like you are walking in a maze, like you are a testing animal… like I am 
inside a lab… I don’t see anyone… If the bell of the metal detector rings, I 
have to go back by myself, no one tells me to go back! I feel humiliated.  
(interview, 10 June 2017) 
He claimed that he often continued to walk when he beeped if they did not stop 
him, refusing to be disciplined by responding correctly to the machine. Nisreen 
used the same strategy. I could also normally continue after beeping, something 
seemingly determined by my white skin and EU passport (a similar experience 
described by (white British) Mark Griffiths in Hebron [2017]). On those occasions, I 
was assessed by the metal detector, hence the beeping; but this assessment was 
ignored by the soldiers. However, ignoring the metal detector is a riskier exercise 
for Palestinians, as Saba recalled occasions in which he was denied passage through 
the checkpoint or even deprived of his permit.  
This morning, the soldiers remain silent and I move on. I take my suitcase off the x-
ray machine belt and engage the third turnstile. All checking stations seem empty, 
but as I get closer, I can see a soldier in one of the stations, focusing on his phone 
and seemingly not expecting any commuters. I approach the station and hold up 
my passport and entry card. The soldier looks at them, glances at me and wishes 
me a nice day. Again, I do not have to submit my biometric data to the scanning 
devices, my EU passport and Israeli entry card categorise me as a priori ‘acceptable 
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to pass’, without further assessment. Pushing against the final turnstile, I walk 
freely towards the exit door.  
4.5: Concluding remarks  
In this article we have analysed Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem as a spatial political 
technology by focussing in particular on the interactions between Palestinian 
commuters, Israeli soldiers/security guards and the machines operating inside the 
checkpoint. Passing through a checkpoint is a daily exercise many Palestinians 
cannot avoid on their way to work, school, their families or their mosque/church. 
Terminal checkpoints were originally introduced by the Israeli government as 
‘neutral border crossings’ aimed at minimising the impact of these barriers on 
Palestinian lives through a different design and the use of several machines, such as 
turnstiles, metal detectors, x-ray machines, fingerprint- and iris-scanning devices. 
The presence of these machines was supposed to increase the distance between 
soldiers and Palestinian commuters and accordingly decrease the tensions amongst 
them. However, as we have shown in this article, Checkpoint 300 is still a place 
filled with tension and violence, often exercised by the machines in operation and 
by their ‘decisions’. 
By incorporating the ‘agency’ of the machines in our analysis, we have shown that 
Checkpoint 300 is a porous barrier whose regime is produced and reproduced by 
an endless interplay among Palestinian commuters, Israeli soldiers/guards and a 
series of technological devices. The brutal materialities of the checkpoint regime, 
we argue, significantly affect the daily lives and the mobility of the Palestinian 
commuters, with the machines’ ‘responses’ marking the body of the individuals 
subjected to their decision: from beeping to remaining silent, from reading their 
biometrical identities to refusing to do so, from the contact of the turnstiles’ arms 
to their subtle but liberatory ‘clicking’. More specifically, the three ‘passages’ 
described in this article show how the material agency of the machines is exercised 
on different bodies and in different moments. The quiet morning with Mahmoud 
174 
 
and Sara revealed that, even when the passage is smooth and with no major 
disruptions, the machines affect the bodies of the commuters and crucially 
determine the modalities of their passage and, accordingly, their daily lives. Our 
passage on that occasion was smooth because metal detectors and scanning 
devices worked according to the expected ‘rationale’ and allowed us to pass after 
having thoroughly ‘assessed’ us and our bodies. The morning with Nisreen instead 
has shown moments of tension between the machines, the soldiers/security guards 
and the commuters. While during that passage the machines seemed to ‘behave’ in 
line with their own presumed rationale, Nisreen tried to influence their ‘response’ 
in order to increase her chances to pass (by pre-scanning her jewellery and 
clothes/boots), but also challenged them by walking through the metal detector 
and ignoring its beeping. On that occasion, also the soldiers selectively chose not to 
‘listen to the machines’ and allowed her to go through.  
The last passage of the first author before returning home represents instead a 
self-reflection on the many mornings spent inside Checkpoint 300 observing its 
deeper workings. On some of those mornings, when the pressure of the crowds 
was large and the feeling of chaos and tension palpable, the brutal operations of 
the machines was painfully visible: the unyielding steel of the turnstiles when 
thousands of bodies were pressed against them; the loud, often seemingly random, 
beeping of the metal detector when people had to keep on going back and forth, 
trying to discover what the machine deemed unacceptable for their passage; and 
the moments in which the scanning devices at the checking stations decided not to 
allow one specific individual to pass and her/his whole exercise through the 
previous stages of the checkpoint was nullified. These three passages (but also 
many other passages observed during fieldwork) have highlighted diverse ways in 
which Palestinians interact with, reproduce, but also challenge the workings of the 
Checkpoint 300. During these interactions, they generate, as observed also by 
Randall McGuire on the US/Mexico border (2013), endless unexpected outcomes – 
again, ranging from behaving as ‘intended’ by the machines, to trying to minimise 
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the chance of clashing with them or even actively reshaping their effects, for 
example by having up to four individuals pressed against the arms of the first 
turnstile. This possibility of twisting the workings of the machines is known to the 
people who daily travel through the checkpoint. It is also known to the soldiers 
inside the control booths, who may simply ignore it or, alternatively, quickly 
intervene by deactivating the turnstile. But in those minutes of confusion and 
actual disruption of the workings of the machine, while the commuters are still 
passing the turnstile, feel its steel on their skin and manoeuvre their bodies 
through its limited spaces, in those moments it is the commuters who ‘speak’ to 
the machine and manipulate their rationale, and with that, the political technology 
incorporated by the checkpoints’ regime as a whole.  
The ‘wilful inefficiency’ we observed inside Checkpoint 300 is explained by Julie 
Peteet (2017) as one of the key characteristics of the Israeli checkpoints, creating a 
“population in a perpetual state of anxious anticipation” (p. 119). Mikko Joronen 
(2017) even suggested that making Palestinians wait is an important form of 
government that upholds the status quo of the occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories. Such arbitrariness and inefficiency are not eliminated by the presence 
of the machines at Checkpoint 300, but rather produced by and reproduced also 
via their operations. This is perhaps the most powerful ‘special effect’ of a spatial 
political technology like the one here analysed. On the one hand, checkpoints are 
installed to control and manage the mobility of a specific population of commuters 
subjected to their disciplinary regime. There is a whole geography produced by the 
presence of such barriers in the Occupied Territories. On the other hand, while the 
calculative rationalities guiding the realisation of specific spatial arrangements in 
the checkpoints and the machines installed to support such rationalities are in 
place, their unpredictable inefficiencies and the arbitrary interventions on the part 
of soldiers and guards in their workings expose the body of the commuters to a 
regime of uncertainty and fear. Many passages may thus be unproblematic and 
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surprisingly fast; others, for unpredictable reasons, may become long and painful 
experiences, and can even lead to rejection or sanctions.  
This is precisely how spatial political technologies work: their spatialities are 
marked by strict and rather explicit rules of conduct while at the same time they 
remain open to the soldiers’ arbitrary intervention, to malfunctioning machines, or 
even to explicit manipulation on the part of the commuters. The fact that 
Checkpoint 300, despite the introduction of the machines’ ‘neutral’ assessment, 
remains porous and subject to acts of resistance and manipulation is precisely what 
makes it a powerful instrument in the implementation of the architecture of 
occupation, an architecture in which the presence of uncertainty and arbitrariness 
is as important as the hard materialities (walls, barriers, etc.) that populate the 
Occupied Territories. 
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Figure P.15: One of the Palestinian shops at the entrance of Checkpoint 300 
(source: Rijke, May 2017). 
 
 
Figure P.16: The queue before the entry lane at Checkpoint 300 on a busy morning 
(source: Rijke, June 2017). 
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Figure P.17: The old humanitarian lane at Checkpoint 300, which the author has not 
seen in use since 2014 (source: Rijke, May 2017).  
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This morning in Checkpoint 300 the general entry lane is completely full and the 
humanitarian lane has not yet been open. However, this does not mean people do 
not go through the turnstile in this lane. I have noticed a presumably unintended 
possibility that arises due to the design of the turnstile: when someone has entered 
the exit lane through the turnstile on their way from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, and 
s/he does not complete the turn of the turnstile until the arms lock, the turnstile 
remains open for people travelling from Bethlehem to Jerusalem. The turnstile 
remains open as long as the commuters travelling to Jerusalem also do not 
complete the turn. The space that is created is small – only a few dozen 
centimetres. But by pressing their bodies through this small opening, dozens of 
Palestinian commuters pass through the turnstile this way while bypassing the long 
queue in the main lane. This possibility is known to the people who often travel 
through the checkpoint. However, this possibility is also known to the soldiers 
inside the control booth, who, once they realize what is happening, try to quickly 
close the created opening. They do this by either exiting their control room and 
turning the turnstile, or, more often, by opening their window and getting a 
Palestinian commuter to do it. But even though the opening often only lasts for a 
few minutes, dozens Palestinians pass through this way and, in the process, 
manipulate the rationale of the machines and intentions of the Israeli checkpoint 
regime as a whole. 
(fieldnotes, 8 June 2017) 
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Figure P.18: The car gate at Checkpoint 300 (source: Rijke, April 2017). 
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51 This chapter is published as: 
Rijke, A. & Minca, C. (2018). Checkpoint 300: Precarious checkpoint geographies and 
Rights/Rites of Passage in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Political Geography, 65: 35-
45. 
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Abstract 
For many Palestinians passing an Israeli checkpoint is a daily ritual they cannot 
avoid on their way to work, school, family or their mosque/church. Although the 
checkpoints are key sites where the impact of the architecture of occupation is felt 
on a daily basis, the experience of Palestinians at these sites has been the focus of a 
relatively limited number of research projects. In this article, we analyse the daily 
experiences of Palestinians passing Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem in relation to the 
implementation of three biopolitical categorises that influence their passage, 
namely ‘gender’, ‘age’ and ‘ID card status’. In our discussion, we reflect on the ways 
in which the selective and ambivalent use of these categorisations on the part of 
the soldiers and private security forces managing the checkpoint is an example of 
how arbitrariness is a tool to create the conditions for the daily exercise of 
sovereign power over individual Palestinians and endlessly reproduce the 
asymmetrical relationship between the occupier and occupied. While these rules 
and exceptions are confronted by Palestinians with various forms of resistance, 
their impact of this subversive engagement remains relatively limited. In the 
conclusion, we indicate the importance of studying the messiness related to the 
daily practices of the Palestinians’ life-under-occupation and the impact of the 
multitude of material barriers, such as the checkpoints, that make up the 
architecture of occupation in the West Bank.  
Key words: checkpoints, biopolitical technologies, exceptional sovereign 
power, architecture of occupation, Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
 
5.1: Introduction 
 
Bethlehem: Sunday, July 17th 2016, 4:00 – 8:00 am. I am at 
Checkpoint 300, observing the people passing through on their daily 
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commute. The main lane moves quickly, but the humanitarian lane 
has been closed most of the morning. After a couple of hours, the 
queue in the humanitarian lane is very long, including women, old 
men and children, but also young men. Young men are generally 
excluded from this lane, but some are given a special permit. The 
private security guard on duty suddenly gets angry with these young 
men, shouts at them in English through the gate that they do not 
belong to this lane, and that, due to their presence, the lane cannot 
be opened. I hear people shouting back, complaining that there are 
women and children there, that these people have the right to pass. 
The ID of one of the men in the front of the row is checked by the 
security guard, but he is told that, being 63 years old, he is too young 
to use this lane. The man replies that he was allowed to pass last 
week, but the guard does not listen and walks away. I leave with the 
impression that, at Checkpoint 300, no rule seems to be 
implemented twice in the same way. 
(fieldnotes, 17 July 2016) 
 
Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem is one of the most intensively crossed checkpoints in 
the West Bank, used mainly by Palestinians hailing from the south of the West Bank 
on their way to Jerusalem and Israel. According to ActiveStills, an NGO involving 
Israeli, Palestinian and international reporters, an average of 15,000 Palestinians 
pass through Checkpoint 300 each morning (ActiveStills, 2018). Checkpoint 300 has 
been categorised as a ‘terminal checkpoint’ by the Israeli army in 2005 (Applied 
Research Institute-Jerusalem Society, personal communication, 2017) – a term 
used for large checkpoints that are meant to function as official, ‘neutral’, airport-
like border crossings – although the majority of the terminal checkpoints, including 
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Checkpoint 300, are not located on the Green Line, but inside the West Bank.52 
Checkpoint 300 is an example of a new generation of installations described by 
Daniela Mansbach (2009) as an attempt to ‘demilitarise’ the checkpoints and 
normalise the Israeli control of the mobility of Palestinians. The fieldnotes excerpt 
suggests that different categorisations are at play at Checkpoint 300. While some 
individuals, classified on the basis of their age and/or gender, may normally be 
afforded the privilege of using a special ‘humanitarian lane’53 to avoid the pressure 
of large crowds, in practice this ‘privilege’ is not always granted by the 
soldiers/security guards. Even when granted, however, the passage may be 
affected by close (possibly emotional) interactions with the soldiers/security guards 
and their related ‘moods’. At the same time, these categorisations are performed 
by Palestinians when interacting with each other and with the soldiers/security 
guards, with men allowing women to pass before them, the elderly being assisted 
through the gates, but also with young men trying to skip the queue by climbing 
the steel-barred fences, something that precisely age and gender seem to make 
possible.  
Numerous analyses of ‘the Wall’, the (planned to be 750km long) separation 
barrier built by the Israeli government in the West Bank (see, among others, 
Peteet, 2017; Weizman, 2007), have provided valuable insights into the workings of 
the spatial regime imposed by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Some 
research is focused, for example, on the rhetoric used to legitimise the Wall 
                                                 
52 The Green Line, also called the 1949 Armistice border, was recommended by the UN in 
1947 as the border between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Although its 
legitimacy as a border remains debated (see, amongst others, Bicchi & Voltolini, 2018), it is, 
internationally, the most recognised border between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. This border situates East Jerusalem inside the Palestinian Territories (United 
Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, 2017). 
53 In the design of Checkpoint 300, a separate lane and gate were added to function for 
humanitarian purposes. However, this separate gate was closed during the first author’s two 
fieldwork periods in 2016 and 2017. The people entitled to the humanitarian lane now enter 
the checkpoint through the ‘exit lane’, still avoiding the large crowds of the regular lane. 
Here, we therefore use the term ‘humanitarian lane’ to indicate this use of the ‘exit lane’. 
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(Bowman, 2007; Jones, Leuenberger, & Wills, 2016), while other work discusses its 
impact and that of the occupation regime on the lives of Palestinians (Azoulay & 
Ophir, 2009; Eklund & El-Atrash, 2012; Handel, 2009, 2011, 2016) or the different 
ways in which Palestinians resist the restrictions imposed on their mobility (Amir, 
2011; Parizot, 2012; Parson & Salter, 2008). However, while passing through 
checkpoints is a daily experience for most Palestinians travelling within the West 
Bank and to Israel, this specific experience has been analysed by a relatively limited 
number of studies. There are in fact numerous academic interventions in which 
checkpoints have been investigated as part of the broader geographies of 
occupation (see, among others, Grassiani, 2013; Handel 2009, 2011, 2016; Ophir, 
Givoni, & Hanafi 2009; Parson & Salter 2008), but only few of these have focused 
specifically on checkpoints. Most recent research concerning checkpoint 
experiences in the West Bank has been conducted by members of Machsom 
Watch, an Israeli all-women organisation that opposes the occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories (Braverman, 2011, 2012; Kaufman, 2008; Keshet, 2006; Kotef 
& Amir, 2007; Kotef, 2011, 2015; Mansbach, 2009, 2012, 2015). However, as stated 
by Palestinian anthropologist Rema Hammami (2010, pp. 37-38), their otherwise 
valuable work tends to underplay the agency of the Palestinian commuters passing 
through the checkpoints. Other authors, such as Hammami herself, have 
incorporated the experience of Palestinians passing through checkpoints in their 
work (Hammami, 2004, 2010, 2015; Peteet, 2017; Razack, 2010; Tawil-Souri, 2009, 
2010, 2011b), but they largely refer to the years of the Second (or al-Aqsa) Intifada 
(2000-2005), when the checkpoint system currently in place was not yet fully 
operational. In this article, we try to fill this gap – in a dialogue with the existing 
rich body of literature on the Wall and the West Bank – by analysing checkpoint 
practices from the perspective of Palestinians passing through Checkpoint 300 in 
Bethlehem, one of the most important checkpoints in the region.  
Inspired by Eyal Weizman’s spatial analysis of the occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories presented in his influential Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of 
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Occupation (2007), we consider checkpoints as (bio)political technologies aimed at 
producing a set of selective, arbitrary and mutable geographies of mobility 
affecting the people subjected to them. Furthermore, in line with Reviel Netz’s 
(2004) understanding of barbed wire as a spatial political technology, we focus on 
how the assemblage of biopolitical categories, material devices and barriers, 
procedures of control, calculative rationalities and selective practices that we call 
‘checkpoints’ do things. We treat checkpoints as geographical formations capable 
of producing spatial effects that respond to specific strategies of control and 
limitation of the mobility of people and things. Elsewhere we have looked at how 
the checkpoints’ materialities affect the bodily performances of both Palestinians 
and Jewish settlers in the Bethlehem area – when forced to pass through them. 
Here we address in particular the biopolitical categories used by the ‘managers’ of 
Checkpoint 300 to classify and qualify Palestinian individuals and their related 
mobility during their passages. More specifically, we reflect on how the categories 
of ‘gender’, ‘age’ and ‘ID card status’ adopted by the Israeli authorities to qualify 
Palestinians are key to the everyday implementation of the checkpoint 
(ir)rationalities. In the following sections, we first comment on existing research on 
the West Bank checkpoints and introduce the broader context of our research. We 
then discuss in detail the workings of Checkpoint 300 and the methodology used to 
analyse it. The three following sections are dedicated to how the categories of 
gender, age and ID card status are respectively incorporated as biopolitical 
technologies in producing selective rationalities of mobility (or lack thereof) related 
to the checkpoint. We conclude by reflecting on how the somewhat inconsistent, 
arbitrary and selective nature of such categories, together with the ways in which 
the Palestinians engage and negotiate with them, are constitutive of a set of 
specific checkpoint geographies of power. The interplay between the calculative 
rationalities incorporated by these biopolitical categories and the endless 
‘exceptions’ implemented via everyday interactions between soldiers/security 
guards and Palestinians at the checkpoint, we argue, is at the origin of the unstable 
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and unpredictable geographies produced by this powerful political spatial 
technology.  
 
5.2: Architectures of occupation  
After the occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the West Bank and Gaza in 
1967, restrictions on Palestinian movement were gradually put in place by the 
Israeli state (Weizman, 2007, p. 142). All Palestinians were granted a general 
permit to enter Israel and East Jerusalem, with the exception of people convicted 
of crimes or considered a security threat. This permit could be revoked at any time 
but, due to the lack of a comprehensive system of material barriers and 
checkpoints, the mobility of Palestinians was still relatively free. This changed after 
the start of the first Gulf War (1990-1991), when the first permanent checkpoints 
were built and individual permits were required for Palestinians to enter Israel 
(Keshet, 2006, p. 13). Since the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000 (Ophir, 
Givoni, & Hanafi, 2009), the number and the locations of checkpoints has grown 
exponentially. Today, it is estimated that about 100 checkpoints operate inside the 
West Bank (an area of 5,640km2, including East Jerusalem) and on the ‘Israeli 
border’ (B’Tselem, 2017a). Next to these checkpoints and the Wall, the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has registered in 2015 
an average presence of 543 physical obstructions in the West Bank, a situation that 
has been relatively stable since the end of the Second Intifada (OCHA Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 2017). This apparatus of barriers is a key element in the 
‘architecture of occupation’ of the West Bank described by Weizman, consisting of 
a combination of road blocks, checkpoints, fences, the Wall, illegal Israeli 
settlements and the related bypass roads. Weizman’s analysis (2007) shows how 
this multiplicity of barriers splinters the border between Israeli and Palestinian 
territories into a multitude of ever-changing borders, and contributes to a series of 
geographical practices aimed at controlling the daily lives of Palestinians.  
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Checkpoints play a particularly important role in this architecture of occupation in 
the West Bank (Hammami, 2015). They represent material barriers through which 
‘Israeli-only’ spaces are created, spaces from which Palestinians are fundamentally 
evicted and which are the main grounds for the expansion of the state of Israel via 
the development of new illegal settlements (see Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949). 
These settlements materialise on Palestinian land precisely by being fenced off 
through the construction of the Wall, multiple checkpoints and ‘settler-only roads’. 
The checkpoints are a means of surveillance as well, since they represent key 
spatial technologies to monitor, discipline and/or selectively limit the mobility of 
Palestinians. As noted by several authors (Amir, 2013; Hammami, 2015; Handel, 
2009, 2011, 2014; Kotef, 2015), blocking the movement of Palestinians is not the 
purpose of these checkpoints. Instead, the checkpoints are rather porous barriers, 
and the deliberately arbitrary management of this porosity appears as one of their 
main functions (Parson & Salter, 2008). Although checkpoints may be closed, or 
temporarily restricted to specific groups of people – something regularly happening 
– they work precisely as a field of possibility (or impossibility) by providing limited 
and relatively unpredictable ‘openings’ in a broader system of repression and 
control, created through many closures and selective ‘windows’ (on the strategic 
porosity of ‘walls’, see Minca & Rijke, 2017).  
This does not mean that the West Bank checkpoints are in place to simply monitor 
and somehow routinize Palestinian lives (Hammami, 2015). On the contrary, they 
are one of the technologies used by the Israeli occupation forces to ensure that the 
capacity of Palestinian residents to reach their daily destination is never entirely 
predictable. The checkpoint openings, the sudden closures, the long queues, the 
swift passages, the alternation of violent outbursts and quiet days provide a 
permanent sense of arbitrariness, chaos and uncertainty that has become an 
integral part of life-under-Israeli-occupation and is in line with its “strategy of 
obfuscation” (Weizman, 2007, p. 8). Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir have carefully 
detailed the way in which this arbitrariness, connected to withheld violence, is used 
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by the Israeli occupation regime to create an unreliable, and thus punishable, 
subject. This subject is unable to internalise the rules of the regime as these rules 
change too often and in an unpredictable way. Checkpoints are in their view 
exemplary sites in which this kind of interaction between the occupier and 
occupied takes place, where the only thing Palestinians can internalise is their 
submission to the Israeli sovereign power (Azoulay & Ophir, 2009, p. 115). In 
analysing the impact of such arbitrariness on the lives of Palestinians, Israeli 
geographer Ariel Handel (2009) has engaged with the concept of ‘use value’. By 
adopting this concept, he has qualified the difference between the average 
mobility of a Jewish settler, who is able to move unrestrictedly and without the risk 
of being stopped along the road, and a Palestinian resident, who is instead never 
sure that s/he will not be stopped on her/his way home. This sense of uncertainty 
and ‘low use value’, according to Handel, is the main reason for Palestinians to 
become less and less mobile. The random nature of these interventions is indeed a 
constitutive element of the architecture of occupation, something that not only 
affects Palestinians’ mobility in very tangible ways, but also, Handel suggests, 
represents a pervasive form of control over their daily lives. This regime of arbitrary 
intervention, discussed in detail in the pages to follow, is largely based on the 
working of the checkpoints, and plays a key role in the biopolitical monitoring of 
the daily mobilities of Palestinians.  
 
This checkpoint regime can also be seen, at least in part, as a manifestation of what 
Mitch Rose (2014) has described as negative governance. For Rose (2014), 
reflecting on the biopolitics implemented by the Egyptian state over the village of 
Nazlat al-Samman, negative governance is a unique modality of governance 
according to which: 
By exposing villagers to the precariousness of life itself, the state does not 
attempt to control life but use life (in its inherent frailty) as a strategic 
asset. Biopolitics in Nazlat al-Samman is a calculated divestment of the 
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state’s legal authority (and responsibility) to manage, delegate and order 
the social, economic and political dynamics of the village.  
(p. 214) 
 
While we do not intend to claim that the checkpoint is a space of deliberate non-
intervention, at the same time we believe that the checkpoint regimes, as key 
elements of the architecture of occupation, crucially contribute to the exposure of 
the Palestinian population to the precariousness entailed by the ever-present 
possibility of intervention on the part of the Israeli authorities and their 
bureaucratic administration, but also by the equally ever-present possibility of non-
intervention; this regime renders impossible any clear plan, any expected passage, 
any normality in the daily spatialities of commuters. To speak again with Rose 
(2014), “if the Egyptian state governs anything, it is the prohibition of governance. 
If it calculates anything, it is the benefits derived from not calculating” (p. 215). The 
uncertainty concerning the operations of the checkpoints may thus be seen as a 
manifestation of sovereign power enacted ‘on the spot’ by soldiers/security guards, 
a strategy based on the possibility of, alternatively, either following the official 
rules or disregarding them, either to govern or to withdraw from governing, often 
for no apparent reason (on the biopolitical enactments of exceptional sovereign 
power ‘on the spot’, see Agamben, 1998; Minca, 2007; for a different reading, see 
Butler, 2004; Jones, 2009).  
 
Checkpoints are thus assemblages of control and surveillance capable of activating 
specific (bio)political technologies aimed at performing, precisely via a system of 
rules and exceptions, a set of asymmetrical relations between the occupier and the 
occupied (see Parsons & Salter, 2008, but also Azoulay & Ophir, 2009). Whereas 
Israelis and Palestinians may spend most of their lives trying to avoid interacting 
with each other – though this is easier for Israelis than for Palestinians confronted 
with the Israeli army or settlers at unexpected moments in their daily whereabouts 
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– the checkpoint is one site in which they are forced to come together and interact. 
It is a place where the soldiers’ sovereign power may be enacted via a set of 
relatively arbitrary decisions on whether or not someone’s attempt to pass should 
be fast and unproblematic, or instead entail hours-long wait, or include the random 
possibility of having to answer a series of questions or to get undressed for a body 
check. At times, in line with the same regime of uncertainty, the passage is simply 
denied, or the checkpoint closed altogether. 
However, in spite of this climate of arbitrariness and insecurity, Palestinians keep 
on moving and pass through checkpoints every day. As noted above, the agency of 
Palestinians in engaging with the regime imposed by the architecture of occupation 
is often underplayed in the analyses of scholars and organisations such as 
Machsom Watch. While the writings of Machsom members provide valuable 
insights into the impact of the checkpoints and the occupation in general 
(Braverman, 2012; Kaufman, 2008; Kotef & Amir, 2007; Kotef, 2011; Mansbach, 
2012, 2015), and on the rationale behind the material changes in terminal 
checkpoints (Braverman, 2011; Mansbach, 2009), Palestinians are portrayed in 
these accounts as bystanders whose views and practices are only rarely analysed. 
The experience of Palestinians passing through checkpoints in the West Bank is 
instead examined in detail by Palestinian scholars Rema Hammami (2004, 2010, 
2015) and Helga Tawil-Souri (2009, 2010, 2011b). Both Hammami and Tawil-Souri 
have personally experienced the workings of checkpoints during the Second 
Intifada, when Hammami used to pass with her Jerusalem ID and Tawil-Souri, a 
diasporic Palestinian, with her American passport. They have accordingly studied 
the daily passages of Palestinian residents through numerous checkpoints in the 
Ramallah area, and Qalandiya Checkpoint in particular, by highlighting how they 
resisted the status of passive victims of the architecture of occupation, for instance 
by self-regulating the traffic at checkpoints (Hammami, 2010, 2004), or by 
exploiting the social and economic spatialities produced by the very presence of 
checkpoints (i.e. by offering services and products of all kinds to the commuters, 
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see Tawil-Souri, 2009) or by normalising the checkpoints in their narratives, that is, 
“submerging the self into the moral community of the checkpoint crossers thus 
enabling individual experience of Israeli sovereign violence to be domesticated as 
part of Palestinians’ collective normal” (Hammami, 2015, p. 1).  
While these authors in particular provide valuable insights into the daily 
experiences of Palestinians, as noted above, their work is mostly based on data 
collected during the Second Intifada. Checkpoints in the West Bank have changed a 
great deal since those years, from being in most cases ad-hoc barriers made up out 
of dirt piles and concrete blocks to become today’s complex assemblages of 
technologies of monitoring and control. This is especially the case for so-called 
‘terminal checkpoints’, like Checkpoint 300. Accordingly, while we wish to engage 
with some of the key arguments formulated by Hammami and Tawil-Souri, at the 
same time we intend to include in our analysis the implications of the (bio)political 
technologies incorporated by the new ‘terminal checkpoints’, in line with 
Weizman’s accounts of the architecture of occupation. The decision to focus on 
Checkpoint 300 was motivated by the fact that it is one of the most used 
checkpoints in the West Bank and a site where the intricate assemblage of 
intervention and lack of intervention is exercised through the use of the three 
categories here analysed. Also, while existing research concerning Qalandiya 
Checkpoint (Braverman, 2011; Hammami, 2010, 2015; Tawil-Souri, 2009, 2010, 
2011b), a site often characterised by violence, is already rich and detailed, we are 
not aware of previous work focussed on Checkpoint 300, a site where the relative 
absence of frequent ‘spectacular violence’ makes it especially suitable to analyse 
the ‘ordinary’ daily precarious geographies produced by this form of sophisticated 
negative governance. 
In particular, we explore here Checkpoint 300 as a spatial political technology by 
discussing the three abovementioned categories of ‘age’, ‘gender’ and ‘ID card 
status’ used by the security forces to classify individuals at checkpoints and to 
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determine who has the right to pass and under which modality. In the coming 
sections, we reflect on how these categories and the related rules applied to 
qualify the Palestinian bodies at the checkpoint are regularly subject to exceptions, 
giving space to ad hoc enactments of sovereign power on the part of the guards, as 
discussed above, but also to negotiations and forms of resistance on the part of the 
individuals subjected to them. In doing so, we study Checkpoint 300 for ‘what it 
does’ to Palestinian commuters, as well as for how Palestinians themselves 
incorporate in diverse ways its assemblage of materialities, practices, technologies 
and biopolitical measures. 
Most of our analysis is based on research developed in 2016 and 2017, during a six-
month period of fieldwork spent by the first author in the region. The data 
discussed here have been collected using multiple methods largely inspired by the 
work of Gabrielle Ivinson and Emma Renold (2013, 2014) and Gillian Rose, Monica 
Degen and Begum Basdas (2010). Ivinson and Renold have analysed how gendered 
histories of place are repeated and ruptured in the conscious and unconscious 
relations of teenage girls in a semi-rural post-industrial area of Wales. They have 
used go-along interviews, in-depth interviews and observations to explore the 
affective geographies of fear, independence, discipline and a love of the outdoors 
and horses (Ivinson & Renold, 2013, p. 374). Rose, Degen and Basdas (2010, p. 
340), in their analysis of the influence of different mobilities on the materialisation 
of shopping malls, have argued for the combination of go-along interviews and in-
depth interviews as this generated a diverse set of data, including movements, 
sounds, smells, rhythms, etc. We have thus combined intense and extensive 
participant observation – with numerous days spent at checkpoints and equally 
numerous ‘passages’ – with go-along interviews, in-depth interviews and email 
interviews. Thanks to this combination of methods, we have linked the 
conversations with the respondents to the first author’s observations during her 
go-along interviews and participant observation. More specifically, the first author 
has interviewed twenty Palestinians multiple times – 9 women and 11 men, whose 
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age ranged from 21 to 73 and who all regularly pass through Checkpoint 300 – 
often joining them on their commute to work or school, and discussing the 
experiences related to these commutes during in-depth interviews in their homes. 
These Palestinians, who all lived either in Bethlehem or in the surrounding villages, 
travelled regularly to Jerusalem on their way to work or school. In addition, the first 
author has spent up to eight hours each week at Checkpoint 300, often during rush 
hour from 4:00 to 8:00 am, and regularly crossed several checkpoints during her 
stays in the West Bank.54 This was particularly important since, as a white European 
woman, she has experienced prime facie the-difference-that-bodies-make when 
screened by the checkpoint technologies and when qualified as a reflection of her 
gender, age and ID status (holding a European passport) in engaging with the 
checkpoint regime of normalised exceptions. 
 
5.3: Checkpoint 300  
Checkpoint 300 is an assemblage of monitoring and security technologies made out 
of complex materialities (turnstiles, x-ray machines, metal detectors, walls, steel 
bars), politically-situated embodied subjects (Palestinian commuters, Palestinians 
working in the ‘checkpoint economy’, such as the men who sell food, coffee, 
cigarettes or phone cards (Tawil-Souri, 2009), Israeli soldiers and private security 
guards, international and Israeli observers, etc.), and an array of discourses, 
practices and spatial arrangements – which include the validation and 
implementation of ‘age’, ‘gender’ and ‘ID card status’ as selective categories key to 
the working of the checkpoint’s regulatory regime.  
 
                                                 
54 In addition to a four-month period in 2016 and a two-month period in 2017, the first 
author spent one month in 2014 and three months in 2013 in Bethlehem collecting data for 
a different research project; these periods also have helped formulating the questions 
discussed here. 
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Figure 5.1: A map of Checkpoint 300 based on the first author’s fieldnotes and 
drawings during her multiple passages of the checkpoint (source: Iulian Barba Lata). 
 
Checkpoint 300, like other checkpoints in the West Bank, started in the 1990s as a 
mix of cement blocks, sand bags and the presence of Israeli soldiers, aimed at 
checking the documents of Palestinians directed to Jerusalem and further on. It is 
located on the road that historically leads from Hebron to Jerusalem, although the 
Wall currently interrupts it, on the northern entrance of the city of Bethlehem. The 
development of Checkpoint 300 into a terminal checkpoint in 2005 brought about 
significant changes in its architectural design and in the rhetoric used to legitimise 
its presence, since it is now portrayed as a ‘neutral border crossing’ that should not 
be associated with the occupation of the Palestinian Territories. In addition, the 
opening of a terminal checkpoint also entailed the involvement of Israeli private 
security guards, qualified as professional officers operating the border crossings 
(see Braverman, 2011; Mansbach, 2009; see Gordon, 2008, for a more thorough 
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analysis of the changes in the Israeli military rule of the Occupied Territories).55 
These security guards were gradually introduced at Checkpoint 300. In 2013, when 
the first author encountered them for the first time, they were a silent, heavily 
armed presence behind the Border Police, the force in charge of the checkpoint, 
and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) soldiers. In 2016 and 2017, however, they 
seemed to be the authority managing the checkpoint, as the Border Police had 
disappeared and the IDF soldiers only checked IDs and permits (Braverman, 2011; 
Who Profits Research Centre, 2016). 
To pass through a checkpoint, most Palestinians need a permit. The permit system 
predates the checkpoint system. As noted above, after the First Intifada (1987-
1993) a new regime of controlled mobility was enforced, according to which every 
Palestinian had to apply for a personal permit (Keshet, 2006). To apply for a permit, 
Palestinians need a magnetic ID card, granted by the Israeli District Coordination 
Office (DCO). Possession of the magnetic card indicates that one is neither seen as 
a security threat nor that she/he has a misdemeanour on her/his record or on the 
record of their immediate family members. When a misdemeanour is recorded, 
such as trespassing into Israel without the proper magnetic card or permit, it can 
take years before one is allowed to re-apply for the card and the permit. As 
explained by Omer,56 a 46-year-old Palestinian police officer in Bethlehem, a 
common joke in the West Bank is that 101 different kinds of permits exist, one for 
each type of movement of Palestinians inside the West Bank and into Israel 
(interview, 23 June 2016): work permits, student permits, hospital permits, permits 
for farmers travelling to their land and separate permits for these same farmers 
allowing them to carry farming materials with them (Alqasis & al-Azza, 2015). 
However, even with this much-coveted permit (on the many difficulties 
                                                 
55 The private security guards present inside the checkpoints are hired through the Crossing 
Points Directorate, a management body operating under the instructions of the Israeli 
Ministry of Defence. For a detailed discussion of the presence of private security companies 
at the checkpoints, see Who Profits Research Centre, 2016.  
56 All names used are fictive, since the interviewees asked to remain anonymous. 
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Palestinians face in trying to obtain a permit, see Berda, 2018 and Keshet, 2006), 
the passage is not without complications and never assured.  
 
5.4 Rights/rites of passage  
There exist numerous ways in which people passing through a checkpoint are 
categorised by the Israeli architecture of occupation. One of the clearest 
categorisations is employed via the permit system discussed above. Here, the 
differentiation is made between Palestinians who need a permit to pass a 
checkpoint, those who do not need a permit and those unable to get one. 
Individuals who do not need a permit are Palestinians with a foreign passport,57 
Palestinians with an Israeli passport or a Jerusalem ID card, foreign nationals and 
Israelis.58 Technically, Palestinian men with a West Bank ID card above 55 years of 
age and women above 50 should also be able to pass a checkpoint without a 
permit, but in practice the application of this rule is often arbitrary and reliant on 
the mood of soldiers/private security guards, something we discuss more in detail 
later in the article. There is also a group of Palestinians unable to get a magnetic 
card and permit since they are blacklisted; according to Yael Berda (2018), two 
hundred thousand residents of the West Bank have been included in this list after 
the instalment of the permit system. Blacklisting may occur for numerous reasons 
and often without any explanation or warning. Due to this, individuals usually only 
discover that they have been blacklisted when applying for a permit or trying to 
pass through a checkpoint (Piterman, 2007). The second differentiation at play 
                                                 
57 Although this only applies to Palestinians who do not have a West Bank or Jerusalem ID, 
indicated by the fact that they have an Israeli entry card. 
58 However, Israeli citizens are not allowed to use Checkpoint 300, as it leads to Area A. After 
the Oslo Accords the Palestinian Territories were divided into three areas: Area A (18% of 
the West Bank), B (22%) and C (60%). It was agreed that Israel would withdraw from Area A 
immediately after the negotiations and in the future from Area B (controlled by the 
Palestinians and the Israelis) and C (controlled by the Israelis). This has not happened as yet, 
which means that Israel is partly or completely in control of 82% of the West Bank (B’Tselem, 
2017b). 
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concerns the different permits Palestinians may apply for, based on their reasons 
for travel. The permits also stipulate where and when they can pass. Checkpoint 
300 is available to people with many different permits (e.g., work permits, student 
permits, hospital permits and permits to travel to Jerusalem to pray). As argued by 
Berda (2018) with reference to the permit system in Israel/Palestine:  
Contrary to a regime of rights, which obliges the state to avoid 
infringement of individual rights, a regime of privileges allows the 
sovereign to grant (or withdraw) services for certain populations, in an 
instantaneous administrative decision, so the subject is dependent on the 
grace and goodwill of the ruler.  
[italics added] (p. 40) 
In this very possibility of acting and non-acting resides, according to Italian political 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben, the nature of the sovereign exception (1998). This 
system of permits and the related categories reflect in many ways the modus 
operandi of a colonial administration, largely based on a topography of categories 
that aim at rationally incorporating the colonised and their spatialities, but also on 
a hierarchy of ‘privileges’ assigned, often arbitrarily, to specific subjects or 
categories. A robust and pervasive bureaucratic colonial administration is in fact 
essential to implement a regime of uncertainty based on the permanent possibility 
of intervening in the lives of the governed bodies, but also of non-intervening (on 
the role of categorisations of the colonised population in the colonial 
administration, see, among others, the work of Timothy Mitchell [1988] and Ann 
Stoler [1992]). 
In line with this philosophy of occupation, the permit system is complemented by a 
vast array of categorisations adopted by the checkpoint assemblage to differentiate 
Palestinians and grant certain groups privileges over others. While here we 
elaborate on three of these differentiations, namely ‘gender’, ‘age’ and ‘ID status’, 
these are not the only categories at play. Palestinians in the West Bank are in fact 
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qualified via over 40 categories by the Israeli occupation regime, based on factors 
such as gender, religion, hometown, occupation, and education. These categories 
are used to create what Julie Peteet (2017) has defined as an “always legible 
Palestinian subject” (pp. 81-82).  
Such categorisations are not only implemented by the Israeli regime at the 
checkpoints, but are also critically embodied by Palestinians, inside and outside the 
checkpoints, at times in ways that may fit the strategies of the occupation forces, 
other times in rather unexpected ways, making room for lines of flight that 
challenge and resist the biopolitical regime implemented by/through the 
checkpoint assemblage. In the pages to follow, whilst we focus specifically on the 
categories of gender, age and ID card status, we do not imply that these categories 
function as separate, as they become co-implicated and fluid when operationalised 
by the Israeli soldiers/private security guards and engaged with by the Palestinians, 
or that they are only implemented and embodied inside the checkpoints. 
 
5.4.1: Gender 
Checkpoint 300, Thursday, July 14th 2016, 6:15am. I am on a go-along 
interview with Nisreen, a 54-year-old woman who travels from 
Bethlehem to Jerusalem via Checkpoint 300 five days a week to reach 
her work. We have passed the first part of the checkpoint without 
too much delay as we, two women, were able to use the 
humanitarian lane. The normal entry lane is busy, with men climbing 
the metal bars to skip the queue. We walk towards the metal 
detectors and x-ray machines and, again, there is long queue. Nisreen 
decides to move to the front and says ‘yislamu’ [short for yislamu 
ideek, which can be translated as “may your hands be blessed”] to 
the Palestinian man standing at the front of the queue. The man 
steps aside and we are allowed to pass. I ask Nisreen about this and 
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she responds that it is easy for women to skip the queue since men 
allow them to go first. However, if there are too many women 
standing in line, as may be the case on Friday mornings when they 
travel to Jerusalem to pray in the mosque, sometimes they have to 
wait, like the men. 
(fieldnotes, 14 July 2016) 
 
Figure 5.2: A Palestinian woman making her way to the humanitarian lane, 
bypassing the long queue in the main lane on the right (source: Rijke, May 2017). 
 
This fieldnotes excerpt shows one way in which gender is incorporated by the 
checkpoint spatial regime and negotiated and practiced by Palestinians on site. 
According to the categorisations used by the Israelis forces, women are allowed to 
use the humanitarian lane, a lane also dedicated to children, elderly men, 
international visitors (mainly tourists and foreign aid workers) and Palestinians with 
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specific permits, such as those released to visit hospitals and attend school. Using 
this lane means circumventing the general entry lane and, during rush hour, 
thousands of men waiting at the checkpoint. After passing the first turnstile, and 
entering the main checkpoint building, the two lanes merge. One still has to pass 
through three additional turnstiles, an x-ray machine, a metal detector and a booth 
where ID cards and permits are verified – regular commuters are also checked 
biometrically with fingerprint and iris-scanning technology. However, while the 
abovementioned groups are supposedly entitled to use the humanitarian lane, this 
option heavily depends on the soldier/security guard in control at that specific 
moment in time. Soldiers/security guards are perceived by Palestinians to 
randomly open and close the humanitarian lane, making it uncertain for women 
entering Checkpoint 300 whether they will actually be able to use it. Nisreen 
explained that: 
The humanitarian line is supposed to be open all the time. Sometimes 
there are sick people… infants... and they are so small... Sometimes we 
have to wait for 15 minutes, 20 minutes, 30 minutes, and the 
humanitarian lane remains closed while there is no one [no 
soldier/security guard operating the lane]. This is really a problem.  
(interview, 23 June 2016) 
This arbitrary management of the humanitarian lane provides the guards with the 
possibility of revoking the right of using it at any time and to act biopolitically ‘on 
the spot’ by selecting individuals based on their gender when the ‘normal’ rules 
apply, but also by arbitrarily suspending these very rules and dismissing this 
category and its related privileges when women are, or a specific woman in a 
specific moment is, not admitted to the humanitarian lane. This ‘privileged’ lane is 
thus a constitutive element of the political technologies performed by the 
checkpoint assemblage, and gender is one of the categories enabling such a 
selective use of sovereign power and the enactment of the related asymmetrical 
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relationships. Remarkably, this political technology operates also with the 
contribution of some Palestinians invoking their privilege when available and 
claiming the right to be selected as a special category based on their bodily 
presence and appearance. 
The category ‘gender’ is also incorporated by Palestinians passing through 
Checkpoint 300 outside the framework created by the Israeli checkpoint spatial 
regime. Three groups tend to skip the queue, something that is arguably possible 
due to their gendered identities. The first is composed of women who skip the 
main queue before the first turnstile in case the humanitarian lane is closed, but 
also the queue after the first turnstile. They are generally allowed by men to do so 
and, at times, we noticed, even encouraged. As explained by Nur, a 58-year-old 
woman who, prior to her recent retirement, used to travel to Jerusalem on a daily 
basis for work, “this is the good thing about our culture, the men would let the 
women go first” (interview, 1 May 2017). But their attempts may also be 
challenged by the Palestinian men when some feel that there are ‘too many 
women’, although it remained unclear in our interviews what was actually 
experienced as ‘too many’. As Nisreen suggested, women passing through 
Checkpoint 300 are used to negotiate with Palestinian men in order to skip the 
queue, and in case they meet resistance they tend to insist for this privilege, either 
verbally or by simply moving ahead, hence forcing the men to step aside ‘out of 
shame'. In other words, while the ability of women to skip the queue seems to be 
partly dependent on the willingness of the Palestinian men to allow this to happen, 
at the same time, women also claim this space by somehow instrumentalising their 
gender identity and the associated privileges.59 
 
                                                 
59 For a more thorough analysis of the ways Palestinian women resist the occupation in their 
daily lives, see, amongst others, the work on sumud by Caitlin Ryan (2015) and Alexandra 
Rijke and Toine Van Teeffelen (2014). 
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Figure 5.3: The ‘Monkeys’/’Spidermen’ climbing the steel bars to skip the queue in 
the main lane (source: Rijke, June 2017). 
 
The second group skipping the queue are the men who climb the steel bars forming 
the first corridor where people line up, an action that requires significant acrobatic 
skills and is allowed and tolerated precisely because they are young men (it would 
be unthinkable, in that context, for a woman to do the same). This act of climbing 
the steel bars indicates one manifest way in which gender is incorporated in the 
queue by these young men to negotiate their passage. By doing so, they move to 
the front of the first lane, and are thus allowed to by-pass, at times, thousands of 
queuing Palestinian men. This climbing is often presented by Palestinians as an 
indicator that it was a ‘bad morning’ at the checkpoint. An example of a bad day is 
given by Yasser, a 57-year-old man from al-Walaja, a village approximately 5km 
east of Bethlehem, who works in Jerusalem 6km away from Checkpoint 300. 
Although his journey from al-Walaja to the centre of Jerusalem is about 11km long, 
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it can take up to 2 hours on an average morning, more on bad days. When 
discussing the irregular workings of Checkpoint 300, Yasser noted that while 
Wednesday morning that week was particularly busy, since the checkpoint had 
been closed for West Bank Palestinians for four days due to an Israeli holiday, his 
passage was smooth and relatively fast. However, he explained, Thursday was 
horrible, with very long waits and men climbing the bars: “this shows how bad it 
was, men climbing over each other, on the bars… this only happens on bad days” 
(interview, 4 May 2017). Called ‘monkeys’ by some, ‘spidermen’ by others, these 
men are often cursed at but otherwise seemingly tolerated by their fellow 
Palestinians, as explained by 19-year-old Abdel (informal conversation, 17 July 
2016). John, a 27-year-old clergyman living in Bethlehem claimed that he prefers 
the term ‘spidermen’ as he felt this made these men sound like superheroes: “I 
hate it when I see them, the spidermen, because I know it means I will be late for 
work. Checkpoint 300 is such a bad place” (interview, 22 May 2017).  
However, the large majority of men only skip the queue (so blatantly) in the first 
section of the checkpoint, located on the ‘Palestinian side’ of the Wall.60 It is a site 
with no cameras that Israeli soldiers/security guards rarely enter and where the 
many rules applied to the other side of the Wall seem absent. This is clearly 
reflected in the behaviour of the Palestinians, since here they can be seen drinking 
coffee, smoking and, in some cases, indeed climbing the steel bars. Here one finds 
Palestinians selling coffee, ka’ak (a type of bread eaten for breakfast with za’atar, 
eggs and falafel), cigarettes and phone cards; here, as a foreigner, one is able to 
hang out, take pictures and talk to the Palestinians without being told off by 
soldiers/security guards, something more likely to occur inside the main building. 
Arguably, the first lanes are located on the fringes of the checkpoint assemblage. 
However, the act of skipping the queue does represent a way for Palestinian men 
                                                 
60 While the Wall in Bethlehem is located on the Palestinian side of the Green Line, according 
to the Israeli territorial partition, one side is Palestinian, the other is Israeli. The first lanes of 
Checkpoint 300 are located on the Palestinian side of the Wall. 
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to employ the privileges associated with their gender, age and fitness, since 
climbing the steel bars is physically challenging. While these acts by both 
Palestinian women and men do not modify the overall security framework of the 
checkpoint assemblage, they do however contribute to negotiating the biopolitical 
conditions enforced by the regulatory regime, incorporating some of its 
implications while resisting others.  
There is also a small group of men who at times skip the queue on the other side of 
the Wall, right in front of the soldiers/security guards. These, often young, men 
enter the checkpoint through the humanitarian lane, despite not being entitled, 
something they can only do if the first gate is open and the security guards and/or 
soldiers are out of sight. While others with the right to use this gate would proceed 
to the turnstile – which is opened from a control room once the soldiers/security 
guards decide someone is entitled to use this lane – these young men either slide 
under the fence that separates the humanitarian lane from the general entry lane – 
an opening of only a few dozen centimetres – or, alternatively, push themselves 
through the turnstile of the humanitarian lane without it being opened, again, 
through an interstice of a few centimetres. They seem caught in a game with the 
soldiers/security guards on duty, sneaking closer, one foot at the time, trying to 
assess whether or not they will make it without being seen or if, instead, they will 
be caught, and sanctioned accordingly.  
While these men’s behaviour is often a source of frustration for other Palestinians 
standing in the general lane, since it is considered rude and selfish, as explained by 
Abdel (informal conversation, 17 July 2016), who works as a merchant in the 
‘checkpoint economy’ (Tawil-Souri, 2009) at Checkpoint 300, at the same time their 
actions work in an unexpected way against the regular functioning of the 
checkpoint assemblage. Due to their unruly behaviour, the humanitarian lane is 
often closed down during busy mornings. 
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Figure 5.4: A man sliding underneath the gate separating the exit 
lane/humanitarian lane from the main lane to skip the queue  
(source: Rijke, June 2017). 
 
The most obvious effect of this is that the people with the ‘right’ to use this lane 
are unable to do so. However, this behaviour also challenges, at least in part, the 
workings of the official categorisations and the ability of soldiers/security guards to 
use the openings/closing of the lane as a way to exercise their arbitrary power. In 
fact, in this case all are denied entrance and the door is closed with a clear reason, 
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that is, again, the unruly presence of these young men, something that is quickly 
communicated to the people trying to use the humanitarian lane by their peers. 
While we do not wish to romanticise the acts of these young men – since their 
actions often have negative consequences for other (weaker and more vulnerable) 
Palestinians – we recognise, however, that their unruly and opportunistic actions 
do hamper and thwart the workings of the categorisations system of the 
checkpoint and of its humanitarian lane used as a tool to endlessly reproduce 
conditions of exception allowing the guards to exercise their sovereign power. 
What emerges here is the fact that, if we understand the checkpoint precisely as a 
spatial political technology, we may learn much more about the complications of – 
and the co-implications of different subjects in – the workings of the checkpoint 
biopolitical machinery. This is the case also when another biological category is 
adopted to differentiate the Palestinians at the checkpoint: their age. 
 
5.4.2: Age 
Checkpoint 300, Friday morning, June 10th 2016, 8:00 am. It is the 
first Friday of Ramadan, a period during which tens of thousands of 
Palestinians travel to Jerusalem on Friday to pray at the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque. I have heard yesterday that 83,000 Ramadan permits 
provided to Palestinians during this month to visit Jerusalem have 
been cancelled due to an attack in Tel Aviv on June 8, during which 
two Palestinian men shot seven Israeli citizens, killing four. Men over 
45, boys under 13 and all women should still be able to pass without 
a permit on Friday during this month. Male Palestinians between 13 
and 45 years old will not be allowed to pass. After having been at the 
checkpoint since 5am, it becomes clear that this rule is not 
implemented consistently. Even 80-year-old men have been turned 
away for being ‘too young’ to travel without a permit. I also 
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understand that while boys under 13 should pass without a permit, 
they are not allowed to do so without a parent. Hence, if their father 
is under 45, and the only parent they came with, both cannot pass. 
(fieldnotes, 10 June 2016) 
Age is used as a category to differentiate between Palestinians inside the 
checkpoint in two different ways. First, age determines whether someone needs a 
permit. While during Ramadan the rules may be slightly altered, normally, children 
up to the age of 12, men older than 55 years of age and women over 50 with a 
West Bank ID card should be allowed to pass Checkpoint 300 without a permit. 
However, this does not mean that Palestinians in these categories are always able 
to pass, since the application of these rules is relatively arbitrary, with changes in 
their implementations occurring even during the same day, with no warning or 
explanation. The first author experienced this when travelling with Layla, her 52-
year-old Palestinian landlady, from the south of the West Bank to the north, trying 
to go across Jerusalem (hence, passing through two checkpoints) to shorten the 
trip. In the morning, Layla was allowed to travel without a permit, with no 
problems or comments; in the afternoon, however, she was unable to take the 
same route back again, as she was stopped at Qalandiya checkpoint on her way 
from Ramallah to Jerusalem. She was told by the soldier in charge that she could 
not travel without a permit that day, since it was a Saturday, a rule she had not 
heard before. When she explained that she was entitled to pass and that she had 
already passed that same day, she was told this was incorrect and sent away. 
Whilst she was luckily able to take a detour, bypassing the so-called ‘border 
checkpoints’, such as Checkpoint 300, and travelling on roads east of Jerusalem and 
Bethlehem, and still get home, this is not always the case for all Palestinians forced 
to pass checkpoints. This example reveals how the ability to travel without a permit 
for certain age groups is never certain, and it is instead an aleatory privilege 
awarded, from time to time, by the Israeli checkpoint guards empowered by their 
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capacity to qualify ‘on the spot’ different categories of Palestinians. Whether or not 
this privilege is granted remains entirely unpredictable, making any checkpoint 
passage without a permit a precarious experience but also an opportunity to create 
a space of exception to the rule on the part of the individual soldier/security guard 
in charge in that precise moment. This possibility of acting and/or not acting on the 
part of individual soldiers/security guards, we argue, is constitutive of the 
checkpoint assemblage, if conceived of, as we do here, as a spatial biopolitical 
machinery. 
The age of men is also used as an indication of whether or not they are allowed to 
use the humanitarian lane. While women of all ages are in principle entitled to its 
use, men must be over 60 (EAPPI, 2014). We have already discussed the arbitrary 
ways in which the humanitarian lane is used at Checkpoint 300 in relation to 
women. This arbitrariness is even more evident when it comes to older men. For 
instance, men over 60 are often accused by the soldiers/security guards of being 
too young to use the humanitarian lane. As we regularly observed on busy 
mornings at Checkpoint 300, which age is deemed to be ‘old enough’ by 
soldiers/security guards for men to use the humanitarian lane is neither clearly 
communicated nor consistently implemented. As explained by Youssef, a 62-year-
old man who had been denied the use of the humanitarian lane the morning the 
first author spoke with him inside Checkpoint 300, “if you look only a little bit 
energetic as a man, like you could stand in the main line without collapsing, they 
will not let you pass through the humanitarian lane” (interview, 5 June 2016). As 
with the category ‘gender’, also the category ‘age’, and the arbitrary 
implementation of the rules connected to it, show how the checkpoint’s spatial 
regime aliments a sense of confusion and precarity as a strategic management tool 
capable of endlessly, and unpredictably, reproducing, at the most minute scale, the 
fundamental asymmetrical relationship between the occupier and the occupied. 
This very process is what makes it virtually impossible for Palestinians to plan their 
daily routes and the duration of their travels. 
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However, some of the interviewed Palestinians actively resist the arbitrary and 
unpredictable nature of the checkpoint regime. For example, they try to avoid the 
precariousness of travelling without a permit by actually applying for one, even 
when over 50/55 years of age. As Ibrahim explained, while he is able to travel 
without a permit to his work in Jerusalem due to his age, he nonetheless applied 
for a permit, because passing Checkpoint 300 was a lot easier and more predictable 
with a permit than without it (interview, 7 August 2016). This was also argued by 
Sarah, a 64-year-old woman living in Bethlehem. In 2017 she wanted to visit the 
Holy Sepulchre church in Jerusalem during Easter time with her two sisters, both 
also over 50 years old. Sarah had a permit, one that she had received through her 
church, but her sisters did not. When arriving at the checkpoint, the soldiers told 
them they could not go through: 
They [her sisters] are old, they should have been able to go through 
without a permit, but they were told to go back. I told the soldier I did 
have a permit, so I could go through, but my sisters had to return to 
Bethlehem.  
(interview, 1 May 2017) 
When asked why she carried a permit despite her age, Sarah explained that she 
had not actively applied for it as she received it through her church, but she was 
nonetheless happy to have it. While she should be able to go through without the 
permit, sometimes she had to show it, “I always have it, just in case” (interview, 1 
May 2017). Despite the fact that applying for a permit means providing the Israeli 
military regime with additional personal information on top of the information 
already supplied to receive a magnetic card, and to subject oneself to the 
possibility of being denied a permit or being permitted to pass only during 
restricted timeframes, for some Palestinians included in the abovementioned 
‘privileged’ categories obtaining a permit is a way to become less vulnerable to the 
moods of private soldiers/security guards. In other words, for some of these 
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individuals, not using the possibility of passing through without a permit represents 
a form of resistance to the arbitrariness of the whole checkpoint machinery, which 
selects certain (normally more vulnerable) age categories to then subject them to a 
daily regime of uncertainty by implementing, ad hoc and for no predictable reason, 
a set of endless exceptions to the rule. 
 
5.4.3: ID card status 
Saturday, June 11th 2016. Today I have to pass through Checkpoint 
300, but a general closure of the West Bank was announced after the 
Tel Aviv attack of June 8, so I am not sure if I will succeed. When I 
arrive at the checkpoint, it is quiet and empty, but the turnstiles do 
turn, and I hesitantly enter the main building. Here I am asked by a 
soldier where I am from while passing the x-ray machine and the 
metal detector; after I say ‘The Netherlands’, I am allowed to pass. 
Later that day I will realise that what is defined as a ‘general closure’ 
of the West Bank does not necessarily mean that no one can move, 
since there are many Israeli cars driving around the Bethlehem area, 
but more specifically that Palestinians with a West Bank ID are not 
allowed to move freely. What emerges is a clear geography of ID 
cards. 
(fieldnotes, 11 June 2016).  
A third differentiation at play inside Checkpoint 300 is produced by passports/ID 
cards. For the checkpoint selective machinery, four different categories of 
individuals based on passports and ID cards exist: (a) foreign passport holders; (b) 
Israeli passport holders; (c) Palestinians with a Jerusalem ID; and (d) Palestinians 
with a West Bank ID. These documents have a significant impact on the freedom of 
movement experienced by individuals. People with a foreign passport are the most 
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mobile group, since they are able to enter all places in Israel and the West Bank, 
including Area A and the illegal Israeli settlements. Passing through a checkpoint 
often entails for them simply showing their passport and visa. Israeli passports are 
‘technically’ barred from entering Area A in the West Bank, which also entails that 
they should not be able to pass checkpoints leading to this area, such as Checkpoint 
300. However, as explained by Hajar, a 21-year-old Palestinian student with an 
Israeli passport, as long as she avoids passing through a checkpoint leading to or 
from Area A, she can, unofficially, travel anywhere in the West Bank with her Israeli 
passport (interview, 12 June 2016).  
Since Israel annexed Jerusalem in 1967, the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem 
have become residents of Israel. However, these Palestinians do not have an Israeli 
passport, but a temporary residency ID card, which excludes them, for example, 
from voting in the national elections, or travelling abroad, the latter only being 
permitted with either Israeli-issued travel permits or temporary Jordanian 
passports (Tawil-Souri, 2011a). This residence status can be revoked at any time, a 
punitive action often used by the Israeli authorities, making it illegal for those 
Palestinians to continue their life in Jerusalem (Community Action Centre, 2016). 
Palestinians with a Jerusalem ID card can pass any checkpoint without a permit, at 
any time or day. As explained by Samira, a 54-year-old Palestinian woman with an 
East Jerusalem ID card who works at the Bethlehem University:  
I can cross any checkpoint. Sometimes they will ask for our ID’s [when 
driving into Bethlehem], asking why we are going there. And all that …. But 
not always. The question [the soldiers ask] is ‘where are you coming 
from?’. I think they are checking that you are not a Jewish [Israeli] going 
into Bethlehem by mistake. So, you have to know how to answer. If I say 
that I am from Jerusalem, that is not enough, you can be from anywhere 
inside Jerusalem. So, when I say I am from Beit Sfafa, which is all Arab, 
then it is okay.  
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(interview, 22 May 2017) 
Last in line come the Palestinians with a West Bank ID card, who, as discussed 
earlier, need a permit and magnetic card to go through a checkpoint.61 These 
different ID cards are used, as more thoroughly analysed by Helga Tawil-Souri 
(2011a), as “a widespread low-tech surveillance mechanism and a principle means 
for discriminating (positively and negatively) subjects’ privileges and basic rights” 
(pp. 69-70).  
An example of the different status awarded to Palestinians through ID cards is 
expressed in car ownership. People with an Israeli passport and Jerusalem ID card 
can own a car with an Israeli/yellow license plate, while people with a West Bank ID 
card can only own a car with a West Bank/green-white license plate. Cars with 
green-white license plates cannot be driven in Israel, including East Jerusalem, or 
on ‘settler-only roads’ in the West Bank, while cars with yellow license plates can 
be driven everywhere. Due to this, people with an Israeli passport or Jerusalem ID 
card can drive their own car through a ‘border checkpoint’, such as Checkpoint 300, 
while this is not possible for Palestinians with a West Bank ID card who have to 
walk through the checkpoint and find alternative transportation on the other side, 
such as busses or shared taxis. This makes the commute for Palestinians living in 
the West Bank and working in Jerusalem longer and more insecure, something 
Ahmed, a 62-year-old man living in Al Walaja and working in Jerusalem, 
experiences on a daily basis:  
It is a very big problem for a Palestinian to go from his house to work in 
Jerusalem every day. He can’t use his car. If he has a meeting at 2 o’clock, 
he knows many things can happen to him on the way. Many things stop 
and change.  
                                                 
61 Palestinians with a Gaza ID card are the least mobile inhabitants of Israel/Palestine. They 
are not included in this analysis since we focus on Checkpoint 300, located in the West Bank.  
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(interview, 7 August 2016) 
This is even more the case for Palestinians living further away from Jerusalem, such 
as Hamzah, a 73-year-old man living in Jab’a, a small village located approximately 
twenty kilometres south of Checkpoint 300. Hamzah recently took up a job as a 
security guard for a building site in East Jerusalem. He now travels to East 
Jerusalem five times a week, which entails taking several different types of public 
transport: 
I take a service [taxi] from the village [Jab’a] to Nahaleen, another service 
[taxi] from Nahaleen to Bethlehem, another service [taxi] from Bethlehem 
centre to the checkpoint [Checkpoint 300], where I cross and take the bus 
to work. This takes me about an hour, but this also depends [on whether 
or not] all the roads are open.  
(interview, 23 June 2016) 
Palestinians with a Jerusalem ID card and a car with a yellow license plate can thus 
pass Checkpoint 300 in their vehicle through a dedicated gate, avoiding crowds, 
pressure, turnstiles, metal detectors and cameras inside the main building. In 
addition, they can use all checkpoints in the West Bank. For Palestinians travelling 
from the Bethlehem area to Jerusalem with a Jerusalem ID/Israeli passport, the 
quickest and easiest checkpoint to use, besides Checkpoint 300, is The Tunnels, a 
checkpoint west of Bethlehem limited to cars and buses. The majority of West Bank 
Palestinians who travel to Israel on a work permit are barred from using this 
checkpoint, that is instead regularly used by Jewish settlers.  
While differentiations between groups of Palestinians may be seen, again, as a way 
to assign one group certain privileges against the other and to reinstate through 
this mechanism the ever-present asymmetrical relationship between occupier and 
occupied, such privileges are at times used by Palestinians with Jerusalem ID cards 
to help Palestinians with a West Bank ID card. As several of our interviewees 
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explained, Palestinians with a West Bank ID try to illegally pass with Palestinians 
with a Jerusalem ID by car: 
Sometimes, when 300 is really packed, and it would take me over 
two hours to get to work, I try to pass the checkpoint in a car with a 
yellow plate, joining a friend, or even catching a ride with a stranger. 
Sometimes it is okay, and the soldiers don’t check or say anything. 
Other days, they don’t let you pass and you have to go back. There is 
no consistent policy, every soldier applies his own rules, depending 
on his mood.  
(Nisreen, interview, 23 June 2016) 
 
This was echoed by Nur, who is occasionally picked up by a friend with an Israeli car 
when visiting a hospital in Nazareth. While she can often pass without problems, 
helped by the fact that her friend is a Jewish Israeli woman, at times she is sent 
back, without clear explanation or warning (interview, 1 May 2017). Omer, a 46-
year-old police officer, also explained that this makes it very difficult to know what 
to expect. He told us that once his mother, a woman in her sixties, wanted to visit 
Jerusalem with an American friend. She had trouble walking due to pain in her 
knees. For this reason, he hired a yellow-plated taxi to drive her through 
Checkpoint 300, ensuring she did not have to walk the long distances inside the 
checkpoint: 
I drove behind the taxi in my own car and stopped at the gate [where the 
cars drive through], waiting to make sure they could cross. But they were 
not allowed to do so. So, I drove them to the pedestrian entrance and they 
had to walk through. Sometimes, the soldiers allow her to go through by 
car… but other times, no.  
(interview, 21 June 2017) 
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Omer’s mother also talked about this incident in an earlier interview, claiming that 
the soldiers put their guns up when she tried to talk to them in order to persuade 
them, “we are not terrorists! Women of our age! They should just let us pass!” 
(interview, 1 May 2017). While some of our West Bank interviewees believed they 
could positively influence the chance of getting through the gate in a yellow-plated 
car, this remained a game dependent on multiple random factors such as the mood 
of the soldiers/security guards at the checkpoint, the political climate in the 
country and even the weather. Once again, similarly to the spatialities generated 
by gender and age, the checkpoint logic based on ID card qualifications is an 
ambivalent and complex instrument in generating specifically uneven power 
relationships, but also (precarious) spaces to resist and subvert them. In other 
words, if soldiers/security guards use ‘randomness’ as a strategic tool to exercise 
their sovereign power inside the checkpoints, there emerges also a field of 
possibility for Palestinians to circumvent the elaborate regime of selection and 
control inside Checkpoint 300. 
 
5.5: Conclusion 
For many Palestinians, passing through an Israeli checkpoint is a daily ritual they 
cannot avoid on their way to work, school, family or their mosque/church. 
Although the checkpoints are key sites where the impact of the architecture of 
occupation is felt on a daily basis, the experience of Palestinians at these specific 
sites has been the focus of a relatively limited number of research projects. In this 
article, we have tried to analyse the daily experience of Palestinians passing 
through Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem in relation to the implementation of three 
categorisations that define their right to pass, namely ‘gender’, ‘age’ and ‘ID card 
status’. To do this, we have studied these experiences as being part of a checkpoint 
machinery, considered as a spatial (bio)political technology key to the realisation of 
the broader geographies of occupation in the West Bank.  
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This article has shown the importance of ‘randomness’ and arbitrariness in the 
checkpoint operations as a tool for Israeli soldiers/security guards to create the 
conditions for exceptional sovereign power to be exercised, literally, on the bodies 
of the Palestinians subjected to a series of constantly mutable categorisations. 
Indeed, the very workings of the checkpoint allow for endless exceptions to or 
suspension of those very categories, contributing in these ways to the realisation of 
a spatio-temporal regime of uncertainty and unpredictability. However, the rules 
and their exceptions, we found out, are confronted by the Palestinians in multiple 
ways; by resisting them, by tricking them, by challenging them, but also by using 
them to take advantage of their peers, as in the case of Palestinian young men or 
women skipping the queue. Our main point is that checkpoints ‘do things’, they 
produce, via the agency of their human and non-human components, specific 
geographies based on the limitation and control of the movement of Palestinians, 
but also on the most diverse and creative forms of engagement with those 
restrictions on the part of many Palestinians subjected to such a spatial regime.  
Similar to the ecologies generated by the invention and the popularisation of 
barbed wire described by Netz (2004), checkpoints may be studied as specific 
spatial formations aimed at implementing new political geographies and new 
relationships of power, for all those who are involved, in different ways, with their 
‘special effects’. One special effect, we argue, is that in the case of Checkpoint 300 
many of the Palestinians are indeed able to negotiate, and in part subvert, the 
impact of the arbitrariness implemented by the occupation forces. This capacity to 
play in their own favour some of the ambivalence and the unpredictability of the 
rules based on the categories here considered, while very important in order to 
recognise the Palestinians’ agency in their engagement with the checkpoint, is, 
however, limited. Terminal checkpoints are presented by the Israeli regime as a 
new type of checkpoint which is supposed to function in an ‘airport-like’ ways, 
controlled by professional security guards and aimed at normalising the daily 
passages as part of an established routine – a strategy linked to the overall idea of 
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the permanent nature of the occupation (Braverman, 2011, 2012; Mansbach, 
2009). However, Checkpoint 300 is a place where confusion and uncertainty remain 
paramount, where it is never clear how Palestinians are actually differentiated into 
groups that are afforded varying degrees of mobility.  
With this contribution, we hope to encourage further research on the workings of 
checkpoints, in the West Bank and beyond, in order to investigate their repressive 
spatialities in detail, but also to highlight the ways in which the people subjected to 
their effects are impacted in their everyday routines. We believe in particular that 
more work should be dedicated to the messiness related to the daily practices of 
the architecture of occupation in the West Bank, also to reflect on how specific 
categories, like the ones considered in this paper, are implemented on the actual 
bodies of individuals and are constitutive of the broader political geographies 
affecting the mobility of Palestinians. Checkpoint 300 is in many ways a monument 
to the biopolitical regime implemented by the administration of the Occupied 
Territories, a regime typically marked by the incorporation of rational categories to 
qualify the subjected population, but also by the possibility of not implementing, in 
any given moment and place, those very same categories.  
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Photo Dossier V
Other Checkpoints
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Figure P.19: The entrance to Qalandiya Checkpoint (source: Rijke, June 2016). 
 
 
Figure P.20: A private security guard observing the commuters passing through 
Qalandiya Checkpoint (source: Rijke, July 2016). 
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Figure P.21: An ‘active’ internal checkpoint in Hebron (source: Rijke, August 2016). 
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Figure P.22: Al Jab’a checkpoint, a border car checkpoint located southwest of 
Bethlehem. This checkpoint is closed for Palestinians with West Bank ID cards 
(source: Rijke, June 2016). 
 
 
 
I am on a ‘checkpoint tour’ organised by Machsom Watch. The tour takes us to the 
north of the West Bank and we drive through an internal ‘active’ car checkpoint 
close to Qalqilya, a large Palestinian city in the north of the West Bank. The women 
of Machsom Watch explain that this checkpoint can be used by both Israeli and 
Palestinian cars. All Israeli cars drive through without checks. If a soldier finds a 
Palestinian car somehow suspect, this car can be sent to a specially designated 
area. There, the driver has to close the windows while leaving one window a little 
bit open. A hose is placed into the car through this opening. This hose sucks some 
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of the air out of the car and this air is given to a dog to smell. If the dog barks, the 
car is searched. If the dog remains quiet, the car can pass unsearched. Apparently 
the dog can also bark if you have a sandwich, coffee or groceries in your car. 
(fieldnotes, 28 July 2016) 
 
 
 
 
Figure P.23: A small ‘active’ internal pedestrian checkpoint in the Qalqilya area. This 
checkpoint separates a Palestinian family from their land. With a permit, they can 
pass through the checkpoint to work on this land. In the photo, the young son of 
the family has just passed through the checkpoint with a wheelbarrow  
(source: Rijke, July 2016). 
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62 This chapter was submitted as: 
Rijke, A. (under review). ‘Checkpoint Knowledge’, Navigating The Tunnels and Al Walaja 
checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Geopolitics 
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Abstract 
When Israel occupied the Palestinian Territories in 1967, restrictions on Palestinian 
movement were gradually put in place. Today an intricate ‘architecture of 
occupation’ has been established – made up of numerous material barriers, the 
continuous expansion of illegal Israeli settlements on the West Bank, and the 
establishment of an elaborate checkpoint system (Weizman 2007). For most 
inhabitants of the West Bank passing through an Israeli checkpoint is a daily ritual 
they cannot avoid. In this article, I will discuss two car checkpoints in the 
Bethlehem area: The Tunnels and Al Walaja, and the experiences of the commuters 
subjected to them. I will indicate that these checkpoints are representative of 
spaces where two opposing geographical regimes meet: providing Jewish settlers 
swift passage, while controlling and potentially stopping Palestinian commuters. I 
will address how numerous biopolitical categories are implemented by the 
checkpoints managers to ensure the existence of these regimes, and how the 
design of the checkpoints as low-tech checkpoints is essential to this. Moreover, I 
will address how Palestinian commuters employ their ‘checkpoint knowledge’ to 
try to positively influence their passages: incorporating the rules and regulations as 
much as possible or trying to manipulate and twist the checkpoints’ practices and 
biopolitical categories.  
 
Key words: Checkpoints, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Spatial Political 
Technologies, Foucault, Checkpoint Knowledge, Architecture of Occupation. 
 
6.1: Introduction 
I am on a go-along interview with Hajar, a 21-year-old Palestinian student 
with an Israeli passport. This morning we are driving from her home in Beit 
Jala to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and, on our way, we will pass 
The Tunnels checkpoint. We get in line to pass the checkpoint and Hajar 
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smiles at me nervously. While Hajar and I should have no trouble passing 
the checkpoint, and she had told me during a previous interview she was 
almost never stopped, she is worried now. We were passed by very slowly 
and extensively watched by a couple of Israeli border police when exiting 
her street and she said she felt that today nothing would go as usual. 
Although I know we are allowed to pass the checkpoint, she is making me 
nervous now, too. As she explained, it all comes down to the mood of the 
soldiers. While Jewish settlers seem to always fly through the checkpoint, 
if the soldiers feel like making the lives of Palestinians difficult, they can 
and they will.  
(fieldnotes, 16 June 2016) 
 
Since Israel occupied the Palestinian Territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) 
in 1967, the restricted movement of Palestinians has increasingly been separated 
from the unrestricted movements of the 600,000 Jewish settlers. During the first 
decades of the Israeli occupation, control on Palestinians’ movements was still 
easily circumvented. However, an intricate ‘architecture of occupation’ has 
developed in the West Bank after 50 years of occupation (Weizman, 2007). These 
years saw the construction of ‘the Wall’, the separation barrier the Israeli 
government is building since 2002 in the West Bank, a growing number of Jewish 
settlements and their related bypass roads, and the implementation of an 
elaborate checkpoint system. In this process, the presence of Palestinians living in 
the West Bank has become separated and hidden from the daily lives of Jewish 
settlers. The Palestinians living in Jerusalem and Israel who carry Jerusalem or 
Israeli identity (ID) cards have the same legal level of freedom of mobility as Jewish 
settlers do and share the same spaces. However, as will become clear in this paper, 
they do not experience this as such: while the mobility of Jewish settlers is 
enhanced as much as possible by the Israeli state and its ‘settlement project’ 
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(Allegra, Handel, & Maggor, 2017), the mobility of Palestinians with Jerusalem and 
Israeli ID cards is controlled and frequently hindered.  
Several academics have analysed the checkpoints in Israel/Palestine (see, amongst 
others, Braverman, 2011, 2012; Griffiths & Repo, 2018; Hammami, 2004, 2010, 
2015, 2019; Kotef & Amir, 2015; Mansbach, 2009, 2012, 2015; Rijke & Minca, 2018, 
2019; Tawil-Souri, 2009, 2010, 2011b). In these analyses, the workings of the 
checkpoints are discussed, the Palestinian experience of passing through them 
analysed, and the influence of the presence of Israeli observers is considered. 
These analyses provide important insights into the checkpoints’ regime. However, 
these studies are focused on pedestrian checkpoints predominately used by 
Palestinians with a West Bank ID. Few authors have analysed the car checkpoints 
that both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians with Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards use 
(Bishara, 2015; Parizot, 2009). The work of anthropologists Cédric Parizot (2009) 
and Amahl Bishara (2015), with which I will engage thoroughly in the upcoming 
pages, illustrates the interplay between the slow and laboured checkpoint passages 
of Palestinians and the fast and smooth passages of Jewish settlers, as well as the 
diverse ways in which commuters engage with the spatial regime of shared car 
checkpoints.  
In this article, I wish to add to this body of work by analysing two car checkpoints, 
The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints63, in the Bethlehem area as spatial political 
technologies. To my knowledge, these two checkpoints have not yet been the focus 
of a study. They are used both by Palestinians with Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards 
and by the Jewish settlers living in the ‘Guts Etzion area’ – the name used by Jewish 
settlers for an area east of Bethlehem that is especially densely populated by 
Jewish settlers. These two checkpoints are examples of places where two opposing 
regimes of mobility are brought together: one focused on the speedy and smooth 
                                                 
63 Al Walaja checkpoint is sometimes called Malha checkpoint (B’tselem, 2018a). However, 
my interviewees referred to it as Al Walaja checkpoint, so I will also refer to the checkpoint 
here with that name. 
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movement of Jewish settlers, the other on the limitation and control of Palestinian 
movement. I intend to indicate how this has been translated into the design and 
functioning of these two ‘low-tech’ car checkpoints, in which Israeli soldiers make 
the decision about who is stopped and questioned and who can pass through 
unhindered. In this article I will indicate how this decision, which is based on the 
implementation of several biopolitical categorisations, was experienced by my 
Palestinian interviewees as being made in a highly unpredictable and arbitrary way. 
Moreover, as I will show with several examples, Palestinians engage with the 
checkpoints’ soldiers and regime in specific ways, employing their ‘checkpoint 
knowledge’ to try to positively influence their checkpoint passages: some tried to 
behave in ways that they expected the soldiers wanted them to behave, others 
‘played’ with the biopolitical categories employed in the checkpoints in order to 
pass unhindered.  
To do this, I will first position the checkpoints in the larger architecture of the 
Israeli occupation, in which I address their role as arbitrary openings in a larger 
system of enclosures. Then I will discuss the biopolitical analytical framework that 
is used in this article and briefly introduce Foucault’s arguments concerning the 
importance of surveillance and circulation. Here, I elaborate on Foucault’s term 
‘political technologies’. After a concise description of the methods used to collect 
the data presented, I will discuss the car checkpoint experiences of the Palestinians 
and Jewish settlers interviewed. In these sections, I will describe the way in which 
the checkpoints function and how the interviewees engaged with them. Finally, I 
will offer some concluding remarks in which I indicate how analysing checkpoints as 
spatial political technologies entails paying attention to how they produce, via the 
agency of their human and non-human components, specific geographies resulting 
in smooth passages for Jewish settlers and in the limitation and control of the 
movement of Palestinians. Furthermore, I will argue that these checkpoints are 
reproduced and challenged by diverse and creative forms of engagement on the 
part of Palestinians subjected to the checkpoints’ spatial regimes. 
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6.2: Checkpoints and the settlement project  
Checkpoints play an important role in the architecture of occupation (Weizman, 
2007). There are 98 checkpoints inside the West Bank and on its ‘border’ with 
Israel.64 These range from large, meticulously designed ‘terminal checkpoints’ filled 
with numerous machines, such as turnstiles, cameras, X-ray machines, metal 
detectors, fingerprint- and iris-scanning devices (Rijke & Minca, 2018, 2019); to two 
fences with a cabin in the middle; to the ‘tollbooth’-like car checkpoints analysed 
here.  
Checkpoints are a technology that, together with the Wall and numerous other 
material barriers, help create Jewish-Israeli-only spaces. These spaces, which are 
inhabited by the 600,000 Jewish settlers living in the West Bank (Allegra, Handel, & 
Maggor, 2017), have been separated from the neighbouring Palestinian spaces 
through the use of material barriers and the creation of bypass roads. The 
settlements cover almost 10 per cent of the West Bank and control another 30 per 
cent, bringing the total percentage of land under direct control of the regional 
councils of the settlements to 40 per cent of the West Bank (B’Tselem, 2017c). 
Most of these settlements are relatively small. Almost 50 per cent of the 
settlements are inhabited by less than 500 people, almost 40 per cent have 
between 500 and 5000 inhabitants, and only 12 per cent of the settlements have 
over 5000 inhabitants (PeaceNow, 2019).  
Due to their small size, the inhabitants have to leave their settlement to go to work 
or school, do their shopping and visit their families and friends. Therefore, the 
Jewish settlers required direct connections to other settlements and to Israel 
(Allegra, Handel, & Maggor, 2017). Over the years, hundreds of kilometres of 
                                                 
64 The term border should be interpreted loosely here – there is no agreed upon ‘border’ 
between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The Green Line, also called the 1949 
Armistice border, is internationally the most recognised border. However, Israel does not 
recognise this line. Furthermore, due to the presence of numerous checkpoints, the building 
of the Wall and the presence of 600,000 Jewish settlers ‘inside’ the Green Line, in practice it 
is difficult to identify the Green Line or any other ‘border’ (B’Tselem, 2017c). 
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bypass roads have been constructed to achieve this (Handel, 2014). While only a 
minority of the roads is explicitly illegal for West Bank Palestinians to use, the way 
these are constructed and securitised is intended to limit their use. These roads, for 
instance, do not always have ramps leading to the Palestinian towns located next 
to them and, when they do, these ramps are often heavily securitised and their 
usage regulated by checkpoints.  
In this way, a parallel road system has been created, in which Jewish settlers can 
move smoothly and quickly in a continuously connected space and Palestinians are 
slowed down, marginalised to slow backroads, having to take long detours and to 
pass through numerous checkpoints. The major effects of the Israeli road structure 
in the West Bank on Palestinian life and the possibility of a future Palestinian state 
have been analysed in detail by authors such as Julie Peteet (2017), Eyal Weizman 
(2007), Ariel Handel (2009, 2011, 2014, 2016) and Hagar Kotef (2015). As argued by 
Marco Allegra, Ariel Handel and Erez Maggor (2017), the bypass roads are an 
important mechanism in the “normalization of the Jewish presence in the West 
Bank (…) i.e., the ongoing incorporation of the settlements into Israel’s social, 
economic and administrative fabric underlying the development of Israel’s 
settlement policy” (p. 1). By connecting the settlements not only to each other, but 
also to Israel through the creation of a continuous thoroughfare, the bypass roads 
work towards erasing the Green Line. The settlements are no longer placed 
‘outside Israeli society’, but are deeply entrenched in Israeli economic and political 
life. The bypass roads in many places look like any other highway in Israel, with 
multiple lanes, petrol stations, signs and lighting, hiding their position ‘behind’ the 
Green Line (Salamanca, 2015). As such, they work towards a seemingly united 
Israel that includes the Jewish settlements in the West Bank.  
That these bypass roads are in fact not the same as other highways in Israel is 
evidenced by the presence of numerous soldiers, the large concrete blocks that are 
positioned at bus stops, the sight of Palestinians towns and Palestinian cars, and 
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the checkpoints. While the majority of these checkpoints are aimed at controlling 
and possibly hindering the movement of West Bank Palestinians, some are also 
positioned on routes taken by Jewish settlers and Palestinians with Jerusalem and 
Israeli ID cards. The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints are examples of such 
checkpoints. As stated earlier, only a relatively small group of academics has 
analysed the workings of this type of checkpoint and the experiences of the 
commuters being subjected to them. Here, I wish to discuss the work of Amahl 
Bishara (2015) and Cédric Parizot (2009).  
In her article entitled ‘Driving while Palestinian’, Amahl Bishara (2015) analysed 
how Israeli Palestinians smuggled West Bank Palestinians through car checkpoints 
into Israel. In her work she did not specifically focus on checkpoints, but she 
described several experiences she had while driving around in the West Bank and 
into Israel. One of these experiences detailed passing a checkpoint. Here, she 
explained that one of her interviewees, a Palestinian woman with an Israeli ID card, 
had smuggled West Bank Palestinians without the proper permit through car 
checkpoints. For this act of defiance, she used her knowledge about who is more 
likely to be stopped and checked while passing through these car checkpoints. 
Examples of such checkpoint knowledge are, for instance, which road to use when 
approaching the checkpoint and where to position whom in the car: the younger, 
least modestly dressed woman in the front while avoiding positioning young men in 
such a visible place. This knowledge, gained, as she stated, “by the skin of one’s 
teeth, uncomfortably and in fear” (Bishara, 2015, p. 43), made it possible for her 
interviewee to circumvent the Israeli regime of enclosure.  
Cédric Parizot (2009) focused on one specific checkpoint in his analysis, namely the 
Meitar/Wadi Al-Khalil checkpoint, which is located in the south of the West Bank. 
In his analysis, he compared the experiences of Jewish settlers, Israeli Bedouins and 
West Bank Palestinians who use the checkpoint. These three groups all pass 
through the checkpoint and, as such, share the same space. This is most explicit, as 
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Parizot explains, with the Jewish settlers and Israeli Bedouins, who both drive 
through the checkpoint using the same car lanes. However, Parizot argued that 
they are subjected to different regimes of control and mobility. The Jewish settlers 
experienced their time spent passing through the checkpoint as “temporal 
pollution” (Parizot, 2009, p. 15) – as undesired time – a means to achieve an end 
without any intrinsic value. Their checkpoint passage was simply part of a steady 
and predictable journey. While the Israeli Bedouins legally should have the same 
freedom of movement as the Jewish settlers, this group, who Parizot stated are 
treated in an equally precarious way as Palestinians with a Jerusalem ID, 
experienced their passages in a very different way. They were subjected to 
uncomfortable, humiliating and at times violent interactions with Israeli forces. For 
West Bank Palestinians, the least mobile of the three groups, the checkpoint 
passages were central to their lives. Although they considered the passages a waste 
of time, they did represent very significant moments in their daily lives. Whether or 
not one would be able to pass was never certain and this meant the same was true 
for their ability to reach their work, school or family. 
In this article, I wish to add to these works by analysing the checkpoint experiences 
of Palestinians with Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards and Jewish settlers. I will engage 
with the work of Bishara (2015) and Parizot (2009) throughout my analysis, 
indicating the differences between the experiences of the Jewish settlers and the 
Palestinians with Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards who I have interviewed, and the 
ways these latter used their ‘checkpoint knowledge’ to ‘improve’ their checkpoint 
passages. 
 
6.3: Surveillance in the architecture of occupation 
Besides helping to create Jewish-Israeli-only spaces, the checkpoints are also a 
means of surveillance. They have not been constructed to completely stop 
Palestinian movement (as Amir, 2013; Hammami, 2015; Handel, 2009, 2011, 2014; 
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and Kotef, 2015 have also argued). Instead, they represent key spatial political 
technologies that monitor, discipline and/or selectively limit the mobility of 
Palestinians. As Polly Pallister-Wilkins (2016) argued, the working of the barriers in 
the West Bank as a security apparatus is dependent upon the existence of 
checkpoints. One should always keep in mind when studying barriers/walls that 
“they include openings, checkpoints and gates that allow for the movement of 
people and goods” (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016, p. 154). As also stated by Parsons and 
Salter (2008), the Israeli barriers are not in place to stop movement; they are there 
to control porosity, and in the process represent an important biopolitical 
technology in the occupation (p. 703). These openings, Pallister-Wilkins (2015a) 
argued elsewhere regarding Israeli’s architecture of occupation “enable Israel to 
comprehensively regulate Palestinian circulation, discipline and govern the 
occupied population using topographical, spatial and material forms of control 
working in conjunction with the forces of circulation” (p. 451). Following these 
authors, I wish to examine how the checkpoints function as biopolitical security 
technologies that the Israeli state uses to control porosity and the flow of 
population.  
Analysing checkpoints as political technologies – a term I take from the work of 
Michel Foucault (1977) – entails analysing the checkpoints as made up of specific 
practices and techniques aimed at organising the bodies subjected to them 
(Behrent, 2013; Elden, 2013; Katz, Martin, & Minca, 2018; Minca, 2015; Simon, 
2013). It entails focusing on methods of calculation, the controlling of mobility and 
the role played by ‘eruptive’ and ‘withheld’ violence (Azoulay & Ophir, 2009) in 
their workings. It also sheds light on power as productive and creative, “as a 
relationship that moulds, adapts, triggers, and stimulates individual behaviour, 
particularly by shaping bodily conduct” (Behrent, 2013, p. 60). This does not mean 
that the mechanisms analysed do not have violent effects but rather that, when 
analysing these mechanisms, one should focus on what they produce. It also brings 
into frame the interplay of human and non-human interactions. As stated by 
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Foucault (1982), the exercise of power is not “a naked fact” (p. 345), but it is 
influenced by and influences the space in which the relationship takes place. 
Analysing these relationships entails acknowledging that they are influenced by and 
always put into operation systems of differentiation – differences in privilege, 
economic status, linguistics, and so forth – and the material means that are used as 
enforcement – the threat of weapons, but also systems of surveillance, archives, 
rules and more (Foucault, 1982, p. 344). Here, I wish to include a spatial element by 
framing the checkpoints as spatial political technologies (Katz, Martin, & Minca, 
2018; Minca, 2015), and by analysing how these produce selective, arbitrary and 
mutable geographies of mobility. 
This choice of words is deliberate, because while the checkpoints are porous 
openings in the larger architecture of occupation, they do not always function in a 
predictable and stable way. More precisely, the commute for Palestinians is never 
entirely predictable. Whether a passage will be smooth or long; whether the Israeli 
soldier managing the checkpoint will be polite, rude, or violent; whether or not a 
permit will provide passage; or whether or not the checkpoint will be closed all 
together – one can never be sure. As it has been argued by Arielle Azoulay and Adi 
Ophir (2009), due to the constant arbitrary workings of the checkpoints’ regime, 
the only two things Palestinians can learn in their interactions with Israeli forces 
inside these points of friction is “the absolute submission of the Palestinian to the 
agents of the Israeli ruling power and the need to relearn again and again what is 
expected in order to either please or avoid them” (p. 115). The Palestinian moving 
bodies are disciplined to know they can never predict how their commute will go 
and that they will have to incorporate any unexpected changes in their daily 
routine. This arbitrary functioning of the checkpoints is not an unintended by-
product of the Israeli occupation. Instead, their arbitrary management appears to 
be one of the main functions of the checkpoints. As stated by Yael Berda (2018), 
the occupation regime should not be seen as a regime of rights but rather as a 
‘regime of privileges’. She explained that the Palestinian subject is dependent upon 
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the goodwill of the ruler. Compared to a regime in which a subject can call upon 
certain rights, privileges can be withdrawn in an administrative decision, without 
prior notice or explanation (Berda, 2018, p. 40).  
This regime of privileges is based upon the use by the Israeli occupation regime of 
numerous categorisations to differentiate between Palestinians – such as ID card, 
gender, religion, hometown, occupation, marital status (Peteet, 2017). Within the 
checkpoints, the permit system is the most important tool of categorisation. The 
first differentiation is made between commuters who need a permit to pass a 
checkpoint, those who do not need a permit and those who are unable to get one. 
Individuals who do not need a permit are Palestinians with a foreign passport, an 
Israeli passport or Jerusalem ID card, foreign nationals and Jewish Israelis, including 
Jewish settlers. Palestinians with a West Bank ID card need a permit and a 
magnetic card, on which their (biometric) data is registered.65 The Palestinians who 
need a permit are further categorised according to the type of permit with which 
they are travelling. The last category is a group of Palestinians who are unable to 
get a permit or a magnetic card due to the fact that they have been blacklisted by 
Israeli authorities. According to Berda (2018), 200,000 residents of the West Bank 
have been included in this list. Blacklisting may occur for numerous reasons and 
often without any explanation or warning.  
Despite these obstacles, Palestinians keep on moving, and thousands pass through 
checkpoints every day and employ diverse strategies to try to improve their 
passages. Analysing their experiences compared to those of the Jewish settlers is 
the main focus of this article.  
 
                                                 
65 I do not include Palestinians with a Gazan ID card, the least mobile inhabitants of 
Israel/Palestine, in this analysis because I focus on The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints, 
which are located in the West Bank. 
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6.4: Checkpoint analysis 
This analysis is based on research developed during a seven-month period of 
fieldwork spent in the Bethlehem area in 2016, 2017 and 2019. As part of a larger 
research project focused on the workings of checkpoints in this area (Rijke & 
Minca, 2018, 2019), I aimed to explore the dynamics of The Tunnels and Al Walaja 
car checkpoints. To do this, I conducted 34 interviews. I interviewed eight 
Palestinians either with a Jerusalem or Israeli ID card and eleven Jewish settlers, 
nearly all of them twice. The interviewees, 13 women and six men, whose age 
ranged from 21 to 65 years old, regularly passed through the two car checkpoints 
analysed. The Palestinians I interviewed lived either in Bethlehem or in the 
surrounding villages. All the Jewish settlers lived in the Har Gilo settlement, located 
south of Jerusalem and east of Bethlehem. Both the Palestinians and Jewish 
settlers I interviewed travelled regularly to Jerusalem on their way to work or 
school. Besides these interviews and to further observe the workings of these 
checkpoints, I regularly crossed these checkpoints independently during my stays in 
the West Bank. 
The data I discuss here were collected using methods that have been largely 
inspired by Gabrielle Ivinson and Emma Renold (2013, 2014) and Gillian Rose, 
Monica Degen and Begum Basdas (2010). The combination of go-along interviews – 
where I joined my respondents on their way to work or school – and in-depth 
interviews and observations allowed me to analyse the way these car checkpoints 
work and the impact they have. The go-along interviews have been especially 
valuable for observing their workings. I experienced the differences that the two 
opposing geographical regimes created while travelling through the checkpoints 
with my interviewees. Going through the checkpoints together allowed me to 
observe the different experiences of the Palestinian interviewees and the Jewish 
settlers I interviewed. For instance, while the Jewish settlers never stopped talking 
to me when we were driving through the checkpoint, at most absently waving at 
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the soldiers; my Palestinian interviewees often fell silent when we were passing 
through.  
Furthermore, by assessing my own positionality as a white woman with a European 
passport, the different experiences of different bodies became all the more clear. I 
was never stopped at these checkpoints, something undoubtedly influenced by my 
white skin and blond hair. My interviewees often commented on this when we 
were discussing who was more likely to be stopped in these car checkpoints. 
John66, a 27-year-old Palestinian, for example, remarked: “you would be good in 
the car when passing the checkpoint!” (interview, 22 May 2017) and 46-year-old 
settler Ariel, who commented that “we would not be stopped with you in the car” 
(interview, 9 July 2016).  
 
6.5: The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints: where two geographical 
regimes meet 
The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints are both located west of Bethlehem and are 
considered ‘border checkpoints’ by the Israeli army (B’Tselem, 2018a). Al Walaja 
checkpoint is on the Green Line and positioned close to the Palestinian town it has 
been named after, Al Walaja. The Tunnels checkpoint is located several kilometres 
west of the Green Line, inside the West Bank. It has four lanes with four soldier 
booths leading in the direction of Jerusalem, two lanes leading in the direction of 
Bethlehem/Hebron, as well as watch towers and a separate area where cars can be 
directed to for further inspection (see Figure 6.1). Al Walaja checkpoint is 
considerably smaller; it has one lane in both directions and a small area to the side 
where cars can be further inspected.  
 
                                                 
66 All names used are fictitious, as the interviewees asked to remain anonymous. 
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Figure 6.1: The Tunnels Checkpoint (source: Rijke, May 2017). 
 
The checkpoints can be considered to be ‘low-tech’. Besides cameras there are no 
visible machines present – there is not even a traffic arm to stop the cars from 
driving up to the checkpoints. The only mechanisms used to slow down cars is the 
bumps on the road and the soldiers and the guns with which they are armed. 
Often, especially during rush hour, there are several vehicles waiting to drive 
through the checkpoints. When arriving at the front of the queue on the way to 
Jerusalem and Israel, a vehicle is confronted with one or two armed soldiers. There 
are no soldiers in the direction of Bethlehem and Hebron. 
Only commuters with Israeli or Jerusalem ID cards are allowed to use both these 
checkpoints.67 Since they are ‘car checkpoints’, they can only be passed while inside 
                                                 
67 There is a small group of Palestinians with West Bank ID cards who can pass through The 
Tunnels checkpoint in a bus. This is due to the type of permit they hold – such as work 
permits for employees of international organisations or special hospital permits. Because 
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a vehicle. This vehicle has to have a yellow – Israeli – number plate. Vehicles with 
green-white – Palestinian – number plates are not allowed to pass through these 
checkpoints.68 The Israeli and Jerusalem ID cards mean these commuters can travel 
to Israel and Jerusalem without having to acquire permits. Hence, unlike 
checkpoints used by West Bank Palestinians, The Tunnels and Al Walaja 
checkpoints do not revolve around checking the permits of the people traveling 
through them. This does not mean that these checkpoints do not control and 
discipline the passages of (some of) its users. More specifically, these checkpoints 
bring together two, arguably opposed, geographical regimes: providing Jewish 
settlers swift passage, while simultaneously stopping and controlling Palestinians 
with Israeli and Jerusalem ID cards – who can be stopped by the soldiers for a short 
chat, an ID check or a search of their car, but who can also be denied passage or 
even be detained.  
To ensure the fast passage of the settlers, not every car is stopped inside these 
checkpoints. As explained by 47-year-old Fadwa, a Palestinian woman who holds an 
Israeli ID card, “it is impossible to check everyone at the Tunnels because Jewish 
people also use it and they [the soldiers] do not want to delay them” (interview, 12 
June 2016). This means that there is always the possibility of not being stopped and 
checked. Although Palestinians carrying Israeli or Jerusalem ID cards should legally 
enjoy the same level of freedom of movement as Jewish settlers do, their 
checkpoint passages are often associated with tense and humiliating contacts with 
Israeli forces, something Cédric Parizot also found in his analysis of the checkpoint 
passages of Jewish settlers and Israeli Bedouins (Parizot, 2009). Most of my 
                                                 
this is a relatively small group and none of my interviewees were able to pass through the 
checkpoint in this way, I do not include the experiences of this group in my analysis.  
68 It is not allowed to drive a Palestinian car and Palestinians with a West Bank ID card are 
not allowed to drive inside Jerusalem or Israel. Because of this, Palestinians with a West 
Bank ID have to pass through pedestrian checkpoints and find alternative transport.  
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Palestinian interviewees were stopped and checked regularly at these checkpoints. 
As explained by 27-year-old clergyman John:  
When you see the long line of cars at the checkpoint, you realise you are 
going to be late for work. You see the soldiers checking a lot of the cars 
and you start brainstorming: Do I have something in my car? Tools? Any 
food? Did I think of my ID? That is something you always have to worry 
about.  
(interview, 22 May 2017) 
The Jewish settlers I interviewed did not experience their checkpoint passages in 
the same way. As 64-year-old Jewish settler David notes, “I am never stopped. The 
only time I have to stop is because they stop a car in front of me” (interview, 4 June 
2017). Another example is Hannah, a 44-year-old Jewish settler, “I usually just wave 
at them, tell them ‘Good morning’ or ‘Good day’ and continue on” (interview, 5 
July 2016). This was also the experience of 25-year-old Esther, “I just say ‘Hi’ to the 
soldiers, and go through” (interview, 22 June 2016).  
While at first sight it could be expected that Palestinians with Israeli and Jerusalem 
ID cards are stopped and checked to ensure that they do possess the right papers, 
Salah, a 47-year-old Palestinian with an Israeli ID card, mentioned a possible other 
reason behind the random stops. Salah, who was born in Jerusalem with a 
Jerusalem ID, had gained the Israeli ID card through his employment with the Israeli 
police during the 1990s. He travelled from his home in Beit Jala to Jerusalem five 
days a week, usually passing The Tunnels checkpoint on his way. Salah stated he 
was stopped often: “I am stopped many, many times. You can say one out every of 
three or four times” (interview, 12 May 2017). He explained what he thought was 
behind the random stops:  
Often the soldiers know me, they see me pass through the checkpoint 
every day. But they still want to stop me. It’s a matter of psychology. They 
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want to give you the feeling that everybody can expect to be stopped, 
they don’t want you to feel free.  
(interview, 12 May 2017) 
Here, one can see how the checkpoints work towards disciplining Palestinian 
commuters to believe that they can never predict how their commute will go by 
subjecting them to specific techniques aimed at controlling their mobility.  
However, all cars that can pass through these checkpoints are Israeli. This means 
that the soldiers must differentiate one Israeli car from another, and they have to 
do this quickly to ensure that the Jewish Israeli drivers are not slowed down too 
much. As stated before, these checkpoints are low-tech. Hence, there are no 
machines present to aid the soldiers in making the decision about who to stop and 
who to let pass without delay. While this may seem unexpected, especially when 
compared to other Israeli checkpoints where there are many machines present 
(Griffiths & Repo, 2018; Hammami, 2019; Rijke & Minca, 2018, 2019), this is 
actually necessary to guarantee the Jewish settlers’ smooth passage. Subjecting 
Palestinian commuters to any interaction with scanning devices would also mean 
subjecting Jewish Israelis to these same interactions and, hence, delaying them. 
One way in which the decision is simplified for the soldiers is through the use of 
stickers on the windshields of the cars of Jewish settlers. These stickers, which 
settlers can voluntarily decide to put on their car, indicate which settlement they 
live in, and, hence, that they are Jewish Israelis. However, not all of the settlers I 
interviewed had this sticker on their windshield and some of them with this sticker 
were occasionally stopped.  
 
6.6: Who to stop? 
The Palestinians and Jewish settlers I interviewed explained that they suspected 
that the soldiers at the checkpoints used several categories to decide who to stop. 
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One of the most important categories implemented is whether or not the person 
trying to pass through the checkpoint is identified as Palestinian/Arab or Jewish 
Israeli. 
6.6.1: Jewish versus Arab 
The first response my interviewees provided when asked what influenced the 
chances of someone being stopped was whether or not someone looked ‘Jewish’ 
or ‘Arab’. As 43-year-old settler Ruth explained, “You can recognise them. This is 
how the soldiers make a difference at the checkpoint. With women, you can see if 
they wear a headscarf. And... I don’t know... I think you can recognise most of 
them” (interview, 16 July 2016). When asked if it had to do with a darker skin tone, 
Ruth responded, “I don’t know... not all of them are darker. But there is 
something... You can see if someone is Israeli or not. You can be wrong, but usually 
you can tell” (interview, 16 July 2016). Samira, a 54-year-old Palestinian woman 
with a Jerusalem ID card, said she was rarely stopped. When asked about this, she 
explained:  
What I noticed is that if you look very Arab, if you are a veiled woman, of if 
you are a man with really Arabic features, you will be stopped. Every time I 
look in the car of the people getting stopped, it is definitely that they are 
stopped because they look Arab. I think that if they don’t stop you, you 
don’t look suspicious enough, or they don’t think you’re Arab. That’s my 
interpretation. I am always mistaken by Arabs and Jews as not being Arab. 
I don’t know why, maybe it is the short grey hair. 
(interview, 22 May 2017) 
My interviewees indicated that factors other than ‘looks’ were also used to 
differentiate between ‘Jewish’ and ‘Arab’ commuters. One of these was the car 
someone drives: certain car brands were seen as more likely to be driven by 
someone ‘Jewish’ or by someone ‘Arab’. This was explained by 46-year-old settler 
Ariel. Ariel, who was occasionally stopped at the checkpoints, said that this was 
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because of the type of car he drove. He owned a plant nursery in a town close to 
Jerusalem and often needed to transport plants and other gardening materials. 
Due to this, he owned a large truck: “Sometimes I need to take plants with me, so 
because of that I have a big car. Occasionally they stop me and take me out of the 
line because they want to see what is inside the car” (interview, 9 July 2016). Lya, 
a-62-year-old Jewish settler, also brought this up when I asked her how she 
thought the soldiers decided which cars to stop and which ones to let pass: “When 
someone drives a Subaru, they would be a Palestinian. The Subarus and Peugeots – 
they are good for builders. They are sturdy cars. Everybody in the building business 
would have them” (interview, 17 June 2017). This was confirmed by 54-year-old 
Palestinian Samira. She was almost never stopped at the checkpoint and while, as 
already stated, she felt her short grey hair helped, she also suspected the brand of 
car she owned helped: she owned a Volvo. According to Samira, this was a brand of 
car that was almost never owned by Palestinians. While most brands may have had 
a more neutral reputation, she mentioned that the Mercedes that her colleague 
owned was not really Palestinian or Jewish, certain brands were more obvious: 
“Truck? Palestinian. Peugeot? Palestinian. Volvo? Jewish” (interview, 13 June 
2017). And while she had not purchased the car because of this (No, I just like it” 
(ibid.)), she did feel the difference it made. 
6.6.2: Gender 
Another categorisation that my interviewees identified as being employed by the 
checkpoint regimes was gender. As has been described in detail by Rema 
Hammami (2019), the Israeli occupation regime treats Palestinian men and women 
differently: “the Palestinian male body is the archetype of the terrorist-other of the 
Israeli military and the larger Zionist national imaginary, this masculine corporeality 
is almost always already the paradigmatic threat” (p. 91). Opposed to this 
threatening male body is the female body: “female corporealities and 
performativity have a greater chance of success in passing through the scan [at the 
checkpoints]” (Hammami, 2019, p. 92). Inside large terminal checkpoints, such as 
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Checkpoint 300, the checkpoint managers provide, or deny, only women the 
‘privilege’ of using a ‘humanitarian lane’ (Rijke & Minca, 2018). With regards to the 
car checkpoints, gender is employed by the checkpoint managers to decide who is 
suspect and should be checked. This was exemplified by Abeer, a 27-year-old 
Palestinian with a Jerusalem ID who lives with her husband and two young 
daughters in Bir Ouna. Bir Ouna is located west of Bethlehem and on the West 
Bank side of the Wall. Half of the town is administratively designated as Jerusalem. 
Due to this, Abeer and her family, with their Jerusalem IDs, can live here. Abeer 
often passes through The Tunnels on her way to Jerusalem for work or to visit her 
family. She explained that although she was regularly stopped anyway, it was best 
to travel with her daughters and without her husband. If her husband was with her 
in the car, chances of being stopped were bigger. Travelling alone with her 
daughters often meant she passed through The Tunnels without getting stopped. 
John, a 27-year-old Palestinian, brought up the same subject:  
Usually if they see a lady driving, then it’s easier. If they see a guy driving, 
then they definitely stop you at the checkpoint. It depends on the mood of 
the soldiers, it’s not a law... my experience is that if my wife or my mom is 
driving, it is easier. If we are just with guys in the car, it is a definite stop.  
(interview, 22 May 2017) 
Here we can see how certain categories, such as ‘Jewish’ versus ‘Arab/Palestinian’ 
and gender, have been incorporated as biopolitical technologies to produce 
selective rationalities of mobility. While the checkpoints are at most barriers that 
can cause unwanted delay for the Jewish settlers, they represented places for 
Palestinian commuters where a set of asymmetrical relations between the occupier 
and occupied are performed. Although these Palestinian commuters have the same 
legal rights as the Jewish settlers to freely enter Jerusalem and Israel, the passages 
of my Palestinian interviewees always came with the lingering possibility of having 
to engage in tense interactions with checkpoint managers, being stopped, being 
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searched and even being denied access altogether. However, the Palestinian 
commuters I interviewed did not passively accept this. More specifically, they 
selectively used these same biopolitical categories while passing through the 
checkpoints. As put by Samira, “There are many things that we have learned. There 
is so much that we know that they don’t know we know... after a while you get the 
hang out of it” (interview, 22 May 2017).  
 
6.7: Checkpoint knowledge 
Many of my Palestinian interviewees used their ‘checkpoint knowledge’ to try to 
positively influence their chances of passing through the checkpoints without being 
stopped. This usually meant behaving/driving in a way they described as being the 
least suspect, or ‘the least Palestinian’. An example is, again, 27-year-old clergyman 
John, who said when I asked him if he thought certain strategies could increase the 
chances of one passing through the checkpoint unstopped:  
Phone... the passenger should play with his phone, pretend to have a 
phone call. Close the windows. Closed windows help more. It means... I 
don’t know what it means... so, close your windows, the passenger should 
play with the phone and try not to have eye contact with the soldiers. The 
chauffeur says hi. Don’t stop or make them feel that you are worried. 
Don’t slow down too much. Just keep on driving.  
(interview, 22 May 2017) 
John employed all these strategies, and while he could not explain to me what 
some of these strategies implied, during the many years of travelling through these 
car checkpoints he had learned that they somehow worked. Hajar, a 21-year-old 
Palestinian with an Israeli ID card, was more specific about the reasons for her 
strategies. When I asked her if she was ever stopped at the Tunnels checkpoint, the 
checkpoint she regularly passed through on her way to the university in Jerusalem, 
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she responded that she was almost never stopped. I asked her why this was the 
case, and she stated:  
I know how to be around them [Israeli soldiers], how to deal with them. 
They never think I am an Arab. The most important thing is to be 
confident, to smile and say hi. You should never wait for them to tell you 
what to do, do not hesitate. Slow down, but not too much, you have to 
keep on driving. 
(interview, 12 June 2016) 
These types of strategies were also employed by 54-year-old Nisreen. Nisreen 
holds a West Bank ID and is thus technically barred from using The Tunnels and Al 
Walaja checkpoint. She also holds a US passport, but, without the obligatory entry 
card, she is not allowed to use this passport to pass a checkpoint. However, this 
does not mean that she does not try, and, at times, succeeds. She explained that 
sometimes, when the pedestrian Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem was particularly 
busy, she would travel through The Tunnels checkpoint with a Palestinian friend of 
hers who carries a Jerusalem ID card. While her friend could travel through The 
Tunnels, Nisreen is barred from using this checkpoint with her West Bank ID. The 
trick was to be mistaken for a foreigner. Nisreen explained the tactics she used:  
Wearing a hat! If you are wearing a hat, 99 per cent of the time they think 
you are a foreigner. So, I just wear a hat when I go through the Tunnels 
with my friend, and they don’t stop us. With a hat and an English magazine 
in my lap, in their mind I am a foreigner. This way, they won’t check for the 
entry card, showing them the [US] passport is enough.  
(interview, 23 June 2016) 
When I asked her why she did not do this every day, she explained that she had 
been sent back a few times. The repercussions of getting caught were large. Her 
friend could get fined for transporting her through the checkpoint, Nisreen could 
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lose the permit she had through her employer in Jerusalem, and it was difficult for 
her to get back from The Tunnels checkpoint to Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem:  
Getting out of the car [belonging to her friend at The Tunnels checkpoint], 
you have to walk until you can catch a ride with the bus that drives back to 
Bethlehem. Then [catch] a taxi from the bus stop in town back to the 
checkpoint here [Checkpoint 300].  
(interview, 23 June 2016) 
These are examples of the strategies used by Palestinians that imply enacting 
certain biopolitical categories in such a way that they could possibly be mistaken 
for being Jewish Israeli, or a foreigner, and not ‘Palestinian/Arab’. Amahl Bishara 
(2015) indicated the same, when she described several strategies her interviewees 
used to smuggle West Bank Palestinian through car checkpoints. One of these 
implied embodying certain stereotypes her interviewees suspected the Israeli 
soldiers would have of how a Palestinian woman would behave and dress:  
Upending age hierarchies, the youngest of the group claimed the most 
visible driver’s side passenger seat. She was ready to dress the least 
modestly and, thus, to look the “least Palestinian,” according to what the 
group expected Israeli soldiers’ stereotypes to be.  
(Bishara, 2015, p. 42) 
Not all interviewees tried to be identified as someone who was not 
‘Palestinian’/’Arab’. Salah, for instance, used a different strategy. As was described 
earlier, 47-year-old Salah was stopped very often on his way through The Tunnels. 
When I asked him if he employed certain strategies to improve his chances of not 
being stopped, he responded: 
 You shouldn’t be clever inside the checkpoints. If the soldier gives you a 
very small sign with his hand that you have to stop, you have to stop 
immediately. Otherwise you’re in trouble. So, you have to obey, whatever 
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they say. They can keep you aside for whatever they want. They can start 
checking your car, very slowly, checking your ID, calling the main post to 
check about you. This will all take a long time. If you are in a hurry, if you 
want to go to work, it’s like you are ruining your own day. In the end, it 
depends on the soldier. So, the best way is to obey them.  
(interview, 12 May 2017) 
While the different strategies implemented by John, Hajar, Nisreen and Salah may 
seem contradictory, these quotes actually illustrate the diverse ways in which 
Palestinians engage with these checkpoints’ biopolitical categories and related 
spatial regimes. Where some commuters – like John, Hajar and Nisreen – choose to 
use creative ways to try to negate the effects of the arbitrariness at play inside 
these checkpoints by enacting certain biopolitical categories, others – like Salah – 
argued the best way to engage with the checkpoints was to follow the soldiers’ 
instructions as precisely as possible. In this process, all tried to positively influence 
their chances of getting through unchallenged. 
The people I interviewed experienced this decision-making process of the soldiers 
regarding who was to be stopped and who was not as highly unpredictable and 
arbitrary. As they explained, they often felt it was determined by the mood of the 
soldiers, or the ‘goodwill of the ruler’ (Berda, 2018). As exemplified by 47-year-old 
Salah:  
It depends on the soldier. If he is in a bad mood or in a good mood, you 
never know how they will work. Sometimes they know you because they 
see you every day, but they still want to stop you. Sometimes they only 
ask for your ID, sometimes they want you to open your trunk to check 
your car. 
(interview, 12 May 2017) 
 
 255 
 
John, the 27-year-old clergyman, said the same thing: “It depends on the soldiers’ 
mood. If they decide that this car is good, they let it pass. If they think no, then you 
get stopped. Why? We do not know” (interview, 22 May 2017). This was also 
stated by 54-year-old Samira when I asked her if her journey from Bethlehem to 
Jerusalem had become predictable. Samira, who had told me that she was almost 
never stopped, said that her journey would never really be predictable:  
Maybe they will stop you, maybe not. There is nothing official about this. 
Sometimes you find that things go easier, and then it will get harder. They 
can stop you and send you back. We take it one day at the time.  
(interview, 22 May 2017) 
Why or when you would be stopped was difficult to say, according to Samira. Due 
to this unpredictability, she felt like she had no control over the commute from her 
home to the university in Bethlehem:  
It should take me about seven minutes to reach the university from my 
home. But there is something more to this seven-minute drive... Driving 
through the checkpoint, I feel that I’m doing something much more 
complicated than a simple seven-minute drive. You never have a sense of 
control over those seven minutes. If I am going anywhere else and it is 
seven minutes away, I have a better sense of the distance. When driving 
through the checkpoint, it feels like there is a break... There are two pieces 
of time: the time before and the time after. And you cannot connect these 
two.  
(interview, 22 May 2017) 
Here, it becomes clear that even though Palestinian commuters can employ several 
tactics to try to improve their chances of getting through the checkpoints 
unhindered, the checkpoint passage never becomes fully predictable. Amahl 
Bishara (2015) found the same in her research: “Palestinians’ systematized 
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knowledge of closure has to take into account the lack of systematicity of military 
rule and the possibility of arbitrary brutality” (p. 42). As such, these checkpoints 
produce selective, arbitrary and mutable geographies of mobility.  
 
6.8: Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I have indicated how The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints in the 
Bethlehem area function as spatial political technologies. While on the one hand 
they help to create Israeli-only spaces by excluding Palestinians with a West Bank 
ID from using them, on the other, they monitor, discipline and selectively limit the 
mobility of Palestinians with Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards. While Palestinians with 
Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards have the same legal right as Jewish Israelis to enter 
Jerusalem and Israel, their checkpoint experiences are often determined by 
uncertainty and possible tense interactions with Israeli soldiers. As such, these 
checkpoints are examples of places within the West Bank where two opposing 
geographical regimes meet: one aimed at ensuring the fast and smooth movement 
of Jewish settlers, the other aimed at controlling and possibly hindering the 
movement of Palestinians.  
The existence of these two geographical regimes influences the design and spatial 
regime of these checkpoints. More specifically, to ensure that these regimes can 
exist simultaneously, the checkpoints have been designed as low-tech, with almost 
no technological support present. As a result, Jewish settlers are not slowed down 
by having to engage with (biometric) machines, but this also means that there are 
no machines available to control and possibly delay the movement of the 
Palestinian commuters using these checkpoints. The decision of who is stopped and 
who can pass unhindered is thus made solely by the soldiers. 
The Jewish settlers interviewed indicated that they were almost never stopped and 
checked, while many of the Palestinian interviewees were stopped regularly and all 
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experienced these checkpoints as potential obstacles on their way to work, school 
or family. Various biopolitical categories were employed by the soldiers at these 
checkpoints when making the decision of who to stop and who to let pass 
unhindered. In this paper, I discussed two categories, namely ethnic distinction: 
‘Jewish’ versus ‘Arab’ and gender, which were identified as being employed by the 
Israeli soldiers managing the checkpoints to determine who could be a potential 
threat – the Palestinian (male) Other – and hence needed to be stopped. 
Palestinian commuters used various tactics based on their ‘checkpoint knowledge’ 
to try to make their passages as smooth as possible. Part of the interviewees 
explained that they employed and performed the same biopolitical categories that 
they expected the soldiers to use to sort cars and those inside them in order to 
enhance their chances of getting through unhindered. This entailed behaving in 
such a way that they could either be helpfully miscategorised as ‘Jewish’ or as a 
foreigner. Other interviewees explained that they tried to behave as they expected 
the soldiers wanted them to as much as possible: as the obedient and non-
threatening ‘Palestinian Other’.  
However, although this ‘checkpoint knowledge’ may enhance the chances of 
Palestinian commuters to pass through the checkpoints unhindered, they remain 
depended upon the goodwill of the ruler: the mood of the soldier. While some may 
be stopped regularly and others almost never, for Palestinian commuters the 
passage through the checkpoints is never entirely predictable: they are never fully 
in control of their commute. The arbitrariness at play in the decision of who to stop 
and who not – which for my interviewees included stopping commuters who pass 
through these checkpoints every day – shows how the checkpoints are a tool for 
Israeli soldiers to reinforce the asymmetrical relations between the occupier and 
the occupied. As such, these checkpoints produce, via their spatial regimes, design 
and managers, specific geographies based on the limitation and control of the 
movement of Palestinians. 
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Figure P.24: The blocks installed at the entrance of Checkpoint 300 installed to 
control the crowds on Fridays during Ramadan (source: Rijke, June 2017). 
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Figure P.25: A booth for the soldiers checking the paperwork of the commuters 
 (source: Rijke, May 2019). 
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Figure P.26: Palestinian women queuing up at Checkpoint 300 on a Friday during 
Ramadan (source: Rijke, June 2017). 
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Figure P.27: Palestinian men queuing up at Checkpoint 300 on a Friday during 
Ramadan (source: Rijke, June 2017). 
 
 
Today is a Friday during Ramadan and hundreds of thousands of Muslim 
Palestinians will travel to Jerusalem to pray in the Al Aqsa Mosque. At the entrance 
of the checkpoint the men are separated from the women. I follow a group of 
women. It is still dark, and I spot the Israeli soldiers when I get closer to the blocks. 
They let me pass unchallenged. The group of women I am following seem confused 
as to where to go. They try the normal lane, but the turnstile does not move. They 
turn to the old humanitarian lane, but this turnstile also does not move. A young 
Palestinian woman walks towards us and says that the car lane is the exit for 
women. The group walks in that direction. The soldiers must have seen us walking 
back and forth but decided not to tell us where to go. 
(fieldnotes, 10 June 2016) 
 

Chapter 7
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Passing through a checkpoint is a daily exercise most Palestinians and Jewish 
settlers cannot avoid on their way to work, school, family or places of worship. In 
this thesis, I have analysed the ways in which Checkpoint 300, The Tunnels and Al 
Walaja checkpoints in the Bethlehem area produce, via the interplay between its 
managers, commuters and material devices, specific geographies based on the 
limitation and control of the movement of Palestinians. In this final chapter, I 
return to the main research questions and critically discuss the project’s outcomes 
and implications. 
The central aim of this thesis was: 
To analyse checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as spatial political 
technologies, that, through an interplay of human and non-human interactions, 
produce a set of selective, arbitrary and mutable geographies of mobility.  
The following research questions were formulated to address this aim:  
1. How do the checkpoint managers implement biopolitical categories in the 
governing of mobile Palestinian and Jewish Israeli bodies? 
2. What role do the machines in and the spatial arrangements of the 
checkpoints play in the checkpoint passages of the Palestinian and Jewish 
Israeli commuters?  
3. How do the Palestinian commuters, in particular, engage with, reproduce, 
but also redefine and/or resist the workings of the checkpoint regimes? 
The theoretical framework I used to analyse the data collected and to answer these 
research questions was predominately informed by Michel Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of biopolitics and Giorgio Agamben’s formulation of the 
sovereign exception. More specifically, taking into account Foucault’s formulations 
of power as relational and productive, and his arguments regarding the importance 
of the circulation of bodies for the implementation of a state’s security apparatus, I 
framed checkpoints as political technologies. This entailed analysing checkpoints as 
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made up of specific practices and techniques aimed at the bodies subjected to 
them. This framework allowed me to focus on the interplay between human and 
non-human interactions, and thus the role played by machines in the checkpoints. 
Moreover, it meant investigating the daily experiences of the commuters subjected 
to the checkpoints and the role of eruptive and withheld violence. Inspired by the 
work of Claudio Minca, Irit Katz and Diana Martin (Katz, Martin, & Minca, 2018; 
Minca, 2015a), I added a spatial element to this analysis by framing checkpoints as 
spatial political technologies that produce a set of selective, arbitrary and mutable 
geographies of mobility. Including Agamben’s sovereign exception to this 
theoretical framework allowed me to analyse the arbitrary decisions of the 
checkpoint managers not as incidental or accidental, but as inherent to the 
checkpoints’ spatial regime and an expression of the sovereign exception.  
This thesis is based on a seven-month period of fieldwork spent in the Bethlehem 
area in 2016, 2017 and 2019. While in the field, I combined extensive checkpoint 
observations with go-along interviews and in-depth interviews. I conducted 61 
interviews with 25 Palestinians and 11 Jewish settlers. I also spent up to eight hours 
each week observing Checkpoint 300, often during rush hour from 4:00 to 8:00 am, 
and regularly crossed The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints, as well as several 
other checkpoints, during my stays in the West Bank. Thanks to this combination of 
methods, I was able to link the conversations I had with my interviewees to my 
experiences during the go-along interviews and the many hours I spent observing 
the checkpoints. 
Although the three preceding empirical chapters already included concluding 
remarks, in this chapter I wish to draw some general conclusions and address the 
research questions posed at the outset of the thesis. More specifically, through a 
discussion of the findings presented in the empirical chapters I will illustrate the 
two main general conclusions of this thesis: firstly, I will explain how checkpoints as 
spatial political technologies produce arbitrary, mutable and selective regimes of 
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mobility. Secondly, I will argue that checkpoints should be seen as the outcome of 
the endless interplay between their managers, the commuters, biopolitical 
categories, material devices, procedures of control and calculative rationalities. 
After this, I will reflect on the implications of this thesis and discuss some insights 
that could be useful for future research. I will end the chapter, and as such this 
thesis in general, by going back to where it all started for me: Checkpoint 300.  
 
7.1: Research questions 
7.1.1: The implementation of biopolitical categories in the governing of 
mobile Palestinian and Jewish Israeli bodies. 
In Chapters 4 and 6, I described how checkpoint managers used several biopolitical 
categories in Checkpoint 300, The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints to discipline 
and differentiate between Palestinian and Jewish Israeli mobile bodies. In Chapter 
4, the daily experiences of Palestinians passing through Checkpoint 300 were 
analysed in relation to the implementation of three categories that define their 
right to pass, namely ‘gender’, ‘age’ and ‘ID card status’. These categories were 
seemingly based upon official rules and regulations and were used by the 
authorities to differentiate between who could, for instance, use a separate 
‘humanitarian lane’ and who could travel without a permit. In Chapter 6, it was 
described how the soldiers at The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints employed 
various biopolitical categories when deciding who to stop and who to let pass 
unhindered. While the official rules stipulated that every commuter carrying an 
Israeli or Jerusalem ID card should be allowed to pass the checkpoints, the 
Palestinian commuters were often stopped, subjected to tense interactions with 
Israeli soldiers and, at times, denied passage. As such, at Checkpoint 300 
biopolitical categories were used to differentiate between different groups of 
Palestinians, while these categories were employed at The Tunnels and Al Walaja 
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checkpoints to differentiate between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians with 
Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards, as well as between different Palestinians. 
Furthermore, while at Checkpoint 300 the commuters had to be seen and 
recognised by the checkpoint managers to try to claim certain ‘privileges’, the 
biggest ‘privilege’ that Palestinian commuters hoped for at The Tunnels and Al 
Walaja checkpoints was to be ‘misrecognised’ as Jewish Israelis and pass the 
checkpoints ‘unseen’ and unhindered.  
Although the employment of biopolitical categories in Checkpoint 300 is based on 
different processes of recognition and differentiation compared to those applied at 
The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints, this research project has shown that all 
three are part of the same larger checkpoint machinery and work in similar ways 
towards the realisation of the broader geographies of occupation in the West Bank. 
More specifically, these biopolitical categories are essential tools that help create 
the conditions for the daily exercise of the sovereign exception and the 
implementation of the ‘regime of privileges’ in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(Berda, 2018), in which asymmetrical relationships between occupier and occupied 
are endlessly reproduced.  
All the Palestinian commuters interviewed indicated that they never knew 
beforehand if they could pass the checkpoints unchallenged: if they could use the 
humanitarian lane, if they could pass without a permit, if they had to answer 
questions, if they had to show the contents of their car, if they had to wait for 
hours, or if the checkpoints would be closed altogether. While the consequences of 
the arbitrary decisions on the part of the Israeli soldiers did not have the same 
impact on all groups of Palestinians interviewed (Palestinians with West Bank ID 
cards are in a much more precarious position than Palestinians with Jerusalem and 
Israeli ID cards), all interviewees explained that they experienced randomness at 
play inside the checkpoints in regard to the ways in which the checkpoint managers 
implemented such categories. In this research project, it became clear that these 
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experiences of randomness inside the checkpoints were located in the moments in 
which an Israeli soldier or private security guard managing the checkpoint decided 
that a certain rule or regulation did not apply to the Palestinian commuter trying to 
pass through. These moments proved to be exemplary for the ways in which the 
checkpoints’ regimes allow for the exercise of sovereign power. This can, for 
instance, be seen when a private security guard decides that a woman is not 
allowed to use the humanitarian lane, even though these lanes have been created 
for them, or when a soldier decides that a 70-year-old Palestinian man with a West 
Bank ID card cannot pass the checkpoint without a permit, although the rules 
stipulate that all men over 55-years-old are allowed. Another example is when a 
soldier demands to see the documents and contents of the car of a Palestinian with 
an Israeli ID card, although this person is a citizen of Israel and has the legal right to 
enter Jerusalem and Israel unchallenged. As such, the regime inside the 
checkpoints – and in the occupation in general – allows for the unsanctioned 
exercise of sovereign power and the structural occurrence of arbitrariness in the 
implementation of the biopolitical categories. This shows that the checkpoints’ 
regime has created a context in which Palestinians often feel subjected to what my 
interviewees understood as the ‘mood of the soldiers’ and the arbitrary, mutable 
and selective regimes of mobilities that are produced inside the checkpoints. 
7.1.2: The roles of the machines in and the spatial arrangements of the 
checkpoints for Palestinian and Jewish Israeli commuters. 
In Chapters 4 and 6, I have demonstrated in which ways the checkpoints’ spatial 
formations and the presence, or absence, of machines generated particular 
political geographies and relationships of power. The specificities of the spatial 
design of Checkpoint 300 as a terminal checkpoint were discussed in Chapter 4, 
with a focus on the presence of several machines, such as turnstiles, metal 
detectors, x-ray machines, and fingerprint- and iris-scanning devices. The presence 
of these machines was supposed to increase the distance between soldiers and 
272 
 
Palestinian commuters and thus ease the tensions amongst them. However, as 
became clear in Chapter 4, Checkpoint 300 is still a place filled with tension and 
violence, often exercised by the machines in operation and their ‘decisions’. In 
Chapter 6, I described how the low-tech design of The Tunnels and Al Walaja 
checkpoints, with almost no machines present, enabled the simultaneous existence 
of two opposed regimes of mobility. A high-tech design would have meant 
subjecting the Palestinian commuters to (biometric) machines, which would have 
meant that the Jewish settlers would also have to do this and be slowed down.  
The differences in the spatial arrangements of these three checkpoints had an 
important influence on the methodology. Analysing the workings of Checkpoint 
300 entailed focusing on the ways in which Palestinian bodies were subjected to 
engaging with several machines. It meant looking at the moments when crowds of 
thousands of (predominately) men were pushed against the metal bars and 
turnstiles, the moments when commuters had to go back and forth through the 
metal detector until it remained quiet, and the moments when a biometric 
scanning device refused to read someone’s finger and forced them to turn back. 
Hence, analysing the workings of Checkpoint 300 entailed investigating the 
workings of its machines and how the Palestinian commuters engaged with them. 
The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints had a different ‘logic’. Due to the fact that 
Jewish settlers also used these checkpoints, there was an almost complete absence 
of machines. No x-ray machines, no barriers, and no biometric scanning devices. 
These checkpoints have been designed in such a way that they allow for the 
smooth and quick passages of Jewish settlers, while still allowing the soldiers to 
control and potentially stop the Palestinian commuters. Hence, analysing these 
checkpoints required investigating how the spatial arrangement of these 
checkpoints allowed for the existence of these two opposed regimes of mobility. As 
such, it meant focusing on how the commuters were disciplined by the spatial 
arrangement of the checkpoints in the absence of machines. 
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While the spatial arrangements of these checkpoints were different, the analysis of 
these checkpoints illustrated how the spatial arrangements and machines, in their 
presence or absence, were constitutive to how the checkpoints produced arbitrary, 
mutable and selective geographies of mobility: in all three checkpoints, the regime 
allowed for the use of arbitrariness as a tool to create the conditions for the 
unsanctioned daily exercise of sovereign power on the part of the soldiers/private 
security guards over individual Palestinians. More specifically, Chapter 4 showed 
how the unpredictable inefficiencies of the machines in Checkpoint 300 and the 
arbitrary interventions on the part of the checkpoint managers in the workings of 
these machines, exposed the bodies of the commuters to a regime of uncertainty 
and fear. Furthermore, Chapter 6 indicated how, because of the absence of 
machines in The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints, the decision of who was 
stopped and who could pass unhindered was made solely by the soldiers. This has 
created a checkpoint regime in which these soldiers were able to act biopolitically 
‘on the spot’ by selecting individuals on the basis of their racialised or gendered 
identities when the ‘normal rules’ applied, but also by deciding when to suspend 
these very same rules and their associated ‘privileges’.  
Hence, the checkpoints have been designed in different ways for different groups 
of commuters, and their spatial arrangements and machines heavily influence the 
passages of these commuters. As such, the exercise of the sovereign exception and 
the associated arbitrary and unpredictable workings of these checkpoints are the 
outcome of the intricate interplay between its managers, the material devices and 
procedures of control. 
7.1.3: Strategies employed by Palestinian commuters  
Palestinian commuters use diverse strategies when engaging with the checkpoint 
regimes. They employ their ‘checkpoint knowledge’ to try to positively influence 
their passages: incorporating, and as such ‘reproducing’, certain implications, while 
redefining and resisting others.  
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As shown in Chapters 5 and 6, Palestinian commuters enacted, and ‘reproduced’, 
certain biopolitical categories to (try to) claim the associated privileges. This was 
the case with the women who skipped the queue by instrumentalising their 
‘gendered identity’ in Chapter 5, but also with the Palestinians with Jerusalem and 
Israeli ID cards who tried to be ‘miscategorised’ as being either Jewish Israeli or 
having a foreign identity in Chapter 6. Their ‘checkpoint knowledge’ provided them 
with the necessary tools to enact these biopolitical categories, for instance, by 
engaging with other commuters or the checkpoints managers in a specific way, or 
by driving their car up to the checkpoint in exactly the right speed – not too fast, 
but also not too slow. Furthermore, as became clear in Chapter 4, the ‘checkpoint 
knowledge’ of Palestinian commuters passing through Checkpoint 300 also meant 
that many knew how to respond to the checkpoints’ spatial design and machines: 
which lane to use based on one’s categorisation, how to find out when a turnstile 
has been activated and how to prepare for the metal detector.  
The most explicit way of resisting the checkpoints’ regime is by not passing through 
them, but this is a privilege not many Palestinians have. However, the Palestinian 
commuters interviewed provided examples of numerous, more subtle, ways of 
how they redefined and resisted certain workings of the checkpoints. In the 
process, the commuters challenged the abilities of the checkpoint managers to 
exercise their arbitrary power. For instance, this was exemplified in Chapter 5 
through the decision of the young Palestinian men to skip the queue by using the 
humanitarian lane, which often resulted in the closing of this lane altogether – and, 
in the process, the taking away of the ability of the checkpoint managers to use the 
opening and closing of this lane to exercise their arbitrary power. Another example 
in Chapter 5 was the decision of women and men respectively over 50 and 55 years 
of age to still apply for a permit, although at their age they should legally be 
allowed to pass the checkpoint without one. In this act, again, the commuters took 
away the ability of the checkpoint managers to arbitrarily decide whether or not 
they could claim the privilege of passing the checkpoint without a permit. Another 
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example was Nisreen’s decision, discussed in Chapter 4, to check her clothes and 
jewellery with a magnet before going to the checkpoint, ensuring that whatever 
she was wearing would not beep. In this way, she would not be in a position in 
which a soldier could decide to make her go back and forth until the machine 
remained silent.  
While at first glance it may seem strange that there is some leeway for people to 
resist the checkpoints’ workings, this research has actually shown that this leeway 
was inherent to the ambivalence and unpredictability at play inside the 
checkpoints. The arbitrary workings of the checkpoints generated and continuously 
reproduced the asymmetrical relationship between the occupier and the occupied. 
However, these same arbitrary workings also created (precarious) spaces to resist 
and subvert the checkpoints’ regimes. This was, for instance, exemplified in 
Chapter 5, when the checkpoint managers would, at times, allow the young men to 
use the humanitarian lane to skip the queue. Because the checkpoint managers 
would arbitrarily allow these young men to do this, these very young men 
continuously tried and, at times, succeeded in bypassing the checkpoints’ lane 
logic. Or, as was discussed in Chapter 4, when the soldiers ignored the beeping of 
the metal detector, Nisreen and Saba’ would try to do the same and, in the 
process, resist the intentionality of the machine. Or, as was shown in Chapter 6, 
since not every car was stopped at The Tunnels and Al Walaja, it was possible for 
Palestinians passing through these checkpoints to try to get through unchallenged. 
The level to which Palestinian commuters could redefine and resist the 
checkpoints’ workings was limited. In the end, almost all of my Palestinian 
interviewees remarked that ‘it all came down to the mood of the soldiers’ and their 
willingness to allow the commuters’ twisting and subverting of the checkpoints’ 
logic. However, in these small, sometimes almost fleeting, moments in the 
everyday checkpoint passages, the commuters ‘spoke back’ to the checkpoints’ 
regime and, in the process, resisted their rationale and the occupation in general.  
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As I have argued in this thesis, this is precisely how checkpoints work: they are 
marked by strict and explicit rules of conduct, while at the same time they remain 
open to the soldiers’ arbitrary intervention, to the malfunctioning of machines, but 
also to the manipulation of the commuters. This makes them powerful instruments 
in the architecture of occupation – in which uncertainty and arbitrariness are as 
important as the walls, fences and roadblocks. 
 
7.2: This thesis’ scholarly contributions 
With this thesis I intended to address five gaps in the academic debates in political 
and human geography concerning the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories, its accompanying architecture of occupation and its checkpoints. 
Furthermore, as I will elaborate on here, the contributions I discuss in the following 
paragraph may also be useful for the broader academic debates concerning 
walling, border crossings and other sites of state violence in the fields of political 
geography, political science, border studies and critical international relations 
studies.  
The first gap that I intended to address with this thesis was related to that the lack 
of contemporary scholarly research on the various everyday experiences of 
commuters having to pass through checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. What work did analyse these checkpoints largely referred to the years 
of the Second Intifada (2000-05), underplayed the experiences of the Palestinian 
commuters (Braverman, 2011, 2012; Kaufman, 2008; Keshet, 2006; Kotef, 2011, 
2015; Kotef & Amir, 2007; Mansbach, 2009, 2012, 2015) or focused explicitly on the 
ways in which Palestinian commuters resisted the status of passive victims 
(Hammami, 2004; 2010, 2015; Peteet, 2017; Razack, 2010; Tawil-Souri, 2009, 2010, 
2011b). While these authors provide important insights in the workings of the 
checkpoints and the agency of Palestinian commuters, they did not incorporate the 
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various ways in which Palestinians engaged with the checkpoints. By analysing the 
ways in which Palestinian commuters engaged with checkpoints on a daily basis 
with a biopolitical framework inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, I have 
shown how these checkpoints work as a means of surveillance that monitors, 
disciplines and selectively limits the mobility of Palestinians. Furthermore, with the 
use of Foucault’s understanding of power as relational and productive, I argued 
that, in certain moments, these commuters reproduced the checkpoints’ regimes, 
while in other moments, they manipulated and resisted these same regimes. As 
such, I focused on what the checkpoints did in relation to the commuters, but also 
what the commuters did in their various and diverse engagements with the 
checkpoints during their daily passages. In this way, I was able to avoid reducing 
Palestinian commuters in this analysis to passive victims and heroic resistance 
fighters, neither over-romanticising nor simplifying their resistance (see on this, 
amongst others, Abu-Lughod, 1990, 2000; Mahmood, 2005, or, from a different 
perspective, Abulhawa, 2019). 
Secondly, by including ‘things’ in the analysis of the workings of the checkpoints, I 
intended to highlight the important role played by the spatial design of the 
checkpoints and the presence, or absence, of machines. Again, with a biopolitical 
framework inspired by the work of Foucault – who stated that the exercise of 
power is never a naked fact (1978) - but also with insights taken from the work of 
Reviel Netz (2004) and Randal McGuire (2013), I investigated the important role 
played by machines and the specific set of relationships that were produced by the 
constant interplay between the commuters, checkpoints managers and these 
machines inside the checkpoints. McGuire’s (2013) analysis of the border wall 
between the USA and Mexico showed the importance of focusing on the messiness 
related to the daily practices of people engaging with militarised border crossings, 
while Netz (2004) discussed the historical role played by barbed wire in generating 
and reproducing specific relationships of power. Within their analyses of 
checkpoints, Irus Braverman (2011) and Daniella Mansbach (2009) have 
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investigated the role of the spatial arrangements and machines inside the terminal 
checkpoints. My work on the diverse experiences and interactions of the 
Palestinian commuters with machines inside the checkpoints contributes to this 
body of literature.  
In the same line, Rema Hammami (2019) has recently published an analysis of the 
interplay between Palestinians, the Israelis managing the checkpoints and the 
machines present inside these checkpoints. Here, she argued for critically assessing 
the functioning of the numerous machines present inside the checkpoints, as they 
are too often framed as representing “total mastery and control” (Hammami, 2019, 
p. 95). Hammami’s (2019) analysis stems mostly from her own checkpoint passages 
as a Palestinian with a Jerusalem ID, and focuses predominately on Qalandiya 
Checkpoint (although she has also used testimonials of former soldiers collected by 
the Israeli protest movement Breaking the Silence69 (p. 88)). She describes how the 
checkpoints developed from ad-hoc sheds to the intricate terminal checkpoints in 
place today. She criticises academic scholars who have not taken into account the 
agency of Palestinian commuters in their analysis of the checkpoints, a critique she 
had already formulated in earlier work (2010). As she states, “What checkpoints 
may intend to do versus what they actually accomplish can only be grasped 
through a close reading of their operations of power in the everyday dynamics of 
embodied confrontation and interaction between Israeli soldier and Palestinian 
subject” (Hammami, 2019, p. 96). What I have aimed to do in this thesis by 
investigating the daily workings of Checkpoint 300, Al Walaja and The Tunnels 
checkpoints echoes and adds to Hammami’s analysis: investigating the interactions 
between Israeli checkpoint managers, Palestinian commuters and the machines. By 
                                                 
69 In my thesis I have not used testimonials of Breaking the Silence because there are no 
testimonials available on their website on the three checkpoints analysed in this research 
project. Furthermore, the large majority of these testimonials have been given by soldiers 
who have served at the checkpoints during the period of the Second Intifada (2000-05), a 
period during which the current checkpoint system was not yet fully operational. To read the 
testimonials and a more comprehensive explanation of Breaking the Silence’s work, please 
visit: https://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/ 
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observing the checkpoints, particularly Checkpoint 300, for hours and hours, I was 
able to witness the ways in which Palestinian commuters and Israeli 
soldiers/private security guards engaged with the machines, how they at times 
behaved in accordance with the machines’ intended roles, but also the ways in 
which both groups challenged the intended workings of these machines. The 
insights gained through these observations demonstrate the added value of 
including machines not only in the analysis of checkpoints in Israel/Palestine but 
also of border crossings elsewhere (see, for instance, on the use of machines at 
border crossings Amoore & Hall, 2009; Bellanova & Fuster, 2013; Martin, 2010; 
Redden & Terry, 2013).  
A third gap that I intended to address with this thesis was the lack of research on 
the checkpoint experiences of Palestinians with West Bank, Jerusalem and Israeli ID 
cards, and of Jewish settlers. A limited number of scholars have analysed the 
experiences of multiple groups passing through checkpoints in Israel/Palestine. The 
work of Cédric Parizot (2009) and Amahl Bishara (2015) proved to be especially 
insightful, since they shed light on the diverse ways in which commuters engage 
with the spatial regimes of shared car checkpoints. However, these authors did not 
interview all four groups that have to pass through checkpoints: Palestinians with 
West Bank, Jerusalem and Israeli ID cards, and Jewish settlers. In my project, I 
interviewed all of these four groups. Including Palestinians with three different ID 
cards and, hence, three different levels of freedom of movement associated with 
these ID cards, helped me to investigate the role played by arbitrariness and the 
exercise of sovereign power in the checkpoint passages of all these groups. While, 
as stated earlier, the potential consequences are much larger for one group than 
for the other, analysing the experiences of all three groups of Palestinians showed 
the important role of the checkpoints as powerful instruments in the architecture 
of occupation, in which arbitrariness is used as a tool to create the conditions for 
the daily exercise of sovereign power over Palestinians with all three ID cards. 
Furthermore, joining these settlers on their checkpoint passages, and seeing the 
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stark contrast between their checkpoint passages and the checkpoint passages of 
Palestinians allowed me to analyse the car checkpoints as spaces where two 
opposing regimes of mobility came together, as well as the important impact 
settlers had on the spatial design of these checkpoints. These processes take place 
at many border-crossing sites in the world (see, for instance, Jones, 2009; Vaughan-
Williams, 2010) and, my research project shows how insightful it can be to focus on 
the experiences of commuters with different levels of freedom of movement when 
studying these contexts. While the experiences of the least mobile group may seem 
the most important when investigating unjust bordering regimes, a more in-depth 
understanding of these bordering processes can be created by including the 
experiences of groups with more freedom of movement in the analysis. 
A fourth gap I aimed to address with this research project was a focus on three 
checkpoints that had not been analysed previously in academia.70 These three 
checkpoints are important within the architecture of occupation due to their 
locations on key routes and the large numbers of commuters having to pass 
through them. Furthermore, focusing on these checkpoints meant researching 
checkpoints that were not characterised by spectacular violence. Actually, many of 
the mornings in which I observed Checkpoint 300 and most of the times I passed 
through The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints were uneventful. However, again 
showing the importance of long extended periods of observations, uneventful 
observations are also insightful. Passing through checkpoints is often a boring 
exercise and analysing these boring mornings provides insights into the functioning 
                                                 
70 Since I started with this PhD project, one other publication has come out that focused on 
Checkpoint 300 by Mark Griffiths and Jemima Repo (2018). In this article, they analyse 
Checkpoint 300 as a biopolitical technology aimed at ordering and managing the lives of 
Palestinians. Chapter 5 of this thesis, ‘Checkpoint 300: precarious checkpoint geographies 
and rights/rites of passage in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’, was published in the 
same issue of the journal Political Geography as the article written by Griffiths and Repo. In 
the fourth chapter of this thesis, titled Inside Checkpoint 300: Checkpoint regimes as spatial 
political technologies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, I have engaged more explicitly 
with the work of Griffiths and Repo. 
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of the checkpoints not as sites of explosive violence but, rather, as sites where one 
can study oppression in everyday life and its subtle expressions of violence. 
Furthermore, once in a while, and one can never know when or why, a checkpoint 
passage is eventful, spectacular and explicitly violent. This may be because of 
‘newsworthy’ events such as extremely long waiting times or the death of a 
commuter, but also because of less obvious things, such as a tense interaction with 
a checkpoint manager or a machine that refuses to let someone pass. As such, 
these checkpoints still determine in explicit and extreme ways the lives of the 
commuters subjected to them – which is precisely due to the lack of predictability 
regarding the occurrence of these types of eventful and violent passages. To recall 
54-year-old Samira’s words: “You never have a sense of control (…). When driving 
through the checkpoint it feels like there is a break... There are two pieces of time: 
the time before and the time after. And you cannot connect these two” (interview, 
22 May 2017).  
Recently, the media have depicted numerous examples of ‘outrageous’ border 
practices: the images of the bodies of desperate refugees who have drowned when 
trying to reach the safety of the European Union (Tondo, 2019) or the US 
(Aljazeera.com, 2019b), the stories of children torn from the arms of their parents 
and kept in cages by the US Border Patrol on the US-Mexico border 
(theguardian.com, 2018), and reports of the over 5,000 unarmed Gazans being shot 
by Israeli soldiers for coming ‘too close’ to the fence separating the Gaza Strip from 
Israel during the first seven months of the Gaza border protests against the siege of 
Gaza (b’tselem.org, 2018b). It is incredibly important to analyse these shocking 
bordering practices, and, as such, expose these horrific expressions of state 
violence (see, amongst others, Kovras & Robins, 2017; Topak, 2014; Van Houtum, 
2010; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Adding to the analyses of these extreme bordering 
practices, with this thesis I hope to demonstrate that it is also important to 
investigate the less ‘newsworthy’ sites of state violence and militarised border 
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crossings, as these sites shed light on the less visible, but equally oppressive daily 
precarious geographies to which commuters are subjected.  
Lastly, I aimed to address a gap regarding the use of go-along interviews. This 
method has not been taken up on a large scale by geographers in research focused 
on checkpoints and the occupation in the Palestinian Territories, or on border 
crossings in other areas in the world – with the exception of the work of Mark 
Griffiths (2017) on ‘political tours’ in Hebron and Martin Doevenspeck (2011) on 
the border between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In my 
research project, this was an especially useful method since it allowed me to 
observe and experience the checkpoint passages with my interviewees. While in-
depth interviews provided me with the narratives of my interviewees regarding 
their engagements with checkpoints and the architecture of occupation in general, 
by passing through the checkpoints with them, I could observe their engagements 
directly. Using go-along interviews meant that I discussed and observed their 
routines with the interviewees – ranging from the time they had to leave their 
homes in the morning, the mode(s) of transportation they used and the routes they 
took. Furthermore, it allowed me to observe how the checkpoints engaged with 
their bodies, as well as with mine. However, it may not always be possible to use 
this method in research projects focused on militarised border crossings. This is 
because whether or not this method can be used is highly dependent upon the 
possibility of the researchers being able to pass through these crossings relatively 
freely and without putting their interviewees at risk. This may be one of the 
reasons for the lack of implementation of this method in these types of research 
projects, something Doevenspeck (2011) also reflects on briefly in light of his arrest 
by the Rwandan military during his fieldwork. However, if it is possible to use this 
method safely, it can prove to be especially insightful. 
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7.3: Limitations of this study and suggestions for future research 
The choices I have made with regards to the theoretical framework and the 
selection of data analysed also come with certain limitations. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, I was faced with several challenges during the fieldwork that have 
impacted this research project. This mostly concerned issues with regards to safety, 
the ability to find interviewees and to execute go-along interviews and checkpoint 
observations. Here, I wish to reflect upon the use of a biopolitical framework 
inspired by the work of Foucault, Agamben’s sovereign exception and suggest 
possible ideas for future research.  
Using a biopolitical framework inspired by the work of Foucault meant that I was 
able to analyse the checkpoints as selective openings in a system of enclosure and 
as important technologies of surveillance. It also allowed me to investigate the use 
of biopolitical categories by the checkpoint managers to selectively limit the 
movement of Palestinians. This could be further developed through a critical in-
depth analysis of the permit system. While the permit system is an essential part of 
the regime that controls the mobility of Palestinians in the West Bank, my in-depth 
analysis of three checkpoints did not allow me to also include an analysis of the 
permit regime. The permit regime has not been the subject of many other 
academic studies (Parizot, 2018). Cédric Parizot (2018) explained this by pointing to 
the lack of transparency and written rules in the permit system (p. 22). However, 
this lack of transparency itself is important to study as part of the oppressive 
nature of the permit system for Palestinians. It is the lack of transparency and of 
written rules that ensures that Palestinians cannot know what to expect when they 
apply for a permit, how they are expected to behave to ensure they will receive a 
permit, or why they have been blacklisted. Important work that illustrates the 
complex and opaque workings of the permit system has been done by researchers 
working for NGOs or as legal advisors (Berda, 2018; Bocco, 2015; Etkes, 2011; 
Gisha, 2011; Kadman, 2012; Piterman, 2007). An in-depth study of the permit 
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system with a theoretical framework based on the work of Foucault and Agamben 
could provide important insights into the workings of the checkpoints’ regime and 
into the unsanctioned exercise of sovereign power by Israeli forces and the 
structural occurrence of arbitrariness in the process of applying for and receiving a 
permit, as well as in the checkpoint passages.  
Furthermore, the decision to use a biopolitical framework also meant that I did not 
focus on other factors that influence the checkpoints which could have been 
included with the use of, for instance, affective geographies or more-than-human 
geographies/Science and Technology Studies (STS). As such, for future research, the 
study of checkpoints could be further developed by an in-depth, critical analysis of 
the affective interactions at the checkpoints between commuters and checkpoint 
managers, but also between commuters and machines.  
The inclusion of Agamben’s sovereign exception to this study meant that I could 
critically analyse the occurrence of arbitrariness in the checkpoints, something all 
my Palestinian interviewees mentioned as one of the most important 
characteristics of the checkpoints’ regime. Instead of seeing the arbitrariness only 
as a by-product of the checkpoints’ workings, Agamben’s work allowed me to 
analyse these arbitrary workings of the checkpoints as neither accidental nor 
incidental but, rather, as inherent to their spatial regime and an expression of the 
sovereign exception. A more in-depth engagement with the work of Agamben 
could be insightful for further research focused on checkpoints. While I chose to 
specifically engage with Agamben’s concept of the sovereign exception, other 
(related) concepts of Agamben, such as ‘the ban’, could provide further important 
insights into the workings of the checkpoints (see, for instance, Minca, 2007, 2011, 
2017; Minca & Rowan, 2015, and Minca & Vaughan-Williams, 2012).  
I have positioned this research project explicitly within the academic discussions 
regarding the occupation of the Palestinian Territories and Israel’s architecture of 
occupation. This decision was based on the fact that these academic debates are 
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well established, rich in quality and there are many factors that speak to the unique 
nature of the occupation of the Palestinian Territories. However, I believe that my 
research project also speaks to the broader academic debates in the fields of 
political geography, political science, critical international relations and border 
studies concerning walling and militarised border crossings, as I have tried to 
indicate in this concluding chapter. While the context of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories is in many ways unique, the insights taken from this thesis could prove 
to be useful when studying checkpoints and militarised border crossings elsewhere 
in the world. For instance, as this study has shown, analysing checkpoints and/or 
militarised border crossings as the outcome of the various interactions between 
their managers, machines and commuters can provide insights into their endless 
interplay and into the diverse ways in which commuters engage with the 
checkpoints’/border crossings’ regimes. Moreover, by analysing arbitrariness as 
neither accidental nor incidental but, rather, as inherent to the spatial regime of 
the checkpoints/border crossings and an expression of the sovereign exception, the 
workings of this exception and the coping mechanisms of the commuters can be 
studied as a part of the same regime of power.  
Furthermore, in the analysis, I have foregrounded the experiences of Palestinian 
commuters passing through the checkpoints. While I have included the experiences 
of Jewish settlers in this study, their experiences do not receive the same amount 
of attention as the experiences of the Palestinian commuters do. Firstly, my focus 
on Checkpoint 300, a checkpoint that is not used by Jewish settlers, in two 
empirical chapters in this thesis meant that I excluded Jewish settlers from these 
chapters. Secondly, while Jewish settlers did use the two other checkpoints I 
analysed, I experienced difficulties with trying to find Jewish settlers willing to be 
interviewed. However, with the data I was able to collect on their checkpoint 
passages I could include the experiences of the Jewish settlers in the study to 
further understand the checkpoints’ regime by comparing the fluid and fast 
movement of the settlers with the slow and laboured movement of Palestinians. As 
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such, by including the experiences of Jewish settlers I was able to show the 
injustice that is inherent to the checkpoint regime and the role that the Jewish 
settlers play in this. In a further line of enquiry, the checkpoint experiences of 
Jewish settlers could be studied in more depth by foregrounding their experiences 
and the influence they have on the checkpoints, but also by including, for instance, 
settlers living in settlements that are located deeper inside the West Bank.  
I also decided to solely focus on the experiences of Palestinians who pass through 
the checkpoints, although the checkpoint regime and architecture of occupation in 
general also highly affects the lives of Palestinians who do not pass through the 
checkpoints, because they are unable to, they decide not to or because they bypass 
the checkpoints and enter Israel illegally. Adding to this, I have also decided not to 
interview the family members of the commuters who pass through the checkpoints 
and the effects this has on their family lives (see, for instance, Griffiths & Repo, 
2018). Studies focused on these experiences can add to a broader understanding of 
the architecture of occupation and the impacts of the checkpoints in Palestinian 
society.  
The limited space and focus of a thesis also meant that I had to exclude certain 
data from the analysis. This was the case with data that concerned the checkpoint 
passages. I have analysed gender as a biopolitical category employed by the Israeli 
soldiers/private security guards and reproduced and/or challenged by the 
Palestinian commuters. For a deeper analysis of the gendered experiences of the 
commuters passing through the checkpoints, see, for instance, the insightful work 
of Rema Hammami (2019), Hagar Kotef (2011), Hagar Kotef and Merav Amir (2007), 
Daniela Mansbach (2012) and Julie Peteet (2017).  
I also had a lot of interesting data on the more general architecture of occupation 
that I did not include here. This is especially the case with regards to the different 
ways people experienced their freedom of movement in Areas A, B and C. The 
borders between these areas are, for instance, not always visibly displayed, but 
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known to most residents. While the large majority of the Jewish settlers I 
interviewed avoided entering Area A, my Palestinian interviewees regularly crossed 
the boundaries between the different administrative zones. These ‘border 
crossings’ highly affected their behaviour on the road. For instance, when driving 
from Area B or C into Area A, this is immediately clear because most Palestinian 
commuters will unbuckle their seatbelt, while, by contrast, an unknown foreigner is 
immediately told to buckle her seatbelt when bypassing the (at times) invisible 
border that separates Area A from areas B and C. My Palestinian interviewees 
explained this act of unbuckling one’s seatbelt when entering Area A; they argued 
that the Israeli police focused on giving fines to Palestinian commuters in Areas B 
and C – especially to those easily identifiable in a car with a Palestinian license 
plate. In Area A, the Palestinian police in charge did not fine motorists breaking the 
law as consistently. The significance of the seatbelt in this scenario remains unclear 
to me: does unbuckling one’s seatbelt at the exact moment in which the car passes 
into Area A represent the freedom to decide whether or not to buckle it? Or 
perhaps the unwillingness to adhere to Israeli rules and regulations? Further 
research into these types of ‘bordering practices’ could address these kinds of 
questions. The different administrative zones also impacted the lives of people 
living in the West Bank in many other ways, such as the fact that some Palestinian 
mobile phone cards do not work properly in Area C or that one can only connect to 
a 3G network when close to a Jewish settlement. The research that I present here is 
solely focused on border checkpoints, but it could be further developed with an in-
depth analysis of these ‘internal border crossings’ (see, for instance, Handel, 2009). 
 
7.4: “Aren’t we Palestinians lucky?” - Checkpoint 300, May 2019 
In conclusion, I would like to return to where it all started for me: Checkpoint 300 
in Bethlehem. When I left Bethlehem in June 2017, I did not expect to return 
before finishing this PhD project. I had collected enough data to write the thesis 
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and should have focussed on doing exactly that: writing the thing. When I left in 
2017, a big sign had been posted at the checkpoint. It was all in Hebrew and 
seemed to suggest some renovations. I asked around, but my contacts were all 
quite unsure about what it meant. In May 2018, I heard from a friend living in 
Bethlehem that Checkpoint 300 had started to change quite dramatically. I soon 
decided that I wanted to see the ‘new’ Checkpoint 300 before I submitted my 
thesis, my curiosity overtaking my practical reservations against going on a 
‘fieldwork trip’ right before submission. The trip proved worthwhile: 
 
Bethlehem, Monday 6 May 2019, 11am. When I walk up to Checkpoint 300 
everything seems normal. The extra barriers that will be used on Fridays 
during Ramadan have already been installed and the ‘checkpoint 
economy’ is active as usual. When approaching the checkpoint, I can see a 
large building that has been built on the other side of the Wall, dwarfing 
the Wall: the new checkpoint. The long tunnel that used to lead to the 
entrance of the checkpoint is blocked and three new openings have been 
created in the Wall. I enter the one that has a sign that says ‘entrance’ (see 
Figure 7.1) and I am confronted with two turnstiles. 
The ceiling of this hallway is very high – I am indeed inside the building 
that is dwarfing the Wall. There are no soldiers in sight. There is a sign that 
says: ‘Welcome to the Rachel’s Tomb Crossing’, one of the alternative 
names the Israeli army uses for Checkpoint 300 (see Figure 7.2). The 
checkpoint seems empty. I hesitantly move forward; it feels strange to 
enter this completely unfamiliar place. 
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Figure 7.1: The new entrance of Checkpoint 300 (source: Rijke, May 2019). 
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Figure 7.2: ‘Welcome to Rachel’s Tomb crossing’ (source: Rijke, May 2019). 
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After pushing against one of the turnstiles I enter a long hallway that is 
filled with music! Yes, music! Arabic music, to be precise. I walk up the 
hallway and see where the music is coming from: there are two TV sets 
that are blaring loud music while playing a clip in which the use of the new 
biometric scanners is illustrated, the so-called ‘speed gates’. I am 
flabbergasted. Music and video clips inside Checkpoint 300! The terminal 
checkpoints have often been compared to airports and this comparison 
has never been as adequate as it is right now. This clip looks exactly like a 
clip that could be used in Schiphol Airport to explain the passport scanners 
(see Figure 7.3).  
 
 
Figure 7.3: The ‘speed gate’ clip (source: Rijke, May 2019). 
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I continue and I feel unsure about how to move forward. There are two 
large doors that lead to another corridor with four double doors. They all 
seem closed. There are no indications of where I should go and due to my 
horrible sense of direction – I have the ability to get lost in my own 
neighbourhood – I am completely disorientated. I must be on the former 
parking lot? I try one of the doors. It does not open. While standing there, 
a Palestinian man walks up behind me and pushes against another door. It 
is also closed. We try the third and get lucky, it opens. There are no lights 
or any form of signage to know which door would be open – one has to 
push against the door to find out. Walking through the third door I am 
finally back in familiar territory – we are in the hall with the metal 
detectors. But there are considerably more metal detectors now. Eight 
instead of three! The rooms with the initial three metal detectors have 
been made smaller and new metal detectors have been added. I see that 
the light on top of one of the turnstiles is green, so I push against it. It does 
not move. The man and I try several turnstiles until we find one that is 
active. The lights on top of this turnstile are off. I guess the issue of the 
malfunctioning lights has not been addressed yet. After passing through 
the turnstile, I see two Israeli soldiers sitting inside a booth next to the 
metal detector and X-ray machine. I realise that these are the first Israelis I 
have met so far – in the first sections of the checkpoint I have only seen 
cameras. I walk through the metal detector, which remains silent and pass 
through another turnstile.  
Here, I stand still for a moment to take in what I see in front of me. There 
is a large sign that says ‘for biometric card holders only’ in English, and also 
something in Hebrew and Arabic – I assume it reads the same. There are 
large Israeli flags everywhere (see Figure 7.4). This is probably related to 
the Israeli ‘independence day’ that is celebrated every year in May – an 
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event that is commemorated by Palestinians as the Nakba day. But it could 
also be a new way to ‘decorate’ the checkpoint? 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Israeli flags inside Checkpoint 300 (source: Rijke, May 2019). 
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There are three openings underneath the sign that have hand and face 
scanners, similar to a type of passport scanners I have seen in some 
airports. Next to these three openings there is a fourth opening with a 
booth with a soldier. Since I do not hold a biometric card, I queue for the 
booth. There is a short queue and there are private security guards 
observing from the other side of the scanners. There are Palestinian men 
passing through the biometric card readers. I have never seen this type of 
scanner work as fast as this at the airport. The Palestinian men put their 
card on the scanner, look in the camera and a few seconds later they can 
pass. Are these better scanners? Or perhaps less accurate? While I am 
waiting to get to the front of the queue (the foreigners and Israeli ID 
card/Jerusalem ID holders who cannot use the biometric scanners are now 
the slower commuters!), I also see that the machines often seem to stop 
working. The Palestinian men who are trying to pass through the biometric 
card readers then turn to another machine and I see several of them walk 
continuously back and forth between the machines. They seem confused, 
and I am confused, too. This does not seem very efficient. Perhaps this 
‘malfunctioning of the machines’ is happening because these machines are 
still new? Or maybe there is a disconnect between the machines and the 
commuters? Or, instead, these ‘malfunctioning machines’ ensure that the 
functioning of the checkpoint remains unpredictable? Or all of the above? 
I get to the front of the queue. The soldier glances at my passport and 
gestures that I can pass, quickly as always; I do not have to provide any 
biometric data. I try to linger a bit to continue observing the machines but 
one of the private security guards is glaring at me in a rather intimidating 
way, so I exit the checkpoint – bypassing many more gates with biometric 
scanning devices and large Israeli flags (see Figure 7.4).  
(fieldnotes, 6 May 2019) 
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I had expected Checkpoint 300 to look different, but I was surprised to see how 
drastically it had changed. As I described in Chapters 1 and 5, the spatial design of 
the terminal checkpoints was based on the intention to minimise the encounters 
between Palestinian commuters and Israeli forces by placing numerous machines in 
between them. In the old Checkpoint 300, the checkpoint managers were still 
visibly present throughout the whole checkpoint and many of my observations of 
the workings of the checkpoint included tense interactions between Palestinian 
commuters and these managers. In the new Checkpoint 300, the soldiers seem to 
have disappeared in large sections of the checkpoint. The managing of the 
turnstiles is now done from a distance and the scanning device now checks (some 
of) the permits. I wonder if the arbitrary functioning of the machines still plays such 
a major role as it did before Checkpoint 300 was renovated. The malfunctioning of 
the lights on top of the turnstiles and the scanning devices does seem to suggest 
this.  
Some of the people with whom I spoke said that the checkpoint was much faster 
now. A few days after my first encounter with the new Checkpoint 300, I went 
there early in the morning for a more systematic observation. When I saw 20-year-
old Abdel, a merchant who sells produce at the checkpoint and has always been 
happy to chat with me throughout the years, he joked to me that our hard days in 
Checkpoint 300 were over. We were joined this morning by two Scandinavian 
women of the EAPPI and Abdel seemed proud to tell them that I had experienced 
the horrible mornings in the old checkpoint, that I knew ‘the real checkpoint’, 
something they would not be able to experience. And indeed, this morning passage 
through Checkpoint 300 was smooth and quick.  
Does this make it ‘better’? Can we speak of a checkpoint as something that can be 
‘better’, when it has been put on Palestinian land by the Israeli state? Should we 
assess the ‘functionality’ of these type of technologies when they have been 
implemented by an occupying force? When I discussed the new checkpoint with a 
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Palestinian friend of mine, she rolled her eyes and asked me, sarcastically, ‘Aren’t 
we Palestinians lucky?’. She continued on and argued that these are especially 
dangerous times. As she explained, Palestinians in the West Bank have internalised 
the occupation and stopped resisting it. The occupation has thus been normalised, 
and these checkpoints, with their concrete walls, scanning devices and large Israeli 
flags, are a part of this. I cannot help but think that she is right. Perhaps there will 
not be as many awful mornings at the checkpoint as there were before the 
renovations. However, I do not believe that the means for the exercise of sovereign 
power – the implementation of violence, arbitrariness and malfunctioning 
machines – have disappeared. These elements will only be more subtle and less 
visible from now on. As such, I would argue that the ‘new’ checkpoint actually 
further enshrines and legitimises the Israeli control of the Palestinian Territories, 
and its violence and injustice – a process already started with the introduction of 
the terminal checkpoints in 2005. As Hagar Kotef and Merav Amir stated in 2007, 
the design of the terminal checkpoints “reinforce[s] the illusion that they are 
normal sites marking the border between two sovereign entities and concealing 
the fact that Israeli rule applies on both sides of the terminal” (p. 982). While the 
terminal checkpoints had been designed in such a way that machines were placed 
in between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian commuters, in the old Checkpoint 300 
there were still regular tense interactions between commuters and heavily armed 
soldiers and/or private security guards. As such, I always thought that the aim of 
the Israeli army to ‘take the army out of the checkpoints’ would not be met. 
However, the new Checkpoint 300 does seem to live up to these ‘promises’ of the 
Israeli army. Checkpoint 300 now looks like an actual ‘border crossing’ (Kotef & 
Amir, 2007, p. 982).71 Due to this, their violence is less easily witnessed or 
documented than it was before and, as such, these checkpoints work towards 
making their own presence, and the occupation in general, the normal state of 
                                                 
71 The other terminal checkpoints seem to have been renovated as well: I visited Qalandiya 
Checkpoint in May 2019 and it had been renovated in a similar way. 
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things. However, in this process the role played by checkpoints in the architecture 
of occupation has remained the same: to produce a set of selective, arbitrary, 
unjust and mutable geographies of mobility. 
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Appendix 1 
Interviewees 
 
# Pales.72/ 
Jewish 
Israel 
Gender Hometown Age ID card Type of 
interview 
#  
interviews 
1 Pales. Female Bethlehem 65 West 
Bank ID 
Go-along 
interview 
1 
2 Pales.  Female Ramallah 27 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
3 Pales. Female Beit Jala 21 Israeli ID In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
4 Pales. Female  Beit Jala 47 Israeli ID In-depth 
& go-
along 
1 
5 Pales. Male Al Khader 56 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
3 
6 Pales. Female Al Khader 52 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
3 
7 Pales. Male Jab’a 73 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth  1 
8 Pales. Male Jab’a 47 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 1 
9 Pales. Male Jab’a 45 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 1 
10 Pales. Male  Jab’a 21 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 1 
11 Pales. Female Bethlehem 54 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
5 
12 Pales. Male  Al Walaja 54 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth  1 
13 Pales. Male  Al Walaja 57 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 1 
                                                 
72 Pales. = Palestinian 
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14 Pales. Male Al Walaja 62 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth  1 
15 Pales. Female Bethlehem 58 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 1 
16 Pales. Female Bethlehem 62 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
17 Pales. Female  Bethlehem 64 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
18 Pales. Male  Al Walaja 57 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
3 
19 Pales. Female  Bir Ouna 28 Jerusalem 
ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
20 Pales. Male Bir Ouna 30 Jerusalem 
ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
21 Pales. Male Beit Jala 54 Israeli ID In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
22 Pales. Female  Jerusalem 54 Jerusalem 
ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
3 
23 Pales. Male Bethlehem 27 Jerusalem 
ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
24 Pales. Male Nahaleen 46 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 1 
25 Pales. Male Bethlehem 46 West 
Bank ID 
In-depth 
& go-
along 
4 
26 Jewish 
Israeli  
Female Har Gilo  42 Israeli ID In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
27 Jewish 
Israeli 
Female Har Gilo 44 Israeli ID In-depth 
& go-
along 
3 
28 Jewish 
Israeli 
Female Har Gilo 41 Israeli ID In-depth 
& go-
along 
3 
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29 Jewish 
Israeli 
Female Har Gilo 25 Israeli ID In-depth  1 
30 Jewish 
Israeli 
Male Har Gilo 46 Israeli ID In-depth 
& go-
along 
3 
31 Jewish 
Israeli 
Male Har Gilo 64 Israeli ID In-depth  2 
32 Jewish 
Israeli 
Female Har Gilo 43 Israeli ID In-depth 
& go-
along 
2 
33 Jewish 
Israeli 
Female Har Gilo 53 Israeli ID In-depth 1 
34 Jewish 
Israeli 
Female Har Gilo 62 Israeli ID In-depth  1 
35 Jewish 
Israeli 
Male Har Gilo 55 Israeli ID In-depth  1 
36 Jewish 
Israeli 
Female  Har Gilo 54 Israeli ID In-depth 1 
37 Jewish 
Israeli 
Male Jerusalem 52 Israeli ID In-depth 1 
38 Jewish 
Israeli 
Female Jerusalem 84 Israeli ID In-depth 1 
39 Jewish 
Israeli 
Female Jerusalem 71 Israeli ID In-depth 1 
40 New 
Zealand 
Male Bethlehem 63 Foreign 
passport 
In-depth 1 
41 NL73 Male Bethlehem 57 Foreign 
passport 
In-depth 1 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 The Netherlands 
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Appendix 2 
Topic list used during in-depth interviews 
 
Background information (home town/city/settlement, age, profession, short family 
history)  
Discuss route taken in daily life 
- why travel/where to/how often 
  - route taken – which checkpoint used? Why? Has this changed? 
Why? 
Discuss main checkpoints  
- how does interviewee see them?  
- how has this changed? 
Interaction with barriers more in general – how did this develop through the years 
  - How? When? What do you do? 
- Checkpoints 
  - Wall 
  - Settler highway 
  - Settlements 
  - Palestinian towns/Area A 
  - Other barriers? 
Palestinian interviewee 
 Type of permit? 
 Interaction with soldiers/private security guards  
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Settler interviewee or Palestinian with Israeli/Jerusalem ID 
 Ever stopped at checkpoint? 
 Who gets stopped? Why?  
 Interaction soldiers/private security guards 
Go-along interview 
 What route would we take? 
 Make an appointment 
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Appendix 3 
Codes used in Atlas.ti 
 
Code Times 
used 
Code Times 
used 
Code Times 
used 
(lack of) 
Knowledge 
environment 
 
76 (lack of)  
Knowledge  
permit system  
and checkpoints 
 
78 Activism/ 
Demonstrati
on 
 
8 
Age 
checkpoint 
 
13 Al Walaja 
 
24 Al Walaja 
road 
 
55 
Arab towns 
 
7 Arab vs 
Palestinian 
 
8 Arab 
workers 
 
21 
Arbitrariness 
checkpoints 
 
71 Arbitrariness 
occupation 
 
39 Area A 
 
29 
Area C 37 Army base on  
Har Gilo 
4 Banksy 
 
4 
Barriers 
 
107 Behaviour  
soldiers  
checkpoint 
 
112 Being ready 
for attack 
 
20 
Beit Jala 
 
64 Bethlehem 
 
13 Blacklisting 
 
13 
Border 
 
26 Bus from 300 
to Jerusalem 
 
6 Busy traffic 
 
26 
Checkpoint 
 
172 Checkpoint 300 191 Checkpoint 
al Walaja 
 
14 
Checkpoint 
Beit Sahour 
 
8 Checkpoint closed 
 
9 Checkpoint 
Container 
 
8 
Checkpoint 
Qalandiya 
 
33 Checkpoint the 
Tunnels 
 
74 Circle of 
Death 
 
23 
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Confusion 
checkpoint 
 
25 Construction 
Checkpoint 300 
 
6 Costs 
transportati
on 
 
7 
Cutting in 
line at 
checkpoint 
 
28 Data collection  
by Israel 
 
8 Delay due to 
checkpoint 
 
59 
Dreams 2 Driving yellow  
plate 
 
11 Effects 
checkpoints 
 
35 
Effects 
occupation 
 
119 Effects Wall and 
settlements on 
Palestinians 
 
46 Elor Azaria 
 
1 
Entering 
Israeli space 
 
5 Entering 
Palestinian space 
 
53 Entering 
settlement 
 
17 
Ethnic 
profiling 
 
37 Fear/Lack of fear 
 
274 Feelings 
about 
checkpoints 
 
35 
Feelings 
about 
Israel/Israeli
s 
 
21 Feelings about 
settlement/ 
settlers 
83 Feelings 
about the 
Wall 
5 
Feelings 
inside 
checkpoint 
30 Feelings on  
the road 
 
84 First Intifada 
 
14 
Following  
the rules 
 
48 Food checkpoints 
 
5 Freedom of 
movement 
 
115 
Frequency 
route taken 
21 Future Israel-
Palestine 
54 Gender 
 
60 
General 
history 
 
53 Going by car 
through 
checkpoint 
 
38 Going to 
diner Beit 
Jala 
 
6 
Graffiti 
 
1 Gutz Etsion 
 
47 Har Gilo 
 
19 
Hebron 
 
7 Hijab 
 
10 History Har 
Gilo 
44 
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Hole in the 
wall 
 
20 House demolitions 
 
7 How to 
behave 
 in a 
checkpoint 
 
59 
How to 
recognize  
an Arab/ 
Jew 
 
65 Humanitarian line 
 
41 ID card 
 
64 
Illegally 
crossing 
 
62 Illegally working 
 
3 Incident 
 
132 
Interaction 
Arab-Jew 
 
180 Interaction 
soldiers 
 
107 International
/ 
Israeli 
presence 
checkpoints 
 
22 
Jerusalem 
 
28 Lack of light 
 
16 Landscape 
 
33 
Language 
 
17 Language in 
checkpoint 
 
28 Lawlessness 
due to 
occupation 
 
18 
Lights 
turnstiles 
checkpoint 
 
5 Magnetic card 
 
7 Materiality 
barriers 
16 
Materiality 
checkpoint 
 
51 Materiality wall 
 
11 Me: 
Confusion 
occupation 
 
26 
Me: Effect  
my 
presence 
has 
 
4 Me: Entering Har 
Gilo 
 
9 Me: Feelings 
Go-Along 
 
31 
Me: Feelings 
inside 
checkpoint 
 
38 Me: Feelings 
interview 
 
20 Me: 
Interaction 
soldiers/ 
Israelis 
 
7 
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Me:  
Language 
interview 
 
22 Me: My behaviour 
in checkpoint 
18 Me: My 
feelings 
 
99 
Me: Time 
route 
 
9 Me: Travelling 
around 
 
26 Metal 
detectors 
 
34 
Military 
presence 
 
63 Mixed space 
 
6 Mixed 
versus non-
mixed 
spaces 
 
16 
Mode of 
transport 
 
34 Monkeys/ 
Spidermen 
 
8 Mood  
soldiers 
 
30 
Muezzin 
 
3 Muslim versus 
Christian 
Palestinians 
 
33 New - old 
residents  
Har Gilo 
 
7 
Noise 
 
10 Old exit Har Gilo 
 
6 Only 7 
minutes to 
Malha 
 
2 
Permits 
 
105 Personal history 
 
167 Personal 
 info 
 
40 
Physical 
discomfort 
checkpoint 
13 Picture taken  
Go-Along 
 
4 Pictures 
checkpoint 
 
8 
Plastic 
windows 
 
4 Private security  
at checkpoint 
 
31 Problems 
with phones 
8 
Ramadan 
 
45 Restrictions 
Palestinians 
 
78 Road 
closures 
 
27 
Route  
chosen 
 
91 Route taken  
during Go-Along 
 
33 Sadness 
 
19 
Second 
Intifada 
 
25 Security car  
 
 
1 Security 
guards Har 
Gilo 
 
13 
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Separation 
Israeli from 
Palestinian 
space 
 
2 Settlements 9 Settler 
violence 
 
7 
Settlers 
 
1 Shopping Beit Jala 
 
7 Size West 
Bank 
 
1 
Sticker Har 
Gilo 
 
7 Strategy how to 
deal with fear 
 
63 Strategy  
how to  
deal with 
insecurity  
due to  
barriers 
 
55 
Strategy  
how to  
deal with 
occupation 
 
55 Style of driving 
 
18 The Tunnels 
 
48 
Third 
Intifada 
 
57 Time Go-Along 
 
20 Time route 
taken 
 
40 
Translator 
 
29 Urgency 
checkpoint 
 
8 Visa 
 
3 
Wall 
 
83 Wall/No Wall Efrat 
 
7 War on Gaza 
 
1 
Warning  
from 
security 
guards 
 
5 What can(not) be 
seen 
 
17 What you  
can hear  
but cannot 
 see 
 
5 
Work in  
Israel 
 
36 Work in 
settlement 
 
16   
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Summary 
 
When the Israeli state occupied the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip) in 1967, it gradually put restrictions on Palestinian movement in place. At 
first, Palestinians could easily circumvent these, but in the last 50 years these 
restrictions have become an intricate multi-layered ‘architecture of occupation’ 
that includes the Wall, no-go military areas, fences, numerous illegal Jewish 
settlements and their related bypass roads, and an elaborate checkpoint system. 
This architecture of occupation fragments the border between Israeli and 
Palestinian territories into a multitude of ever-changing borders and contributes to 
a series of geographical practices aimed at controlling the daily lives of Palestinians. 
As a consequence, many Palestinians and Jewish settlers cannot avoid passing 
through an Israeli checkpoint on their way to work, school, family or their place of 
worship. Although the checkpoints are key sites where the impact of the 
architecture of occupation is felt on a daily basis, the experiences of Palestinians 
and Jewish settlers at these sites have been the focus of a relatively limited number 
of research projects. In this thesis, I aim to address this gap by analysing how 
checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories function as spatial political 
technologies that produce arbitrary, selective and mutable geographies of mobility.  
In Chapter 1, I elaborate upon the context in which this research took place, 
introduce the research questions and reflect upon the intended academic 
contributions of this PhD project. In Chapter 2, I introduce my theoretical 
framework, which is largely informed by Michel Foucault’s biopolitics and Giorgio 
Agamben’s sovereign exception. Inspired by the work of Foucault, I frame 
checkpoints as political technologies, made up of specific practices and techniques 
aimed at organising the bodies subjected to them. This means that I focus on the 
interplay of human and non-human interactions, and on the daily experiences of 
the commuters subjected to them. Furthermore, following the insightful work of 
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Minca (2015a) and Katz, Martin and Minca (2018), I have added a spatial dimension 
by analysing checkpoints as spatial political technologies producing a set of 
selective, arbitrary and mutable geographies of mobility. The addition of 
Agamben’s sovereign exception allows me to investigate randomness and 
arbitrariness not as an unintentional by-product of the checkpoints, but as inherent 
to their spatial regime and as an expression of the sovereign exception. As such, I 
analyse the workings of the sovereign exception and the coping mechanisms of 
Palestinian commuters as part of the same spatial regime of power.  
Chapter 3 discusses the fieldwork that I conducted to collect the necessary data. I 
spent seven months in total collecting data in the Bethlehem area, in 2016, 2017 
and 2019. During these periods, I conducted in-depth interviews, go-along 
interviews and made extensive observations. I interviewed 36 Palestinians and 
Jewish settlers – most of them twice, some more often. In addition, I observed 
Checkpoint 300 up to eight hours each week, usually from 4:00 to 8:00 am during 
rush hour. This combination of methods allowed me to connect what my 
interviewees told me during the interviews to my observations of their checkpoint 
passages and the workings of the checkpoints in general. Furthermore, in Chapter 
3, I reflect upon the ethical issues related to my safety and that of the interviewees 
while collecting data in a militarised context, as well as my position as a researcher. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the limitations of this study. 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide an analysis of Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem. In Chapter 4, 
I discuss the specific design of Checkpoint 300 as a terminal checkpoint, with a 
focus on the roles played by some of its numerous machines: the turnstiles, metal 
detectors, x-ray machines, and fingerprint- and iris-scanning devices. While the 
Israeli army introduced these machines to ‘decrease the tension’ inside Checkpoint 
300, I describe how the checkpoint is still a place filled with tension. Moreover, I 
discuss the ways in which Palestinian commuters engage with the machines, 
reinforcing but also twisting some of their expected functions. In Chapter 5, I also 
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analyse Checkpoint 300, but with a focus on the use of biopolitical categories by 
the checkpoint managers and the Palestinian commuters, zooming in on ‘gender’, 
‘age’ and ‘ID card status’. In this chapter, I discuss how the checkpoint managers 
implement these categories. I indicate how these categories are tools that help 
create the conditions for the exercise of sovereign power – in which a checkpoint 
manager can decide ‘on the spot’ whether or not the rules and associated 
privileges of a certain category apply or are ignored. I, again, describe also how 
Palestinians adopt some of these categories and their associated privileges, while 
resisting others.  
In Chapter 6, I analyse The Tunnels and Al Walaja checkpoints. These are two car 
checkpoints in the Bethlehem area used by Palestinians with Jerusalem and Israeli 
ID cards and by Jewish settlers. These checkpoints bring together two opposed 
regimes of mobility: one aimed at providing smooth and fast checkpoint passages 
for Jewish settlers, the other aimed at stopping and checking Palestinians. These 
two aims can be simultaneously achieved because of the low-tech design of these 
checkpoints – there are almost no machines present. The soldiers employ several 
biopolitical categories when they decide which car to stop and which one to let 
pass unchallenged. In this chapter, I describe the use of two of these categories: 
‘Jewish versus Arab’ and ‘gender’. Similar to the use of these biopolitical categories 
in Checkpoint 300, these categories selectively limit Palestinian mobility, while 
Palestinian commuters incorporate part of the categories and their associated 
privileges, and redefine or resist others. 
This thesis concludes with Chapter 7. In this chapter I discuss the two main 
conclusions. Firstly, checkpoints are spatial political technologies that produce 
arbitrary, mutable and selective regimes of mobility. Secondly, checkpoints should 
be seen as the outcome of the endless interplay between its managers, biopolitical 
categories, material devices and procedures of control, on the one hand, and the 
commuters, on the other. I arrive at these conclusions by addressing the three 
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main research questions of this project: 1) how biopolitical categories are 
implemented in governing mobile Palestinian bodies; 2) which roles the machines 
and spatial arrangement of the checkpoints play in the checkpoint passages of the 
commuters; and 3) how Palestinian commuters engage with, reproduce, but also 
redefine and/or resist the workings of the checkpoints. Moreover, in this chapter I 
discuss the academic implications of this thesis. I specifically address the ways in 
which this research can contribute to the existing debates concerning 
Israel/Palestine, checkpoints and walling in political geography, but also the impact 
it may have on the broader debates about walling, bordering practices and mobility 
in political geography, border studies, political science and critical international 
relations. I also discuss some of the limitations of this study and suggest possible 
ideas for future research. Finally, I conclude the thesis by returning to Checkpoint 
300, which was relaunched as an even more ‘humane’ and ‘official border crossing’ 
in the period I was writing this thesis. I therefore end with a reflection on what this 
means with regards to the increased normalisation of the presence of checkpoints 
and the occupation of the Palestinian Territories in general.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Sinds Israël de Palestijnse gebieden (de Westelijke Jordaanoever en de Gazastrook) 
bezette in 1967 voerde het geleidelijk restricties in op de bewegingsvrijheid van 
Palestijnen. Waar Palestijnen deze restricties eerst nog relatief makkelijk konden 
omzeilen zijn deze de afgelopen 50 jaar ontwikkeld tot een complexe ‘architectuur 
van bezetting’. Onder deze architectuur vallen de Muur, verboden militaire 
gebieden, hekken, illegale joodse nederzettingen en hun wegen en een uitgebreid 
systeem van checkpoints. Deze architectuur van bezetting fragmenteert de grens 
tussen Israël en de Palestijnse gebieden in een mozaïek van steeds veranderende 
grenzen en is een van de tactieken van de Israëlische staat om het dagelijkse leven 
van Palestijnen te controleren. Een van consequenties hiervan is dat veel 
Palestijnen en Joodse kolonisten door een Israëlisch checkpoint heen moeten gaan 
op weg naar hun werk, school, familie of gebedshuizen. De ervaringen van 
Palestijnen en Joodse kolonisten met deze checkpoints zijn in relatief weinig 
wetenschappelijke studies onderzocht, ook al zijn deze checkpoints belangrijke 
plekken waar dagelijks de impact van de architectuur van bezetting gevoeld wordt. 
Als een reactie hierop analyseer ik in dit proefschrift checkpoints in de bezette 
Palestijnse Gebieden als ‘spatial political technologies’: technologieën die 
willekeurige, selectieve en veranderlijke geografieën van mobiliteit produceren.  
In Hoofdstuk 1 beschrijf ik de context waarin het onderzoek heeft plaatsgevonden, 
introduceer ik de onderzoeksvragen en reflecteer ik op de beoogde academische 
toegevoegde waarde die dit proefschrift kan hebben. In Hoofdstuk 2 introduceer ik 
het theoretisch raamwerk dat ik heb gebruikt. Deze is grotendeels gebaseerd op 
Foucault’s formulering van ‘biopolitics’ and Agamben’s ‘sovereign exception’. 
Geïnspireerd door het werk van Foucault analyseer ik checkpoints als ‘political 
technologies’: technologieën die bestaan uit specifieke praktijken en technieken 
gericht op het organiseren van bepaalde lichamen. Dit betekent dat ik mij 
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concentreer op het samenspel van menselijke en niet-menselijke interacties binnen 
de checkpoints, en de dagelijkse ervaringen van de forenzen die hieraan worden 
blootgesteld. Verder volg ik het werk van Minca (2015a) en Katz, Martin en Minca 
(2018), en heb ik een ruimtelijke dimensie toegevoegd aan de analyse van 
checkpoints as voornoemde ‘spatial political technologies’. Door de toevoeging van 
Agamben’s ‘sovereign exception’ kon ik bovendien de willekeur en 
onvoorspelbaarheid in het checkpoint analyseren als een inherente eigenschap van 
het ruimtelijke regime en dus niet als een ongewenst bijproduct. Hierdoor kon ik de 
werking van de sovereign exception en de strategieën van de Palestijnen om de 
checkpoints zo soepel mogelijk door te komen analyseren als onderdeel van 
hetzelfde ruimtelijke machtsregime.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik het veldwerk dat ik heb uitgevoerd om de nodige data 
te verzamelen. Ik heb in totaal 7 maanden doorgebracht in Bethlehem, in 2016, 
2017 en 2019. Gedurende deze periodes heb ik diepte-interviews en go-along 
interviews afgenomen en uitgebreide observaties uitgevoerd. Ik heb 36 Palestijnen 
en Joodse kolonisten geïnterviewd – de meesten tweemaal, sommigen vaker. 
Daarnaast heb ik Checkpoint 300 wekelijks minimaal acht uur geobserveerd, 
meestal gedurende de drukste uren van 4:00 tot 8:00 in de ochtend. Deze 
combinatie van methodes zorgde ervoor dat ik wat mijn respondenten mij 
vertelden kon koppelen aan wat ik zag tijdens mijn observaties. Verder reflecteer ik 
in Hoofdstuk 3 op de ethische vraagstukken die naar boven komen bij onderzoek in 
een conflictgebied en de veiligheid van mijn respondenten en mijzelf. Dit hoofdstuk 
sluit ik af met een bespreking van beperkingen die gepaard gaan met dit type 
veldwerk.  
Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 geven een analyse van Checkpoint 300 in Bethlehem. In 
Hoofdstuk 4 bespreek ik het specifieke ontwerp van het ‘terminal checkpoint’ 
Checkpoint 300, met een focus op de rol die de aanwezige machines spelen: de 
draaideuren, metaaldetectoren, röntgenapparaten en vingerafdruk- en 
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irisscanapparaten. Hoewel het Israëlische leger deze machines heeft 
geïntroduceerd om de spanning in Checkpoint 300 te verminderen, beschrijf ik hoe 
het checkpoint nog steeds een plaats is vol spanning. Bovendien bespreek ik de 
manieren waarop Palestijnse forenzen omgaan met de machines waardoor 
sommige van hun bedoelde functies worden versterkt, terwijl andere worden 
verdraaid. In Hoofdstuk 5 analyseer ik ook Checkpoint 300, maar met een focus op 
het gebruik van de biopolitieke categorieën ‘gender’, ‘leeftijd’ en ‘ID-kaart status’ 
door de checkpoint managers en de Palestijnse forenzen. In dit hoofdstuk bespreek 
ik hoe de checkpoint managers deze categorieën implementeren. Ik geef aan hoe 
deze categorieën hulpmiddelen zijn die helpen de voorwaarden te creëren voor de 
uitoefening van soevereine macht – waarin een checkpoint manager ter plaatse 
kan beslissen of de regels en bijbehorende privileges van een bepaalde categorie 
van toepassing zijn of worden genegeerd. Wederom beschrijf ik hoe Palestijnen 
hiermee omgaan; namelijk hoe zij zich in bepaalde gevallen de categorieën en de 
bijbehorende privileges eigen maken, en in andere gevallen zich hier juist tegen 
verzetten.  
In Hoofdstuk 6 analyseer ik The Tunnels en Al Walaja checkpoints. Dit zijn twee 
autocheckpoints in het Bethlehem-gebied die worden gebruikt door Palestijnen 
met Jeruzalem en Israëlische ID-kaarten en door Joodse kolonisten. Deze 
checkpoints brengen twee tegenovergestelde regimes van mobiliteit bij elkaar: één 
gericht op de soepele en snelle doorgang van Joodse kolonisten, de andere gericht 
op het stoppen en controleren van Palestijnen. Deze twee regimes kunnen 
tegelijkertijd bestaan vanwege het low-tech ontwerp van de checkpoints – er zijn 
bijna geen machines aanwezig. De soldaten maken gebruik van verschillende 
biopolitieke categorieën wanneer ze beslissen welke auto’s ze stoppen en welke ze 
door laten rijden. In dit hoofdstuk beschrijf ik het gebruik van twee van deze 
categorieën: 'Joods versus Arabisch' en 'gender'. Net als bij het gebruik van deze 
biopolitiek categorieën in Checkpoint 300, beperken deze categorieën selectief de 
mobiliteit van Palestijnse forenzen, terwijl deze zelf zich deze categorieën en de 
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bijbehorende privileges gedeeltelijk eigen maken, maar ook gedeeltelijk 
herdefiniëren of afwijzen.  
Dit proefschrift wordt afgesloten met Hoofdstuk 7. In dit hoofdstuk bespreek ik de 
twee belangrijkste conclusies: dat checkpoints ‘spatial political technologies’ zijn 
die willekeurig, veranderlijk en selectieve regimes van mobiliteit produceren; en 
dat checkpoints moeten worden gezien als het resultaat van het eindeloze 
samenspel tussen de managers, de forenzen, biopolitieke categorieën, materiële 
apparaten en controleprocedures. Ik kom tot deze conclusies door de drie 
belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen van dit project te behandelen. Ten eerste hoe 
biopolitieke categorieën worden geïmplementeerd om mobiele Palestijnse 
lichamen te besturen; ten tweede welke rollen de machines en de ruimtelijke 
ordening van de checkpoints spelen in de ervaringen van de forenzen; en ten derde 
hoe Palestijnse forenzen omgaan met de checkpoints, hoe ze bepaalde biopolitieke 
categorieën reproduceren en andere opnieuw definiëren en/of zich daartegen 
verzetten. Ook bespreek ik in dit hoofdstuk de academische implicaties van dit 
proefschrift. Ik ga specifiek in op de manieren waarop dit onderzoek kan bijdragen 
aan de bestaande debatten over Israël/Palestina, checkpoints en ‘walling’, de 
toename van grensafscheidingen, in politieke geografie, maar ook de impact die 
het proefschrift kan hebben op de bredere debatten over ‘walling’, grenzen en 
mobiliteit in politieke geografie, grenzenstudies, politicologie en (kritische) 
internationale betrekkingen. Ter besluit van dit proefschrift keer ik terug naar 
Checkpoint 300. Terwijl ik dit proefschrift aan het schrijven was, werd dit 
checkpoint opnieuw gelanceerd als een nog 'humanere' en 'officiëlere 
grensovergang'. Ik eindig daarom met een reflectie op wat dit betekent met 
betrekking tot het verder normaliseren van de aanwezigheid van checkpoints en de 
bezetting van de Palestijnse gebieden in het algemeen. 
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